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Resumen 
Esta tesis se presenta como un conjunto de artículos (ya publicados en revistas 
internacionales, con la excepción del Artículo 6) precedidos por una serie de capítulos 
introductorios. 
 
1. Introducción. Describe los puertos en relación al análisis del riesgo, al manejo de 
materias peligrosas (MMPP) y a leyes y convenciones internacionales relevantes. 
 
2. Análisis bibliográfico. Lista trabajos sobre materias peligrosas, vertidos de 
hidrocarburos y análisis del riesgo de accidentes portuarios, tocando varias técnicas de 
evaluación del riesgo. 
 
3. Objetivos y metodología. Esta capítulo define los objetivos de la investigación, es 
decir analizar los sistemas portuarios desde el punto de vista de la evaluación del riesgo 
de manipulación de MMPP y diseñar herramientas para evaluar dicho riesgo. Además 
se detallan la metodología empleada y los principales resultados para cada artículo 
incluido en la tesis. 
 
4. Conclusiones. 
 
Artículos 
 
Artículo 1 – A Survey of Accidents in Ports (Loss Prevention Bulletin, 183, pp. 23-
28, 2005). Presenta los resultados de un análisis histórico de 1033 accidentes, acerca de 
varios aspectos (tipo y causa de los accidentes, consecuencias sobre la población, etc.). 
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Artículo 2 – Predicting the Frequency of Accidents in Port Areas by Developing 
Event Trees from Historical Analysis (Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 16, pp. 551-560, 2003). Se utilizó el análisis histórico −sobre una muestra 
parecida a la del Artículo 1− identificando secuencias accidentales, es decir árboles de 
eventos generales. Se determinó a continuación la frecuencia de algún típico accidente 
portuario, demostrando que los árboles propuestos pueden utilizarse en el análisis 
cuantitativo del riesgo (ACR). 
 
Artículo 3 – Using Transportation Accident Databases to Investigate Ignition and 
Explosion Probabilities of Flammable Spills (Journal of Hazardous Materials, 
146(3), pp. 106-123, 2007). Se analiza la literatura especializada sobre probabilidad de 
ignición y explosión. Se presentan los resultados de la investigación de varias decenas 
de miles de registros accidentales procedentes de dos bases de datos de 
vertidos/accidentes de organismos federales estadounidenses. Se proponen ecuaciones 
para predecir la probabilidad de ignición y explosión a partir de la cantidad y de la 
sustancia vertida. 
 
Artículo 4 – A Quantitative Risk Analysis Approach to Port Hydrocarbon 
Logistics (J. Haz. Mat., 128(1), pp. 10-24). Se presenta un método para llevar a cabo 
ACRs de terminales de hidrocarburos, que tiene en cuenta vertidos menores y graves. 
Se propone una técnica simplificada para el cálculo de la frecuencia de los accidentes y 
se da un ejemplo de aplicación, basado en un estudio llevado a cabo en el Puerto de 
Barcelona. 
 
Artículo 5 – Consequences of Major Accidents: Assessing the Number of Injured 
People (J. Haz. Mat., 133(1-3), pp. 46-52). El ACR requiere que se estime el número 
de muertos de los accidentes. El número de heridos, si bien importante, se evalúa raras 
veces, ya que supone un esfuerzo importante. En este artículo se utilizó un conjunto de 
registros accidentales para definir una relación entre el número de muertos y de heridos. 
Se utilizaron el análisis de los componentes principales y el cluster analysis, obteniendo 
el número verosímil de heridos en función del número de muertos. 
 
Artículo 6 – Economic Valuation of Damages Originated by Major Accidents in 
Port Areas (J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind., en impresión). Se presenta un procedimiento 
para estimar el coste de los daños sufridos por la población, las instalaciones y el medio 
ambiente como consecuencia de accidentes en puertos. Se proponen niveles de 
compensación económica para daños a personas. Se consideran asimismo los daños al 
medio ambiente (atmósfera, agua, fauna). Se plantean costes de instalaciones y edificios 
afectados. Finalmente, se analizan las pérdidas debidas a la parada de actividades y a los 
costes indirectos. 
  
Summary 
This thesis is structured as a series of papers, all but one already published in 
international journals. A series of introductive sections precedes the papers. 
 
1. Introduction. Port areas are described as related to risk assessment, handling of 
hazardous materials, accidents, relevant regulations and international conventions, and 
security. 
 
2. Bibliographic survey. References are collected above all on port-HazMat topics, i.e. 
oil spills and risk assessment of port accidents, touching various risk assessment 
techniques. 
 
3. Objectives, methodology and main results. This chapter defines the objectives of 
the research, i.e. to analyse port systems from the point of view of risk assessment of 
HazMat handling and to design proper risk assessment tools. Moreover, it lists the 
methodology followed and the major results obtained for each of the papers included in 
the thesis. 
 
4. Conclusions. 
 
Papers 
 
Paper 1 – A Survey of Accidents in Ports (Loss Prevention Bulletin, 183, pp. 23-28, 
2005). A historical analysis of 1000+ port accidents was carried out allowing for 
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various aspects (type and cause of accidents, consequences on people, etc.). The relative 
importance of diverse types of accidents was studied. 
 
Paper 2 – Predicting the Frequency of Accidents in Port Areas by Developing 
Event Trees from Historical Analysis (Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 16, pp. 551-560, 2003). Historical analysis of a sample of port accidents 
similar to that of Paper 1 was used to identify accident sequences, i.e. general event 
trees for port accident scenarios. The frequency of some typical port accidents was then 
determined, showing that the event trees proposed can be used in QRA. 
 
Paper 3 – Using Transportation Accident Databases to Investigate Ignition and 
Explosion Probabilities of Flammable Spills (Journal of Hazardous Materials, 
146(3), pp. 106-123, 2007). Literature analysis of ignition and explosion probability 
data is performed. The results of a scrutiny of some tens of thousands of records 
obtained from two vast spill databases are reported. Equations are proposed to predict 
the ignition and explosion probability as a function of the amount and the substance 
spilled. 
 
Paper 4 – A Quantitative Risk Analysis Approach to Port Hydrocarbon Logistics 
(J. Haz. Mat., 128(1), pp. 10-24). A method is presented to perform QRA on 
hydrocarbon terminals. The approach accounts for minor and massive spills due to 
loading arm failures and hull ruptures. A shortcut approach for frequency calculation is 
proposed. An example application is given, based on a pilot study conducted in the Port 
of Barcelona. 
 
Paper 5 – Consequences of Major Accidents: Assessing the Number of Injured 
People (J. Haz. Mat., 133(1-3), pp. 46-52). QRA usually requires the estimation of the 
number of fatalities of accidents. The number of people injured, although important, is 
seldom evaluated, since this entails significant effort. A set of accident records were 
used to define a relationship between the number of people killed and the number of 
people injured. Principal component and clustering analyses were applied, thus 
obtaining expressions estimating the probable number of injured people as a function of 
the number of fatalities. 
 
Paper 6 – Economic Valuation of Damages Originated by Major Accidents in Port 
Areas (J. Loss Prev. Proc. Ind., in press). A procedure is presented to estimate the cost 
of damages suffered by people, equipment and the environment in consequence of port 
accidents. Economic compensation is proposed for damage to people, including fatal 
victims, injured victims and evacuees. Environmental harm is also considered, allowing 
for damage to the atmosphere, soil, water and fauna. Subsequently, estimates of the cost 
of the equipment and buildings affected are proposed. Finally, an assessment of the loss 
of profits due to activity breakdown and indirect costs is analysed. 
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Note 
While carrying out the research that brought up to this Ph.D. thesis, I had the chance of 
seeing six articles published on various journals. These papers report on practically all 
of the results obtained and research conducted in the frame of my Ph.D. activities. For 
this reason, my supervisors decided that it was worth presenting the document by way 
of those papers, instead of starting a full “book thesis” from the beginning. 
The presentation of the thesis in such form complies with the Spanish legislation 
(Real Decreto 778/1998) and the UPC internal regulations transposing it. 
The structure of the document is as follows. 
First comes a general Introduction to the topic of risk, ports, relevant regulations 
and HazMat handling in port terminals. 
A Bibliographic Survey follows, focused on various risk analysis issues related to 
the research. This chapter contains accounts of the literature read when I was preparing 
the various research activities that later lead to the compilation of the corresponding 
papers. Moreover, other books and articles are reviewed when this was deemed 
pertinent. 
The chapter Objectives, Methodology and Main Results gives unity to the thesis: it 
lists the objective of the thesis –first in general and then of each article– and briefly 
describes the methodology followed in and the main results obtained from the research 
behind each article. 
After the Conclusions, which inventory the most original findings of the thesis, 
each of the six papers is reported in its published form. The journal papers constitute the 
bulk and the most important part of the thesis. Each of them contains its own 
introduction, methodology, results section, discussions, conclusions and appendices. 
The order in which the papers are presented is not strictly chronological, partly due the 
inevitable differences in the duration of the editorial process of the papers, and partly 
due to the author’s choice of following a logical sequence rather than a chronological 
xviii Note 
 
one, in order to demonstrate the commitment of each paper to fulfil the objectives of the 
thesis. 
A. Ronza 
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 1 Introduction 
The ship was cheered, the harbour cleared, 
Merrily did we drop 
Below the kirk, below the hill, 
Below the lighthouse top. 
The Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner 
 
1.1 The concept of risk and the handling of hazardous 
materials 
Every human activity entails risk. The concept of risk seems intuitive to many of us: at a 
first analysis risk could be defined as “a situation involving exposure to danger” or “the 
possibility that something unpleasant will happen”, as given in the Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary (Soanes & Stevenson, 2004). Nevertheless, modern engineering 
science has formalised this notion, defining risk as the arithmetical product of the 
consequences of a certain undesired event or set of undesired events (accidents) by the 
frequency over time of such event(s). If we can measure risk for a certain activity, we 
can then tell if it is worth to engage in that activity or not. In order to do that, we will 
compare the benefits brought about by the activity with the risk entailed. 
Consequences and frequency have to be expressed in suitable units of 
measurement. Frequency may be given in terms of number of accidents per year, or per 
operation (in the case that one is referring to a device or installation), while the unit 
expressing consequences may vary according to the type of aftermath considered. Harm 
to people is usually reported in terms of number of casualties (per accident), or number 
of injured people; but one may choose to address risk in financial terms, and then 
consequences will be measured by economic loss (€ per accident). 
The great variety of possible units of measurement for the consequence term 
depends on the great flexibility of the concept of risk, and its adaptability to a great 
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range of systems. These include loss of human life, material loss, loss of public image 
(as a consequence of an accident), and environmental damage. 
Risk is present everywhere: nature itself is the cause of important disasters such as 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods. Such events have always existed. On the other 
hand, economic loss and harm to people are also inherently induced by human 
activities, as a function of their characteristics (what is done, where it is done, with what 
materials, in what safety conditions). In the 20th Century, both frequency and 
consequences of accidents related to human activities increased significantly due to the 
dramatic growth of industrialisation, which brought the workers and the public in close 
contact with new technologies and materials. While modern industry expanded, a 
generalised concern for health, safety and environmental impacts began to spring up in 
the most advanced countries. 
Over the last decades, there have been a number of emblematic disasters that have 
paved the way for a general awareness of the hazards of industrial activities, especially 
of those involving hazardous materials (often referred to simply as HazMat). Nuclear 
industry was hit by the accident of Three Mile Island (1979) and the outstanding 
catastrophe of Chernobyl (1986). Before them, a number of near-accidents (Hanford, 
1949; Detroit, 1966) had already raised public concern about the risks entailed in the 
production of atomic energy. At the same time, this suddenly boosted the study of 
accidental frequencies and plant reliability. 
Most techniques developed in the field of nuclear safety were subsequently 
introduced in the process industry. A suitable definition of the latter is 
Production Industry using (raw) materials to manufacture non-assembled 
products in a production process where the (raw) materials are processed in a 
production plant where different unit operations often take place in a fluid form 
and the different processes are connected in a continuous flow. 
(Lager, 2002) 
The worst accidents in process industry tend to happen in chemical and 
petrochemical plants, due to the intrinsic dangerousness of the substances (HazMat) 
processed in those installations. Several disasters, such as massive explosions and toxic 
clouds, have happened during the last decades that produced enduring effects in terms 
of public concern about the chemical industry. This has been looked at quite 
suspiciously since then. Among such events one has to cite at least the following: 
- At Flixborough (UK, 1974), a severe explosion in a caprolactam plant killed 
28 people; this accident was of capital importance in the development of 
safety and loss prevention in the UK. 
- Two years later a cloud of TCDD (a dioxin, extremely toxic) was released at 
Seveso, near Milan, Italy; this accident (which, according to the studies 
carried out so far, did not cause casualties) had a tremendous impact in 
Europe and led the European Parliament to issue the “Seveso Directive” 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1982; see 
section 1.3.2). 
- In 1984, 500 people died at San Juan Ixhuatepec, near Mexico City, as a 
consequence of a huge fire and a series of explosions in an LPG facility. 
- In the same year, nearly 3800 people lost their life and nearly 2700 were 
caused permanent disability at Bhopal, India, after the accidental release of 
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a methyl isocyanate cloud. Bhopal is by far the worst disaster ever occurred 
in the chemical industry. 
- In 2001, a strong impact was created by a severe ammonium nitrate 
explosion at Toulouse, France, which was the cause of 31 deaths. 
- In 2005, the Buncefield oil depot at Hemel Hempstead (UK) almost entirely 
burned causing an enormous smoke plume clearly visible from tens of 
kilometres away and in pictures taken from space. 
A specific term, major accident, has been coined in risk assessment engineering. 
The Seveso II Directive defines a major accident as 
an occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from 
uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment 
covered by this Directive, and leading to serious danger to human health and/or 
the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and 
involving one or more dangerous substances 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1996) 
According to the database MHIDAS (Health and Safety Executive, 2004), the 
worst major accidents (in terms of loss of life) happened due to HazMat handling in 
fixed installations are those shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2. 
A number of novel technologies, safety devices, new building materials and 
innovative plant layouts have been tested and implemented during the last few decades 
in order to make process industry safer. More important, loss prevention and risk 
assessment are now taken into account in most plants, and many conceptual methods 
are at hand for risk identification, assessment, reduction and prevention in process 
plants. 
Some methodologies are focused only on hazard identification (checklists, 
HazOp, FMEA, what-if analysis, preliminary hazard analysis), some on the frequency 
of accidents (fault tree analysis, event tree analysis). Many physical models have been 
produced to forecast the effects of fires, explosions and gas clouds; several of them have 
been implemented into commercial computer programs. Diverse procedures have been 
devised to link such effects to the individual risk, i.e. the probability of a person to die 
as a consequence of the exposure to a certain level of thermal radiation, overpressure or 
toxic concentration. 
Some methods claim to be more comprehensive, embracing the evaluation of the 
risk entailed by a plant. Such is the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA), aiming at a 
structured estimation of the expected number of casualties per year in a given plant/area. 
A far more “inexpensive” technique is represented by risk ranking and risk indices. Risk 
ranking is generally based on the use of matrices allowing to express the risk entailed by 
an occurrence, according to its consequences (e.g. represented on the rows, in different 
severity ranges) and the frequency (on the columns). Risk indices, on the other hand, are 
algorithms that allow to describe the level of risk associated with a plant by means of a 
simple number or score; the input data are usually the substances involved in the 
process, the temperature and pressure conditions, parameters related to material 
handling and transfer. 
HazMat are present not only in the process industry. Plants have to be constantly 
supplied and, at the same time, ship off their products. Growing flows of hazardous 
substances began to run through roads, railways, rivers, waterways, pipelines and the 
sea as soon as chemical industry took off during the 20th Century. HazMat transport is 
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often less controllable than HazMat processing, because it is not set in a “rigid” plant or 
facility, but in a dynamic scenario, changing as rapidly as the HazMat move towards 
their destination. Many disasters happened during the transport of (petro)chemical 
products, which have left an important mark. For instance, one of the worst chemical 
road transport calamities occurred in Catalonia in 1978, at San Carles de la Ràpita, 
when 216 people died as a consequence of a propylene fireball. Rail transport has been 
hit by even worse accidents in recent years (Ufa, Russia, 1989; Iran, 2004; North Korea, 
2004). Table 1.3 based on MHIDAS, shows some of the worst accidents in HazMat 
transportation. 
1.2 The situation of ports 
1.2.1 Ports: some definitions 
A port is a facility at the edge of an ocean, river, or lake for receiving ships and 
transferring cargo and persons to and from them. Ports have specially-designed 
equipment to help in the loading and unloading of vessels. Cranes and refrigerated 
storage may be provided by private interests or public bodies. Often, canneries or other 
processing facilities are located very close by. 
The term seaport is used for ports that handle ocean-going vessels, and river port 
is used for facilities that handle river traffic. Sometimes a port on a lake or river also has 
access to the ocean, and is then referred to as an inland port. A fishing port is a type of 
port or harbour1 facility particularly suitable for landing and distributing fish. 
Critical to the functioning of seaports and river ports are: 
- Presence of deep water channels (12 m minimum) and berths; 
- Protection from wind, wave, and surge; 
- Access to intermodal transportation (trains and lorries). 
In fact, it can be stated that a port is an intermodal node where goods (and 
passengers) are loaded/unloaded to/from vessels and sent to their destination, be it 
onshore or offshore. A port system could be thought of as a complex, often huge, 
environment where several transport operations are carried out, including not only 
maritime transport, but also (un)loading and, of course, storage of goods, along with 
typical process activities. 
Transport includes ships and barges as well as lorries, trains, and pipelines. 
Process operations embrace mainly storage, which can be of different types: solid bulks 
in silos, stacks, warehouses, packages; liquid bulks and liquefied gases in tanks; 
containerised goods of any kind. Anyway, production and transformation processes can 
                                                 
1  Harbours and ports are often confused. A port is a man-made coastal or riverine facility where boats 
and ships can load and unload. It may consist of quays, wharfs, jetties, piers and slips with cranes or 
ramps. A port may have magazine buildings or warehouses for storage of goods and a transport system, 
such as railway, road transport or pipeline transport facilities for relaying goods inland. A harbour (or 
haven) is a place where ships can receive shelter from the weather. Harbours can be man-made or natural. 
A man-made harbour will have sea walls or breakwaters. A natural harbour will be surrounded on most 
sides by land. 
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Table 1.1. Worst HazMat accidents ever happened in fixed installations, in terms of casualties 
(Health and Safety Executive, 2004). 
MHIDAS 
accident 
number 
Year(a) Location Number of deaths Description 
1098 1984 Bhopal 
(India) 
> 2000 A cloud of MIC was released at Union 
Carbide pesticide plant following a 
runaway reaction when water entered a 
45 tonnes storage tank. All four major 
safety systems were ineffective. 
11345 2002 Ikeja 
(Nigeria) 
1001 Series of explosions at ammunition 
depot. 
1668 1921 Oppau 
(Germany) 
561 An enormous explosion in an ammo-
nium sulphonitrate bulk storage made 
a crater of 400 ft diameter and 90 ft 
deep. The cause has not been estab-
lished but BASF was known to break-
up its stock with explosives. 3 people 
were killed at Mannheim (4 miles dis-
tant). 
420 1984 San Juan 
Ixhuatepec 
(Mexico) 
501 An LPG leak was ignited, possibly by 
a gas burner. Within minutes, 
2 spheres bleved simultaneously, 
probably causing the majority of 
fatalities. Numerous further BLEVEs 
in the next 75 min. 
8418 1997 Mena Plain 
(Saudi 
Arabia)  
343 Muslims on pilgrimage to Mecca fled 
in panic when fire engulfed 
70,000 tents. The cause of fire was the 
explosion of a gas cylinder. 
2416 1944 Port 
Chicago 
(CA, USA)  
321 2 ships loading large quantities of TNT 
and cordite exploded. 
4368 1925 Rio de 
Janeiro 
(Brazil) 
300 Explosion of 3000 cases of dynamite 
caused a disaster. 3000 houses were 
destroyed. 
989 1982 Tacoa 
(Venezuela)  
154 A violent explosion occurred while a 
fixed roof storage tank was being 
gauged allowing burning oil to flow 
into the bund. After burning for 
6 hours a massive boil-over occurred 
projecting the tank contents hundreds 
of feet in all directions. 
2401 1917 Chester (PA, 
USA)  
133 The electric wires of a vibrator were 
used to shake powder into shrapnel 
shells. A short-circuit ignited the 
powder giving rise to a dust explosion. 
1755 1944 Cleveland 
(OH, USA)  
131 A 4200 m3 LNG tank ruptured spilling 
contents into streets and sewers. A 
series of violent explosions and fires 
followed. A second tank collapsed 
giving flames 800 m high. 
(a): accidents happened before 1900 have not been taken into account. 
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Table 1.2. Worst HazMat accidents ever happened in the last decade, in terms of casualties 
(Health and Safety Executive, 2004). 
MHIDAS 
accident 
number 
Year Location Number of deaths Description 
11345 2002 Ikeja 
(Nigeria) 
1001 Series of explosions at ammunition 
depot. 
8418 1997 Mena Plain 
(Saudi 
Arabia)  
343 Muslims on pilgrimage to Mecca fled 
in panic when fire engulfed 
70,000 tents. The cause of fire was the 
explosion of a gas cylinder. 
10298 2000 Kinshasa 
(Zaire) 
110 A fire broke out at an airport 
warehouse, setting light to massive 
ammunition shipment in-transit. 
11063 2001 Mafang 
(China) 
101 A massive explosion left a crater 
where 30 houses once stood. 
Explosives were being stored at home 
after officials had shut down an illegal 
factory. 
... 
8913 1998 Xingping 
(China) 
50 A liquefied nitrogen pipeline exploded 
in a fertilizer plant.  
... 
11192 2001 Toulouse 
(France) 
30(a) An explosion occurred in a silo storing 
off-spec ammonium nitrate. The cause 
is unknown. The factory site was 
severely damaged and windows blew 
out up to 2 miles away. Ammonia and 
chlorine were also stored on the site 
but were not released. 
(a): the death toll later rose to 31, after a victim died at the hospital several days after the 
accident. 
take place in port areas too, as for logistic convenience many process plants are directly 
sited near (un)loading facilities. This is always the case with LNG liquefaction and 
regasification plants; the former collect natural gas, liquefy it and dispatch it via tanker 
vessel to the latter, which follow the reverse chain in order to send gas to the final users 
through pipelines, while small quantities of LNG are also transferred to lorries. 
However, that is not the only case: many isolated hydrocarbon facilities, such as 
refineries, oil terminals, etc. may themselves be considered as port systems, as they 
include a marine (or river, or waterway) terminal where ships and barges berth to 
(un)load bulk liquids. 
Fig. 1.1 is a representation of a typical port. The port has an enclosed water area, 
whose berthing line is normally, but not necessarily, reinforced with concrete structures. 
Sometimes these are artificially raised from the sea-bottom, in order to make room for 
wharves and storing areas (this is the case with the container terminal (a) of Fig. 1.1).  
Ports are normally located near a city, unless they are isolated terminals serving a 
process plant or a pipeline. Many cities have in fact been founded and have grown 
around spots that offered shelter for fishing boats, and later, with the growth of 
commerce and sea-exploration, have become port-cities. The oldest part of a port, above 
all in the case of European ports (e.g. Barcelona), is the nearest to the core of the city. 
Sometimes the old terminals have been converted into marinas, cruise terminals and 
1.2 The situation of ports 7 
recreational structures (b), which is sometimes a problem, due to the proximity of 
leisure areas to industrial facilities. The entrance to the port is generally a narrow 
mouth; natural sheltering can be reinforced with long artificial breakwaters (g). Apart 
from being near to urban areas, ports may be adjacent to important environmental spots, 
like salt marshes, cliffs, beaches (h), deltas, estuaries, coral reefs, etc. Before entering 
Table 1.3. Worst HazMat transportation accidents ever happened, in terms of casualties (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2004). 
MHIDAS 
accident 
number 
Year Location Type of transport 
Number 
of deaths Description 
1801 1917 Halifax 
(Canada) 
Ship ~ 2000 The ammunition ship “Mont Blanc” 
carrying lyddite and chlorobenzene 
was holed by another vessel. The 
chlorobenzene cargo leaked and ig-
nited. The ship was abandoned and 
drifted onto a jetty where lyddite deto-
nated in a vast explosion, breaking 
windows up to tens of miles away. 
2394 1956 Calí 
(Colombia) 
Road 1200 7 trucks loaded with dynamite ex-
ploded shortly after midnight while 
parked outside a railway terminal. 
9419 1998 Apawor 
(Nigeria) 
Pipeline 701 Blast from a leaking petrol pipeline. 
Vandals had caused the leak and over 
1000 people gathered to collect the 
fuel to sell on the black market. 
7172 1994 Dronka 
(Egypt) 
Rail 581 Floods caused a rail track to subside. 
Two tank wagons overturned, fuel ig-
nited and spread to other tanks. Light-
ning struck complex of 8 tanks with 
15,000 tonnes of aircraft fuel at a 
military site in the flooded town. 
1807 1947 Texas City 
(TX, USA) 
Ship 576 Insufficient water was provided to ex-
tinguish fire in cargo of vessel 
“Grandcamp”. Fire started in a second 
ship carrying sulphur and ammonium 
nitrate, which exploded 12 hrs later. 
3689 1989 Ufa (Russia) Pipeline 501 Long distance pipeline carrying 30% 
gasoline and 70% LPG leaked for 4 hrs 
before a spark from passing trains ig-
nited the gas cloud in massive explo-
sion and fire. 
6348 1993 Remeios 
(Colombia) 
Pipeline 430 3000 bbl of oil spilled after some re-
bels dynamited a pipeline. Serious 
ecological damage. 
157 1983 Nile river 
(Egypt) 
Ship 317 A fire was caused by an explosion of 
an unauthorised cargo of bottled gas. 
9882 1999 Gaisan 
(India) 
Rail 284 An express and a local train collided 
head on at a station due to a signal 
failure. At least one train had military 
explosives aboard. 
10409 2000 Adeje 
(Nigeria) 
Pipeline 251 A pipeline had been punctured by 
some thieves intending to steal gaso-
line. Two days later local villagers 
were scavenging around the pipeline 
when it exploded. 
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the harbour to carry out loading, unloading or other operations, ships must wait for a 
certain period at anchorage (f) outside the port premises, until admission is given (either 
by the harbourmaster or the PA) and a pilot is sent. After entering the port, the ship has 
to be manoeuvred and berthed. In the case of large ships and tankers, tugs are used for 
towing (c). 
Virtually, any type of vessel can enter a port: 
- Ferries, for the transport of passengers and vehicles; 
- Liners (or cruise ships); 
- Military ships and submarines; 
- Barges, i.e. flat-bottomed boats, built mainly for river and canal transport of 
heavy goods. Most barges are non-self-propelled and need to be moved by 
tugboats. Barges are very common in river and estuarine ports (like 
Rotterdam, Buenos Aires and many US ports); 
- Fishing boats; 
- Yachts and leisure boats; 
- Sailing ships; 
- Cargo ships. 
Among the latter, there can be found the following types of watercraft: 
- Bulk carriers, used to transport bulk solids such as (iron) ore, coal, coke, 
bauxite/alumina, food staples (rice, grain, etc.), cement, sugar, quartz, 
phosphate rock, fertilisers, sulphur, scrap, and similar cargo (Isbester, 1993). 
They can be recognized by the large box-like hatches on their deck, 
designed to slide outboard for loading. Bulk carriers discharge at terminals 
provided with proper cranes (j); ore and coal can be stored in heaps. 
- Container ships. These are cargo ships that carry all of their load in 
containers, by a technique called containerisation. However, cargo that is 
too big to carry in containers can be handled using so-called flat racks, open 
top containers and platforms. They are designed in such a manner that no 
space is wasted. Their capacity is measured in TEU (twenty-foot equivalent 
units). This is the number of 20 ft containers that it can carry. The majority 
of containers used today are 40 ft in length. Above a certain size, container 
ships do not carry their own loading gear. Hence loading and unloading can 
only be done at ports with the necessary cranes. However, smaller ships 
with capacities up to 2900 TEUs are often equipped with their own cranes. 
Informally known as “box boats”, they carry the majority of the world’s dry 
cargo. There are large main line vessels that ply the deep sea routes, then 
many small “feeder” ships that supply the large ships at centralized hub 
ports. Most container ships are propelled by diesel engines, and have crews 
of between 20 and 40 people. They generally have a large accommodation 
block at the stern, directly above the engine room. Container ships now 
carry up to 8000 containers on a voyage. Container wharves (a) are now the 
most important source of income for port commerce; the current boom of 
container transportation is boosting the construction of many new terminals 
and the extension of the existing ones. 
- Car carriers, serving specialised car terminals (i). 
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- Reefers, a type of ship typically used to transport perishable commodities, 
which require temperature-controlled transportation, mostly fruits, meat, 
fish, vegetables, dairy products and other foodstuffs. 
- Tankers, usually large ships, carrying petroleum products or chemicals in 
bulk. Apart from pipeline transport, tankers are the only method of 
transporting large quantities of oil around the world. Among the chemicals 
transported by sea, the most important are ammonia, chlorine, methanol, 
ethanol, acrylonitrile, toluene, hydrochloric acid, sulphuric acid, phenol. 
Tankers used for liquid fuels are classified according to their capacity to 
carry oil: 
a) LNG tankers, relatively rare carriers for natural gas instead of 
oil; 
b) VLCC (very large crude carriers), over 200,000 tonnes; 
c) Suezmax, ships that can pass through the Suez Canal, 
125,000 ÷ 200,000 tonnes; 
d) Aframax, 80,000 ÷ 125,000 tonnes; 
e) Panamax, ships that can pass through the Panama Canal, 
50,000 ÷ 79,000 tonnes; 
f) MR (medium range) tankers, 38,000 ÷ 50,000 tonnes; 
g) GP (general purpose) tankers, under 38,000 tonnes. 
Supertankers are tanker ships built to transport very large quantities of 
liquids, especially crude oil. The terms VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) 
and ULCC (Ultra Large Crude Carrier) are also sometimes used. Tanker 
ships above 250,000 tonnes are generally considered supertankers. They are 
the largest ships in the world, larger even than aircraft carriers. When first 
introduced their size and draft prevented them from docking at many 
existing docks, requiring them to discharge their cargo into smaller tankers 
offshore (this operation is known as lightering). Some ports have developed 
special deep-water off-loading facilities connected to the land by pipelines. 
Due to their size and mass, supertankers have very poor manoeuvrability; 
the stopping distance of a supertanker is typically measured in miles. When 
operating close to the shoreline they are vulnerable to running aground, 
whether due to mechanical failure, human error or bad weather. 
Tankers, supertankers, bulk carriers and container ships are used for the transport 
of huge amounts of dangerous substances (see section 1.2.4) Activities involving 
vessels include navigation, manoeuvre (with or without tugs), berthing and (dis)charge. 
Another typical port activity is bunkering, i.e. vessel re-fuelling. In the case of 
boats and small vessels, bunkering is carried out from shore, using facilities similar to 
normal petrol stations. On the other hand, ships are bunkered from one or more 
dedicated barges, which can be operated by one of the oil terminals.2 Transhipment of 
fuel is generally performed using hoses. The fuel bunkered is fuel oil and diesel oil. 
                                                 
2  In the Port of Barcelona, for example, ship bunkering is carried out by the barge Campero, operated by 
CLH, which holds a concession for an oil terminal in the port premises (CLH, n.d.). 
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Other port activities are carried out on land and can include: 
- Dry docks, dockyards and shipyards. 
- Process plants. In some situations, it can be convenient to process the raw 
materials unloaded directly in the port (or in an adjacent area). This is the 
case with soy beans and cereals, often grinded in situ to obtain flour, then 
stored in specialised silos. LNG regasification terminals are another 
example of plant performing process activities on receiving a product. In the 
same way, many terminals process materials before shipping them at their 
own jetties and wharves. These include refineries, LNG shipping terminals 
and chemical plants. A refinery can actually represent a port system on its 
own, if provided with private wharves, jetties and storage areas. 
- Land transport activities, which are carried out by lorry, train and pipelines. 
- Storage, either in tank parks, warehouses, container terminals, car parks, 
bulk solid wharves, etc. 
With the exception of shipyards and dockyards, these activities are not port-
specific. They are instead standard industrial operations. As well as vessel operations, 
these activities can involve the handling of HazMat and be affected by accidents caused 
by these substances. 
1.2.2 The economic importance of ports and maritime transport 
San Cristóbal et al. (1999) estimated that the Gross Added Value of the transport sector 
represents 5% of the Gross Domestic Product of Spain. Maritime transport is 3% of this 
share. It is therefore the fourth most important form of transport in Spain, after road, rail 
and air transport, respectively. In terms of number of employees, the order is the same. 
Nonetheless, maritime transport is the most important when the amount of goods 
transported into and out of Spain is considered. As much as 73% of the goods either 
enter or leave Spain by sea, while only 23% are transported by road into and out of the 
country. 
As of 2001, 328 million persons passed through EU seaports and the total tonnage 
of goods handled in the EU was estimated at 3000 million tonnes. There were 261 
maritime ports handling over 1 million tonnes of goods per year. 70% of all trade with 
third countries was channelled through the ports. 
Short sea shipping, i.e. shipping along the EU’s and its neighbouring countries’ 
coasts, moves about one third of all goods (considering all modes) with considerable 
growth (Eurostat, 2003-1 and 2003-2; Zachcial, 1997). Short sea shipping is basically a 
form of container transportation. The main advantages promoted by this type of 
shipping are alleviation of congestion, decrease of air pollution, and overall cost savings 
to the shipper. 
Ship transport is a growing sector. As a result, ports are playing an increasingly 
important role in world economy. For example, the crucial role played by seaports in 
European Union transport is evident. For quite a while, seaports have not been at the 
centre of common transport policy. Investment in infrastructures gradually declined 
between 1970 and the late 1980s. At the beginning of the 1990s however, investment in 
ports picked up significantly. Sustainability and intermodality are two keywords that 
push the Commission to take various actions aiming at better connections between ports 
and the rail and inland waterway networks together with improvements in the quality of 
seaport  services.  Since  many  years,  the  top  five  ports remain the same: Rotterdam,  
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Fig. 1.1. Schematic representation of an industrial port. (a): container terminal; (b): marina; 
(c): ship being towed and pulled by tugs; (d): oil jetty; (e): oil depot/tank farm; (f): ships 
anchored outside the port waiting for admission and pilot; (g): breakwater; (h): beaches; (i): 
car terminal; (j): bulk ore terminal; (k): road and rail network surrounding the port. 
Antwerp, Marseille, Hamburg and Le Havre. 
1.2.3 The environmental impacts of port operations 
Operational activities carried out in port areas are a source of pollution. Marí & 
Jaime (1998) describe the environmental impacts of navigation focussing above all on 
hydrocarbon releases. Yet this is not the only environmental impact of navigation and 
ports. Port activities have manifold impacts on the environment, not necessarily due to 
accidental events. Operational impacts of port activities include (Trozzi & Vaccaro, 
2000): 
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- Impacts from ships (see also White & Molloy, 2001, for a complete account 
on this topic): 
a) Air pollution, due to movement and hotelling activities. 
b) Water pollution, caused by leaks of fuels and lubricants, accidental 
spills of liquid cargo during (un)loading, unauthorised discharge of 
tank washings, antifouling paints (especially TBT paints), 
introduction of non-indigenous species through ballast waters. 
c) Waste generation. 
d) Noise. 
- Impacts from port operations: 
a) Air pollution, due to volatile products released during (un)loading 
operations, motor vehicle traffic, demolition or modifications of 
ships (asbestos, heavy metals, hydrocarbons, ozone depleting 
substances and others). 
b) Pollution of water is normally due to accidental discharges and 
releases; nevertheless, ports may pollute water in other ways: they 
are responsible for thermal pollution, eutrophication (due to 
stagnation) and resuspension of materials as a consequence of 
dredging activities. 
c) Pollution of soil, from demolition of ships, bulk handling device 
(oil, rubber, etc.). 
d) Waste production, from oil terminals, fuel deposits, ship demolition 
and maintenance. 
- Impacts from possible industrial activities. 
The EU is showing great interest in the improvement of environmental conditions 
of port communities. Apart from issuing a number of directives on environmental 
matters that affect, directly or indirectly, port areas and marine terminals, efforts have 
been made to urge port authorities to implement an environmental management system. 
These efforts are also due to the promotional effects of good environmental 
performance, given that EMS can be certified according to international standards like 
ISO 14001 (ISO, 1996) and EMAS.3 The latter was proposed by the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2001). 
1.2.4 HazMat accidents in ports 
In the case of large ports, the majority of port business is based on the trade of 
chemicals, oil and hydrocarbons, i.e. HazMat. For example, a quick look at the figures 
of the Port of Barcelona shows that in 2003 dangerous substances, the vast majority 
(90%) of which were bulk liquids, represented more than one third of the total traffic of 
goods. On a European scale, statistics confirm this trend: bulk liquid trade (mainly  
                                                 
3  Such interest has recently generated several projects that involved university research and PA expertise. 
In the ECOPORTS project, a number of tools has been devised, which help PAs on the way to the 
implementation of a complete EMS. See: Darbra et al. (2004-1), Darbra et al. (2004-2), Darbra et 
al. (2005-1). 
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Fig. 1.2. Maritime transport in the European Union (15 countries): share of types of cargo handled 
(inward and outward) in main ports in 2001 (Eurostat, 2003-2). 
hydrocarbons and chemicals) represents between 20% and 50% of the whole transport 
of goods by sea (see Fig. 1.2). 
Of course, the handling and storage of huge amounts of hazardous substances has 
provoked and provokes accidental events in ports, the same way as it does in process 
plants. Moreover, depending on the geographical situation of ports, consequences may 
be even more dramatic. Many ports, for historical reasons, are located in the very core 
of urban areas; it follows that a major accident, e.g. a toxic gas cloud, could have very 
serious consequences on the population. Besides, the presence of water makes it easier 
for oil and chemical spills to spread, thus damaging the environment. 
Port accidents can originate from several HazMat handling activities, such as ship 
approach or manoeuvre in port waters, as well as vessel (un)loading, land storage and 
transport. According to a list published by Rao & Raghavan (1996), hazardous events 
related to port operations can be classified as follows: 
- Carrier accidents at sea in the vicinity of ports, including: 
a) Engine room fires and explosions; 
b) Cargo pump/compressor explosions; 
c) Chemical tank explosions; 
d) Explosions in forward part of vessel. 
- Accidents during berthing at port, including: 
a) Explosions due to loading and unloading operations; 
b) Accidents due to natural causes like lightning; 
c) Fires in electrical installations on the ships/carriers; 
d) Fires during cleaning operations on cargo carriers. 
- Accidents during ship-to-shore transfer of chemicals, including: 
a) Pipeline ruptures; 
b) Valve failures; 
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c) Accidents at port mooring-rope locker system; 
d) Lightning during discharge; 
e) Transfer pump fires and explosions; 
f) Accidental dropping of containers. 
- Accidents at cargo sheds leading to fire explosions and toxic gas/vapour 
discharges, including: 
a) Electrical accidents; 
b) Overfilling of storage containers; 
c) Pipe ruptures; 
d) Failure of hazard control instrumentation. 
- Accidents during lifting and transportation of hazardous cargo from port 
premises to outside agencies, including: 
a) Transport vehicle accidents; 
b) Static electricity development; 
c) Accidental dropping of containers; 
d) Pipe ruptures and valve malfunctions. 
On-board spills of highly flammable chemicals may result in large scale fires and 
explosions. It is very likely that a sequence of events follows that leads to the 
instantaneous loss of contents of a cargo vessel. Instantaneous release and immediate 
ignition of the liquefied hydrocarbons normally leads to a fireball with intense thermal 
radiation in the vicinity of the accident site. Delayed ignition of released liquefied 
hydrocarbons is likely to lead to unconfined vapour cloud explosions (UVCE) at 
distances away from the source of release. Fig. 1.3 is a representation of the possible 
evolution paths of port accident scenarios. Effects and damage of the accidents are 
charted as well. 
Chemical releases from tank farms on site are the most probable. They include 
highly flammable and toxic chemicals. For the former, pressurized or refrigerated 
storage methods are employed. The latter is at approximately atmospheric pressure so 
that even a catastrophic failure should not result in the formation of a large flammable 
vapour cloud. The possible modes of catastrophic failure of pressurised storage 
containers are fatigue, overpressure, missile impact and nearby vapour cloud explosion. 
The causes for overpressure may be overheating due to a neighbouring fire, overfilling 
or rollover. Overfilling is a common phenomenon in storage installations and has one of 
the highest probabilities of occurrence values. Rollover is the phenomenon by which the 
liquid in the tank becomes layered, with a layer of slightly higher-density liquefied 
chemicals at the bottom. The two layers tend to exchange and depending upon the 
hydraulic head of the tank, a fraction of its mass flashes off and may momentarily 
overpressure the tank. Pressurized storages in Horton spheres are generally protected by 
the concrete containment collar plus their own insulation. The catastrophic rupture of 
the sphere may occur due to large thermal stresses, stress corrosion or 
overpressurisation by the pump. The sphere could be caused to fail by stress rupture and 
release its contents if it became overheated as a result of a large fire in the vicinity. 
Another possibility is the liquid catching fire due to a local incident or operation, which 
may lead to stress rupture of the sphere. Severe mechanical damage may occur from 
impacts from projectiles from disintegration of nearby vessels, aircraft impacts or 
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nearby railway accident due to derailment. The tank farm storing of non-boiling liquids 
can be affected by pool fires and unconfined vapour cloud explosions. These spills may 
also result in the direct formation of a flammable vapour cloud. The latent heat required 
for evaporation has to be provided by the surroundings and the ground. The rate of 
evaporation will be initially high but decreases rapidly as the available heat from the 
surroundings is exhausted. 
Toxic gas dispersions are also of major concern to ports. The instantaneous 
release of toxic gas from storage vessels can affect large areas on land and at sea. 
Accidental chemical release can be produced inside hazardous cargo sheds. A 
number of dangerous chemicals are temporarily stored in hazardous cargo sheds at the 
ports prior to their despatch to various destinations. Their hazard potential has to be 
assessed based on their inventory levels and flammability, reactivity and toxicity 
ratings. 
Fire can involve bulk solid storage and handling operations. Self-heating or 
spontaneous combustion of a solid material is a process of slow oxidation. This is 
applicable to coal stored in heaps at port. Prevention of accidents due to self-heating 
depends on recognizing the hazards and taking appropriate measures. Good 
housekeeping can reduce self-heating caused by items such as waste paper/rags or dust 
layers. Employment of smaller heaps and their periodic remixing can to a large extent 
reduce the self-heating process in coal dumps. A smouldering fire in a ship’s hold could 
immobilise the whole ship. In such cases, it may be necessary to dig the material out. 
This involves a number of hazards and suitable precautions should be taken against 
them. The operations should be conducted in such a way as not to raise a dust cloud.  
Table 1.4 presents a list of the worst accidents ever happened in port areas. The 
list gives an idea of the accidental scenarios that can affect port areas. Examining this 
table, the following can be said: 
- The six worst accidents (Halifax, Bombay, Port Chicago, Havana, Bone, 
Bahrain) all happened with explosives and ammunitions, and all before 
1965; 
- Apart from explosives, the most recurrent substance is crude oil; 
- The majority of accidents in Table 1.4 occurred in developing countries. 
In addition to fatal accidents, deriving from explosions, fires and toxic clouds, 
many tremendous tanker spills have happened on ships approaching or leaving a port. 
Any oil spill at sea as far as about 10 ÷ 15 km away from port installations will create a 
major emergency at the port due to the serious pollution and flammability effects of oil 
slicks (Rao & Raghavan, 1996). The infamous accident of the “Exxon Valdez”, which 
occurred on a tanker’s leaving the Valdez terminal at Bligh Reef (AK) in 1989, is 
probably the most outstanding, due to its huge environmental consequences and the fact 
that it affected such an influential country as the United States; in fact the US 
government reacted to the “Exxon Valdez” spill with a number of measures that were to 
change the international perspectives on the safety of oil tankers at sea (see section 1.3). 
Of all the spills happened in ports, or in their vicinities, the biggest in terms of volume 
spilled, is nevertheless the “Urquiola” accident, happened at La Coruña, Spain, in 1976. 
It is important to stress that spills (mostly oil spills) that happen in ports can be as 
catastrophic as those occurring in the open sea, even if booms, skimmers and response 
facilities are sometimes at hand. Some important port oil spills are reported in Table 1.5. 
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Fig. 1.3. Sequence of possible port accidental scenarios. 
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Table 1.4. Worst accidents in port areas in terms of number of deaths (after Health and Safety Executive, 
2004). 
MHIDAS 
accident 
number 
Year Location Number of deaths Description Substance(s) involved 
1801 1917 Halifax 
(Canada) 
~ 2000 The ammunition ship 
“Mont Blanc” carrying 
lyddite and chlorobenzene 
was holed by another ves-
sel. The chlorobenzene 
cargo leaked and ignited. 
The ship was abandoned 
and drifted onto a jetty 
where lyddite detonated in 
a vast explosion, breaking 
windows up to tens of 
miles away. 
chlorobenzene; lyddite 
2091 1944 Bombay 
(India)  
1377 A fire of unknown origin 
started in ships hold, con-
taining mixed cargo of 
cotton, scrap metal, fish 
manure, and ammunitions. 
After 2 days, a massive 
explosion devastated the 
dock, damaged hundreds 
of buildings and sent 
pieces of scrap metal fly-
ing into the city. 
dynamite 
2416 1944 Port Chicago 
(CA, USA) 
321 2 ships loading large 
quantities of TNT and 
cordite exploded. 
TNT 
2408 1960 Havana (Cuba) 100 The unloading of ammu-
nition ship “La Coubre” 
was nearly completed 
when an explosion ignited 
the remaining cargo. 
ammunitions 
2395 1964 Bone (Algeria) 85 Detonation on board “Star 
of Alexandria”. 
explosives 
168 1958 Bahrain 57 A ship with a fire in hold 
was put into port to have 
explosives removed. 
explosives 
8721 1997 Visakhapatnam 
(India) 
56 A vessel was unloading 
LPG into a storage tank 
when a leaking pipe 
caught fire. The fire 
spread to other storage 
tanks containing kerosene, 
crude oil and petroleum 
products. 
crude oil; kerosene; LPG; 
petroleum products 
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Table 1.4. (continued) 
MHIDAS 
accident 
number 
Year Location Number of deaths Description Substance(s) involved 
1132 1979 Istanbul 
(Turkey) 
52 A tanker exploded after 
colliding with a Greek 
freighter near docks. 
3 weeks later the ship was 
still burning. Further ex-
plosions sent flames 
300 m high and burning 
debris rained on shore (see 
also Table 1.5). 
crude oil 
484 1979 Bantry Bay 
(Eire) 
50 Small explosion on tanker 
“Betelgeuse” discharging 
oil at terminal. A second 
blast, followed by a fire-
ball, was produced some 
time later. Missiles thrown 
at a very large distance. 
crude oil 
2122 1966 New York 
Harbour (NY, 
USA) 
33 The “Alva Cape” was 
struck by a tanker. Naph-
tha gushed out forming a 
large pool on the water. A 
tug ignited the vapour 
cloud causing a large fire. 
12 days later 4 more men 
died in an explosion while 
trying to inert an empty 
gas tank. 
naphtha 
1851 1975 Marcus Hook 
(PA, USA)  
26 A 200 m chemical tanker 
tried to u-turn but lost 
control and rammed a 
230 m tanker unloading 
crude oil. Flames were 
150 m high + oil spread 
4 km across a river. Fire 
on other tanker loaded 
with 11,000 tonnes of 
phenol. 
crude oil; phenol 
3345 1945 Port Arthur 
(Canada) 
22 An explosion occurred 
during loading of refuse 
screenings onto a ship. 
grain dust 
1882 1947 Brest (France) 21 The discharge of 
3300 tonnes of ammonium 
nitrate from the “Ocean 
Liberty” began on July 24. 
Yellow smoke was seen 3 
days later. Steam and wa-
ter were injected into the 
hold. The ship was evacu-
ated and towed 600 m off-
shore. Nevertheless, it ex-
ploded damaging Brest 
buildings. 
ammonium nitrate 
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Table 1.4. (continued) 
MHIDAS 
accident 
number 
Year Location Number of deaths Description Substance(s) involved 
2772 1974 Sumatra 
(Indonesia) 
15 A series of explosions 
were produced as fire en-
gulfed the oil tanker 
“Palma” during loading of 
40,000 tonnes of crude oil. 
crude oil 
2851 1987 Manila 
(Philippines) 
15 A tanker was unloading 
750 tonnes of methyl 
methacrylate into two 
barges when a worker lit a 
cigarette and ignited the 
vapours. 
methyl methacrylate 
2677 1974 Fort Miffin 
(PA, USA)  
13 The tanker “Elias” berthed 
at Atlantic Richfield Co. 
terminal was wrecked by a 
series of explosions. 
Burning oil spread into the 
river and onto the pier. 
crude oil 
2783 1987 Porto San 
Vitale (Italy)  
13 Explosion + fire during 
maintenance work on LPG 
carrier “Elisabetta Mon-
tanari”. Dead were trapped 
in confined space in ves-
sel’s double bottom that 
was filled with smoke. 
LPG 
5618 1992 Port Kelang 
(Malaysia)  
13 Explosions and huge fire 
on chemical tanker at de-
pot during a cargo test of 
400 tonnes of xylene. 1st 
test rejected cargo. The 
vessel still contained 
traces of previous toluene. 
toluene; xylene 
6946 1994 Bandar 
Khomeini 
(Iran) 
13 Explosion and fire at 
wheat silo. Electrical short 
circuit suspected. 
wheat 
893 1979 Good Hope 
(LA, USA) 
12 Collision of a cargo vessel 
with a loading butane 
barge on Mississippi river. 
A fireball hundreds of feet 
high was formed and 
lasted 1 minute. 12 hrs 
were necessary to extin-
guish secondary fires. 
butane 
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Table 1.5. Most representative marine oil spills within ports or in their close vicinity. 
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Table 1.5. (continued) 
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1.2.5 Safety issues regarding tankers, cargo ships and port terminals 
This section deals with the most important safety problems posed by the maritime 
transportation of hazardous materials into and out of ports. Safety matters concerning 
non-port-specific operations like storage, process and land transport will not be dealt 
with, since this work is devoted to the specificity of port systems. Anyway several 
references are provided in Chapter 2 – Bibliographical Survey, which cover aspects 
such process plant, storage and land transport safety, whenever these activities are 
approached from the point of view of ports. 
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum has prepared in the last two 
decades a number of Safety Guidelines covering a wide range of operations with 
hydrocarbons. The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers & Terminals (or 
ISGOTT; ICS et al., 1996) concerns oil transportation into and out of port terminals. 
The Safety Guide for Terminals Handling Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk 
(OCIMF, 1982), as well as McGuire & White (2000) on behalf of SIGTTO, are devoted 
to the transhipment of liquefied gases. ICS (2002) published a similar set of guidelines 
dealing with the transport of chemicals. 
The major safety concerns regarding the transport of bulk liquids, be they oil, 
liquefied gases or chemicals, can be summarised as follows: 
- A series of specific precautions must be taken on board the tanker, in order 
to avoid the presence of any ignition sources, ignitable or toxic atmospheres 
and spills. Naked lights and smoking are strictly forbidden, the crew must 
exercise caution when working with lamps and electrical equipment. Hot 
work on board must be carried out under strict safety conditions. When 
using tools, crew must be aware they are a potential source of sparks. 
Special attention has to be paid when working in pump, engine and boiler 
rooms and when entering enclosed spaces. 
- At arrival in port, relevant technical and safety information has to be 
exchanged between the tanker, the terminal and the competent authority (i.e. 
the PA and/or the harbourmaster). Relevant information includes vessel data 
(name, country of registration, overall length, draught and beam, estimated 
time of arrival, nature of cargo, UN number of cargo, flashpoint of cargo, 
distribution of cargo on board, whether the vessel is fitted with an inert gas 
system, oxygen content of cargo tanks, manifold details) and terminal data 
(depth of water at the berth at low water and range of salinity that can be 
expected, availability of tugs and mooring craft, mooring lines and 
accessories present at the terminal, which side of the vessel has to be 
moored alongside, number and size of hose connections, loading arms and 
manifolds, maximum allowable speed and angle of approach, etc.). Mooring 
is a critical operation. Wind can cause the rupture of poorly operated and/or 
designed mooring lines. 
- While at berth, tanker fire hoses have to be connected to the ship’s fire 
main. Fire fighting equipments have to be ready for use, both on board and 
ashore. The tanker’s boilers, main engines, steering machinery and other 
equipment essential for manoeuvring have normally to be maintained in a 
condition that will permit the ship to move away from the berth at short 
notice. Smoking is strictly forbidden, any task to be performed with the aid 
of electrical equipment is required a special permit, as well as any hot work 
activity, including welding and burning. 
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- While preparing for loading (or unloading), the tanker and the terminal 
have to agree on a loading plan (or a discharge plan), including information 
on the amount and nature of the product to be (un)loaded, the sequence of 
the operation, the initial and maximum loading rates, the method of tank 
venting, and the emergency stop procedure. Where possible, an inspection 
of ship’s tanks before loading cargo should be made without entering the 
tanks. The ISGOTT Guidelines, as well as the liquefied gases and the 
chemical bulk tanker guidelines, provide a thorough Ship/Shore Safety 
Checklist, which should be completed on behalf of both the tanker and the 
terminal. The check list was originally endorsed by the IMO. The terminal 
must provide hoses in good condition. Hoses have always to be handled 
with care; they should not be dragged over a surface or rolled in a manner 
that twists their body. As to metal loading arms, it must be ensured that they 
are free to move with the motion of the ship. Excessive vibration should be 
avoided. In order to provide protection against arcing during connection and 
disconnection, the terminal operator should ensure that cargo hose strings 
and metal arms are fitted with an insulating flange. 
- While (dis)charging, the following safeguards must be maintained: a 
responsible officer must be on watch; a senior terminal representative must 
be on duty and communications between him and the responsible officer 
continuously maintained; a competent member of the terminal should be on 
continuous duty in the vicinity of the ship to shore connections. 
- Double hull ships, which provide a higher safety level at sea, need 
additional safety checks when at berth, due to problems of stability and the 
presence of additional enclosed spaces (those in between the two hulls), 
which have to be properly inerted. 
- Possible operations involving tank cleaning and gas freeing are critical to 
the safety of oil tankers. 
As to bulk solid transportation, the major reference in matters of safety is the 
Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMO, 2001). Apart from focussing on the 
correct ways of stowing cargo in holds, this Code is above all concerned with the perils 
of coal, the most important hazardous bulk solid cargo transported by sea. Economists 
distinguish two main types of coal: steam or thermal coal, which is used for power 
generation and domestic heating, and coking or metallurgical coal (Isbester, 1993). A 
number of hazards are associated with the carriage of coal. The most important, at a 
large scale, is fire, sometimes produced in conditions of spontaneous heating. Other 
hazards include the spontaneous production of hydrogen and methane, which can 
ultimately lead to explosion. The sulphur in coal can produce sulphuric acid if it is 
combined with moisture. The relevant provisions of the abovementioned Code are the 
following: 
- Before loading coal must be separated from other categories of hazardous 
cargo and must not be stowed adjacent to hot areas. The shipper should 
provide the master with a written cargo declaration of the cargo’s contracted 
moisture content, sulphur content and size, and whether it will be liable to 
emit methane, or to self-heat. Holds and bilge wells should be thoroughly 
cleaned. Coal cargoes having a moisture content in excess of the 
transportable moisture limit must not be carried. All electrical circuits in 
holds and adjacent compartments must be isolated. The ship should carry on 
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board appropriate instruments for measuring concentration of methane, 
oxygen and carbon monoxide, pH of cargo hold bilge samples and 
temperature of cargo, without requiring entry of personnel into the cargo 
space. 
- During transport self-contained breathing apparatus must be kept available, 
smoking and naked flames should be prohibited; burning, cutting and 
welding should be performed only when strictly necessary and under safe 
conditions. 
- Before discharging precautions must be taken against sparks, especially 
when opening the hatch covers. 
Container transportation is probably the most controversial from the point of view 
of safety. In fact, whilst tankers and bulk carriers are loaded with no more than two 
different HazMat at a time, a container ship can carry tenths of different HazMat, 
together with the most diverse types of other cargoes. Containers include portable tanks, 
carrying any kind of bulk liquid, including liquefied gases and hazardous chemicals. In 
the case of seaborne container transportation, safety regulations are currently under 
development. IMO’s IMDG Code is the basic reference as to regulations as well as safe 
practices with containers (see section 1.3.1). A number of relevant regulations were 
issued in the mark of the Real Decreto 145/1989 (BOE, 1989; see section 1.3.2 and 
Merino et al., 1994). Containerised dangerous goods shall be strictly segregated, as they 
had been stowed in bulk. In general, containers carrying HazMat shall be stowed on the 
deck and as far as possible from the area where the crew live. Sources of ignition, like 
refrigerated containers, shall be disposed at a proper distance. Containers carrying 
HazMat shall bear proper labels to indicate the nature and hazardousness of their 
content. HazMat shall be disposed inside the container with care, providing there is no 
possibility for spills and releases (Palacio, 2001; Costa, 1987). 
1.3 Laws and regulations affecting sea HazMat 
transportation 
1.3.1 Non-port-specific laws and regulations 
In this section the most important laws and treaties will be cited and described, which 
concern safety at sea when transportation of hazardous materials is involved. These 
regulations mainly affect tankers. They have been enacted in the last decades as 
reactive, rather than proactive, measures against the “no. 1” threat to the safety of the 
seas: oil spills (especially massive ones, like the “Exxon Valdez” or “Prestige” spills). 
The previous section has specifically focused on this topic from different points of 
view, mainly risk-related. In the present section we present a brief review of the most 
important international treaties concerning (oil) tanker safety. 
Over the course of the past three decades the international shipping industry has 
undergone significant transformation from virtual self-regulation to increasingly 
prescriptive rules and regulations from international bodies and national governments. 
Major spill events have served as a catalyst for heightened oversight and regulation. 
History has consistently supported acceptance of “freedom of the high seas” as a basic 
tenet governing the operation of vessels. This has served the shipping industry well over 
time, as it has largely shielded this industry, unlike other transportation sectors, from 
significant government involvement or intervention. The International Maritime 
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Organization (IMO) was established under the auspices of the United Nations to 
provide a forum for promoting shipping through uniform standards (Lentz & Felleman, 
2003). 
The first response to the problem of oil spills by the international community was 
not to regulate shipping for prevention of spills, but rather, to limit the liability of ship 
owners, by providing a mechanism to pay for cleanup and damages that would not 
create a financial burden on the industry. Nevertheless, the Torrey Canyon spill of 1967 
provided the impetus for the international community to address liability and 
compensation for accidental spills of oil for the first time. 
The international community’s first consideration of oil pollution was reflected in 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea (OILPOL) in 
1954. The purpose of this Convention was to reduce intentional “operational” 
discharges of oil from routine ballasting and tank cleaning operations. It did not address 
the problem of accidental spills. 
In November 1969, IMO adopted the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC). The purpose of the CLC was to ensure compensation 
for victims of oil spills by adopting uniform standards for establishing liability and 
compensation. Under the CLC, a ship owner is “strictly” liable for damages caused by 
the spill. This means that, regardless of fault, a ship owner must compensate the 
victims. In 1971, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) was 
established to provide compensation for damages from spills, which are not fully 
compensated under the CLC. Both the CLC and Fund Conventions are now gradually 
being superseded by revised versions of the Conventions, known as the 1992 Protocols, 
which entered into force in 1996. In fact, increasing costs of spill cleanup and damages 
has necessitated an increase in both ship owner liability limits and Fund claim limits 
(IMO, 1996). 
The IMO convention that addresses most directly the issue of accidental pollution 
from ships is MARPOL 73/78. While the original focus of MARPOL was intentional 
“operational” discharges of oil, over time, concern for accidental spills has been 
translated into amendments specifically intended to prevent such accidental incidents. 
MARPOL meant a substantial reduction of operational spills (Puértolas, 1993, 
chapter 24). In the 1980s a modest decline in the number and severity of spills is evident 
in the statistics. However, during this time, better understanding by the scientific 
community of the destruction of natural resources and the expanding claims for 
economic loss sustained ongoing concerns about the adequacy of preventive measures. 
In other words accidental spills became the new target for spill reduction. 
However, it was not until the “Exxon Valdez” incident that the international 
community was forced to take significant steps to further improve upon prevention. The 
“Exxon Valdez” incident in March of 1989 roused deep concern within the United 
States about the environmental and economic consequences of oil spills. The US 
Congress acted quickly to adopt the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. A key provision of that 
new law was a requirement that ships entering US ports be fitted with a double hull. 
This requirement was to be phased in over time. 
The unilateral North American intervention included very important aspects such 
as: a) the liability is unlimited in case of accidents, so shipowners have to provide a 
1000 million € guarantee, as well as to appoint a representative in the affected territory 
to whom to demand civil liabilities in case of an accident; b) a list of ports was drawn 
up to give refuge to those vessels with less safety conditions; these safe-haven ports 
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have the suitable infrastructures and means to act if necessary; c) the safety measures 
for vessels were increased and strengthened. A subsequent analysis on the enactment of 
this regulation shows that there have not been more oil spills of the first magnitude 
since the implementation of this legislation. 
As a result, the US set out to convince the international community to adopt 
similar requirements. The United States was successful in doing so, and MARPOL was 
once again amended. Specifically, Regulation 13F of MARPOL was amended to 
provide that tankers contracted on or after July 6, 1993, of 600 deadweight tonnes 
(DWT) capacity or more be equipped with double hulls. Those between 600 and 
5000 DWT are to be fitted with double hulls and double sides, and the capacity of each 
cargo tank is restricted. Every oil tanker of more than 5000 DWT is required to have a 
double hull (double bottom and double sides), a middeck with double sides, or an 
alternative arrangement specifically approved by IMO that provides protection 
equivalent to the double-hull design. Regulation 13G of MARPOL addresses existing 
single hull ships. It provides that tankers (> 20,000 DWT) and oil product carriers 
(> 30,000 DWT) be retrofitted with double hulls or their equivalent according to an 
established schedule. They must also be subject to operational measures providing 
added protection, or be retired 25-30 years after delivery. 
Unlike in the US, in Europe the institutional framework related to oil slicks has 
been quite limited and vague until the “Erika” and “Prestige” accidents (happened off 
Brittany and Galician coasts in 1999 and 2002, respectively), before which the existing 
instruments for the regulation of maritime activities showed a very narrow scope 
(González et al., 2005). The control of maritime traffic, the inspection of the 
characteristics of vessels carrying dangerous goods, the conditions to enter European 
ports, the knowledge of operators, or the responsibilities regarding compensations, are 
examples of this secondary and vague role that the European institutions adopted. 
The European Union reacted positively after the “Erika” accident (1999) and 
started to elaborate new sets of regulations to improve maritime safety, the so-called 
Erika I and Erika II sets of measures. They included new inspections and controls for 
both vessels and classification societies, and they verified the conditions of maritime 
traffic. However, the European reaction was less exigent and decisive than the US 
procedures after the “Exxon Valdez” accident (1989).  
Apart from the previous codes, mainly related to the concern of oil spills and 
other sources of pollution of ships, the IMO released in 1965 the International Maritime 
Dangerous Goods Code, or IMDG Code (IMO, 2002-2). The development of the IMDG 
Code dates back to the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea Conference, which recommended that 
Governments should adopt a uniform international code for the transport of dangerous 
goods by sea to supplement the regulations contained in the 1960 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 
The Code is meant to cover such matters as packing, container traffic and 
stowage, with particular reference to the segregation of incompatible substances. It lays 
down basic principles; detailed recommendations for individual substances, materials 
and articles, and a number of recommendations for good operational practice including 
advice on terminology, packing, labelling, stowage, segregation and handling, and 
emergency response action. It is divided into the following parts: 
- General provisions, definitions, training; 
- Classification; 
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- Packing and tank provisions; 
- Consignment procedures; 
- Construction and testing of packagings, IBCs, large packagings, portable 
tanks and road tank vehicles; 
- Transport operations; 
- The Dangerous Goods List, presented in tabular format. 
Since its adoption by the fourth IMO Assembly in 1965, the IMDG Code has 
undergone many changes, both in appearance and content to keep pace with the ever 
changing needs of industry. 
Amendments to SOLAS chapter VII (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) adopted in 
May 2002 make the IMDG Code mandatory from 1 January 2004. Also in May 2002, 
IMO adopted the IMDG Code in a mandatory form, known as Amendment 31. 
1.3.2 Port-specific laws and regulations 
As ports are located in territorial waters, port authorities are not subject to international 
conventions.4 In general, it can be said that, for administrative and technical matters, a 
port is managed by a port authority as far as the shoreline, while navigation affairs are 
under the competence of a harbourmaster’s office. Port authorities and harbourmaster’s 
offices are either under control of local authorities or national governments. This 
depends on the country and on the size of the port. For an overview of port ownership 
and management organisation in Europe, see Puertos del Estado – Boletín información 
mensual (1999-1, 1999-2, 1999-3) and ESPO (2005). In Puertos del Estado – Boletín 
información mensual (2000) an outline is presented of who is in charge of the 
management of port services (piloting, towing, berthing, stevedoring, shipyards) in 
several European countries. 
These organisational differences are reflected in those codes and laws specifically 
concerning the handling of dangerous goods. However, under the influence of IMO and 
other supranational organisations (e.g. the European Union), uniformity of approach is 
being progressively achieved. It would take too long to make a survey of relevant 
international –or even only European– codes and legislation, so in this section some 
insights will be given on the legal aspects of the handling of dangerous goods in Spain. 
From the administrative point of view, Spanish PAs and harbourmaster’s offices 
fall under the “Ley 27/1992, de 24 de noviembre, de Puertos del Estado y de la Marina 
Mercante” (BOE, 1992). This comprehensive law sets in order a complex system of acts 
and statutes previously issued. In particular it defines the competences of port 
authorities and harbourmaster’s offices. Furthermore it states that major ports are under 
the jurisdiction of special Port Authorities directly managed by an institution (Puertos 
del Estado) belonging to the state ministry of economic promotion. 
The most important Spanish act regulating port HazMat handling is the “Real 
Decreto 145/1989, de 20 de enero, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento Nacional de 
                                                 
4  As long as some specific operational aspect of ships coming from or heading to international waters are 
not concerned. For example the MARPOL convention, which Spain enforced, requires port authorities to 
provide ship operators with installations for the collection of oil residues. 
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Admisión, Manipulación y Almacenamiento de mercancías peligrosas en los puertos” 
(BOE, 1989). The RD 145/1989 has to be enforced in any Spanish port where 
operations with dangerous goods are carried out. Dangerous goods (mercancías 
peligrosas) are defined as those products listed in the article 12 of the IMDG Code. The 
act does not apply to bunker fuels (this matter is now covered by BOE, 2004; see 
below). 
Section I-3 of the act (“Faculties of the Port Authorities”) states that: 
- The harbourmaster is responsible for admitting ships carrying dangerous 
goods into the port, while the director of the port authority is responsible for 
the admission of any dangerous product into service areas (art. 4). 
- The (un)loading of dangerous goods is under the control of the 
harbourmaster (art. 7). 
- Ports must have an emergency control centre for dealing with any dangerous 
goods emergency (art. 12); among other things, the control centre will be 
provided with: 
a) Sufficient communication facilities (towards PA, harbourmaster, 
ship masters, dock operators, etc.). 
b) A safety study (estudio de seguridad), in order to study the risk 
of admitting, handling and storing dangerous goods in the port 
and their possible consequences for the surroundings of the 
terminals and the entire port; it is later specified (art. 123) that 
the safety study has to include a risk assessment for fires, 
explosions and spills, as well as maritime pollution if necessary. 
c) An interior emergency plan (plan de emergencia interior), 
specifically designed for the port, together with the respective 
exterior emergency plan. 
Section I-5 states that ports must set aside special areas for the (un)loading, 
handling and storage of dangerous goods (art. 18). These areas must be located as far as 
possible from urban areas and are subject to particular safety requirements (art. 20). 
Art. 21 lists a series of facilities these special areas have to be provided with. Among 
them, the following fire fighting facilities are specified: 1) hydrants and hoses, 
sufficient to cover the entire (un)loading dock/hazardous goods area; water pressure is 
never to be less than 7 atm; 2) fire extinguishers (foam, dry powder and/or CO2). The 
port must also set separate anchorage areas for dangerous goods ships waiting to berth 
and (dis)charge (art. 22). 
Sections I-6 and I-7 concern the requirements for ships carrying dangerous goods 
into or out of the port. Section I-8 is addressed to terminal and dock operators. 
Section I-10 regards land transport (by train and lorry) of dangerous goods. 
Section II (“Classification and labelling of dangerous goods”) describes the 
obligations for all the transportation stakeholders in the port to label dangerous goods 
according to the classification of the IMDG Code, which is based on nine classes: 
- Class 1: explosives; 
- Class 2: gases; 
- Class 3: flammable liquids; 
- Class 4: flammable solids; 
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- Class 5: oxidising agents and organic peroxides; 
- Class 6: poisonous (toxic) and infectious substances 
- Class 7: radioactive substances; 
- Class 8: corrosive substances; 
- Class 9: miscellaneous dangerous substances. 
Section III lists detailed instructions and obligations on how to handle dangerous 
goods, for each of the abovementioned classes. Special directions are given on 
hydrocarbons, liquefied gases and bulk chemicals in section III-10. Art. 101 (a very 
detailed one) describes the correct practice of handling bulk liquids. Paragraph 1.1 of 
this article institutes a ship/terminal checklist (reproduced in the Appendix VI of the 
law). Art. 108 relates some basic actions to take in case of spill. These have been later 
expanded and better specified in a new Real Decreto (BOE, 2004; see below). 
Section IV affects container, road tanker and rail tanker handling. Section V is 
about the storage of non-bulk goods. 
Section VI (“Emergency and self-protection plans”) specifies that ports handling 
dangerous goods are affected by the Spanish directive on civil defence (BOE, 1985). 
For this reason ports have to be provided with a safety plan and an interior emergency 
plan (see above, art. 12). Art. 123 resolves a possible conflict with the European Seveso 
directive (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1982; now 
replaced by the Seveso II directive). This directive (see below) affects those 
establishments where certain amounts of hazardous materials are processed or stored. 
Many port terminals fall under this directive and are thus required to have a HazMat 
accident risk assessment report and an emergency plan of their own. Art. 123 of 
RD 145/1989 states that this obligation does have to be accomplished and that it is the 
responsibility of the PA and of the harbourmaster to harmonise the different documents 
and plans. Art. 132 is a concise list of resources the port must be supplied with in order 
to cope with emergency situations. 
Finally, section VII regards training of personnel. 
In 2004 a new decree was issued, which regards HazMat matters in port areas, as 
well as at private and public terminals. The RD 253/2004 (BOE, 2004), first presented 
as a project of RD in 2003 (Ministerio de Fomento – Subsecretaría Dirección General 
de la Marina Mercante, 2003), opens with an introduction that makes explicit reference 
to the OPRC Convention (1990).5 The main requirements of the OPRC are: 
- That ports and terminals interested by hydrocarbon commerce, transport, 
transfer etc. be provided with an interior emergency plan;  
- That such ports and terminals have at least a minimum set of equipments in 
place in order to fight and prevent hydrocarbon pollution. 
This RD does not concern HazMat accidents as a whole, but is rather focused on 
accidental hydrocarbon spills. Its scope is extended to bunkering operations, which were 
                                                 
5  The OPRC Convention was issued by the IMO in 1990. The 1998 OPRC Regulations are now the 
principal legislation on counter pollution from a harbour authority and oil handling facility perspective. 
The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency developed guidelines for ports to comply with the OPRC 
(MCA, 2002). 
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excluded from the reach of RD 145/1989. Actually, all Spanish marine installation 
handling hydrocarbons (including offshore platforms and loading buoys) are covered by 
this act. 
Chapter 1 deals with measures for preventing and fighting against marine 
pollution due to accidents during transfer and handling of hydrocarbons.6 Hydrocarbon 
ports/terminals have to produce two documents: 
- An interior contingency plan for accidental maritime pollution (Plan 
Interior de Contingencias por Contaminación Marina Accidental), the 
structure of which is described in Annex I; the main issues of such plan are: 
composition/functions of the directive bodies, how to actuate in case of 
emergency, inventory of the means of intervention, etc. 
- A study of environmental conditions (Estudio de condiciones ambientales), 
the structure of which is described in Annex II; this is both a description of 
the characteristics of the surroundings of the installation (from different 
points of view: oceanographic, physical, meteorological, social, etc.) and a 
study of the possible effects of a hydrocarbon spill. In particular, an 
identification of possible accidental spills and a determination of spill 
trajectories must be included in the study. 
Details are provided on document processing and approval (differences are made 
between ports/terminals on state land, on private land and offshore installations). In the 
Planes Interiores de Contingencias por Contaminación Marina Accidental, 
ports/installations have to show evidence they are provided with, at least, the following 
equipments: 
- Booms; 
- Physical recollection systems for hydrocarbons; 
- Fire hoses properly directed and oriented; 
- Emergency boats, for the disposal of booms and for the recollection; 
- An effective communication system between land and ship. 
Also buoy and monobuoy fields have similar restrictions as to emergency 
equipments. Ports/terminals have the right to inspect ships suspected not to be in safe 
conditions. 
Special, lighter measures are to be taken in the case of bunkering terminals and 
facilities; even lighter ones in the case the bunkered fuel is diesel oil (Chapter 2). 
 
Apart from the abovementioned decrees, it is worth noting that terminals, storing 
companies and stevedoring plants may be subject to another, very important directive, 
i.e. the European directive “Seveso II”. 
The “Seveso” directive made its first appearance in 1982 (European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union, 1982). It was issued by the European Council 
                                                 
6  The definition of hydrocarbon adopted by RD 253/2004 is the one first given in the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), which is: crude, fuel oil, diesel oil, and 
lubricating oil. Gasoline and kerosene are excluded, probably because of their high volatility. 
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after the Seveso accident in 1976 had provoked great public shock. The Directive 
affected sites and establishments where certain dangerous substances were stored and/or 
handled in amounts exceeding specified levels. The aim of the directive was to improve 
prevention practices against the occurrence of major accidents involving HazMat. The 
directive was slightly modified twice (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 1987; European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
1988). It was implemented gradually by all the members of the EU (then EEC); Spain 
enforced it in 1988 (BOE, 1988). 
In 1996 the European Council issued a new version of the directive, which 
substituted the previous one (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 1996). This directive, commonly known as “Seveso II”, was again modified in 
2003 to take into account new substances (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2003). Spain enforced the “Seveso II” in 1999 (BOE, 1999).7 
The requirements to which an establishment may be subject vary according to the 
amount of HazMat stored/processed. In fact, two “tiers” of establishments are defined. 
Establishments belonging to the first tier, with relatively low amounts of dangerous 
goods treated or stored, are only required to send a notification to the competent 
authority, containing basic information on the activity carried out and the HazMat 
involved; moreover, they have to demonstrate they have an interior contingency plan 
accounting for the risks entailed by the dangerous goods handles and stored. The second 
tier, i.e. those establishments where dangerous goods are present in large amounts, is 
subject to stricter requirements. In particular, a complete Safety Report has to be 
produced, together with detailed Emergency plans. Furthermore, “Seveso” operators 
have to supply to the authorities specific information after a major accident occurs in 
their premises. 
The “Seveso” directive does not apply to ports as industrial districts. In fact it 
does not cover transport operations and loading and unloading of goods. In the preface 
to the text of the directive, it is stated that 
Member States may retain or adopt appropriate measures for transport-related 
activities at docks, wharves and marshalling yards, which are excluded from 
this Directive, in order to ensure a level of safety equivalent to that established 
by this Directive 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1996) 
while in art. 4 (c) it is asserted that 
Exclusions. This Directive shall not apply to the following: […] (c) the 
transport of dangerous substances and intermediate temporary storage by road, 
rail, internal waterways, sea or air, outside the establishments covered by this 
Directive, including loading and unloading and transport to and from another 
means of transport at docks, wharves or marshalling yards; 
(ibid.) 
                                                 
7  In several EU member states, the “Seveso” directive has been provided with a further decree, detailing 
practical and technical aspects. In Spain a first version of this Directriz básica had been published in 1991 
(BOE, 1991). Following the issuing of the “Seveso II”, a new Directriz was brought out (BOE, 2003). 
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This exclusion has had an important influence in keeping port operations out of 
the mainstream risk analysis policies and research in the last years. The possible 
inclusion of port areas (and marshalling yards) into the scope of the directive has been 
the subject of debate in the European Council (Mitchison, 1999; Mitchison & Caprioli, 
1998). It should be noted, by the way, that the exclusion only applies to transport-
related activities; the Directive applies to other activities within the establishments, for 
example specialised storage establishments within ports. Port terminals are often subject 
to the directive, since they are responsible not only for the (un)loading operations, but 
also for temporary storage of goods (not to mention those terminals that process, either 
chemically or physically, raw materials inside the port premises; e.g. LNG reception 
terminals are often regasification plants). 
Port authorities must harmonise their safety studies and emergency plans with 
those of the terminals. In the case of Spain, for instance, this is regulated by the text of 
RD 1254/1999 (BOE, 1999), ordaining that: 
- PAs (as well as the Comunidades Autónomas) are responsible for: 1) the 
reception of the notification, the document stating the policy of prevention 
of major accidents, the safety report and the emergency plan of those 
establishments located in public ports; 2) the adoption of measures of 
protection through the collaboration with the Comunidad Autónoma in the 
preparation of the external emergency plan, taking into consideration the 
“Seveso” documentation provided by port terminals. 
- The harbourmaster’s offices are responsible for fighting marine pollution in 
Spanish territorial waters, in agreement with the act of State Ports (BOE, 
1992). 
1.3.3 Port security: a new frontier 
If safety is defined as “protecting the environment against the risk of a system”, the 
quasi-synonym security can be labelled “protecting a system from the risks arising in 
the surrounding environment” (EVI Project Consortium, 2003). Security in ports means 
basically protecting ships and facilities from sabotages and terrorist attacks. Major 
concern about the possibility of large scale terrorist acts in port areas developed in the 
wake of the 9/11 attack in the US, due both to the strategic role of ports in the logistics 
chain and to the high concentration of HazMat in port areas (either on board tankers or 
on shore). These preoccupations are focussed, for instance, on LNG regasification 
plants, since in their premises very large quantities of gas are stored in a small number 
of huge tanks, with volumes in the order of 105 m3 and more.8 
In a Conference, held at its London headquarters, the IMO adopted a number of 
amendments to SOLAS 1974 (IMO, 2002-1), the most far-reaching of which enshrines 
                                                 
8  The US federal government is currently planning the construction of a number of onshore LNG 
regasification plants, e.g. in California (Marks et al., 2003), Louisiana and Texas. Public reactions are 
being quite negative, all of them making direct reference to the possibility of terrorist attacks. See 
Caputo (2005), Wittmeyer (2005) and Living on Earth (2005). Parfomak (2003) provided the US 
Congress with a document for discussion which focuses on the main hazards of LNG, including the 
possibility that LNG onshore regasification plants be the target of terrorist attacks; the benefits of LNG 
are also highlighted. Other recent research efforts in the frame of LNG safety include the Sandia report by 
Hightower et al. (2004). 
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the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). As the ISPS 
Code is part of SOLAS, compliance is mandatory for the 148 Contracting Parties to 
SOLAS. The Code entered into force in July 2004. This regulation contains detailed 
security related requirements for Governments, PAs and shipping companies in a 
mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these 
requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B). In summary the ISPS Code: 
- Enables the detection and deterrence of security threats within an 
international framework; 
- Establishes roles and responsibilities; 
- Enables collection and exchange of security information; 
- Provides a methodology for assessing security; 
- Ensures that adequate security measures are in place. 
It requires ship and port facility staff to: 
- Gather and assess information; 
- Maintain communication protocols; 
- Restrict access; prevent the introduction of unauthorised weapons, etc.; 
- Provide the means to raise alarms; 
- Put in place vessel and port security plans; and ensure training and drills are 
conducted. 
Each Contracting Government has to ensure completion of a Port Facility 
Security Assessment for each port facility within its territory that serves ships engaged 
on international voyages. The Port Facility Security Assessment is fundamentally a risk 
analysis of all aspects of a port facility’s operation in order to determine which parts of 
it are more susceptible, and/or more likely, to be the subject of attack. Security risk is 
seen as a function of the threat of an attack coupled with the vulnerability of the target 
and the consequences of an attack. 
On completion of the analysis, it will be possible to produce an overall assessment 
of the level of risk. The Port Facility Security Assessment will help determine which 
port facilities are required to appoint a Port Facility Security Officer and prepare a Port 
Facility Security Plan. This plan should indicate the operational and physical security 
measures the port facility should take to ensure that it always operates at “security 
level 1”. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures 
the port facility can take to move to and operate at “security level 2” when instructed to 
do so. It should also indicate the possible preparatory actions the port facility could take 
to allow prompt response to the instructions that may be issued at “security level 3”. 
Ships using port facilities may be subject to port State control (see section 
1.2.1.i), inspections and additional control measures. The relevant authorities may 
request the provision of information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers and ship’s 
personnel prior to the ship’s entry into port. There may be circumstances in which entry 
into port could be denied (Ariel Pinto & Talley, 2006). 
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1.4 Port areas and risk analysis: a gap to fill 
Regarding risk analysis methodologies, an important difference can be observed 
between the situation of fixed chemical plants and land transport (both by road and rail) 
on one side and port areas on the other. 
In the case of plants and land transport, the use of traditional risk analysis 
techniques has been a standard for many years. A wide range of probability and 
accident frequency data are available for these settings, which help in performing 
quantitative risk analysis. 
This specific information is often missing in the case of ports. Leaving aside 
certain port storage or process installations, which must meet the requirements and/or 
fall under the regulations mentioned in section 1.3, the rest of operations carried out in 
port areas are not included in the scope of the Seveso directive. Nevertheless, some of 
these operations entail significant hazards, as for example do loading and unloading 
activities, with their high spill and accident rates. 
As a consequence, a solid, reliable collection of data is missing that would make it 
possible to carry out quantitative risk assessments with a certain accuracy. These 
shortcomings have been demonstrated in recent years, whenever risk analysis methods 
were applied to port areas. 
Consequently, it is evident that there is need for a research effort helping carry out 
port risk assessments as reliable as those of the process industry and HazMat 
transportation environments. 
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2 Bibliographic survey 
This chapter is devoted to an extensive overview of recent bibliography on the issue of 
risk in port settings. References are collected and commented above all on HazMat 
topics, but some literature regarding general safety problems in ports is mentioned as 
well, if it is relevant to the contents of this thesis. 
Fig. 2.1 shows that the chapter is organised in two main sections. Section 2.1. is 
devoted to the topic of oil spills, which deserves a separate treatment due to the 
exceptional importance of this accidental scenario in maritime and port settings. The 
great public interest raised by oil spills has boosted over the past years a greater amount 
of research than had been done by other types of hazard affecting maritime transport. 
Maritime oil spills are, so to say, the quintessential maritime accident, always causing 
important impact on the public, because of the widespread and highly visible 
environmental consequences they have. Several aspects of oil spill safety have been 
accounted for, which are listed in Fig. 2.1. 
Section 2.2. is instead dedicated to the risk assessment of other types of accidents 
to be expected in port areas, like spills of hazardous materials other than oil products, 
explosions, fires and toxic gas clouds. 
Finally, section 2.3 summarises the relevant results of the bibliographic survey. In 
particular, in that section we stress the near absence of studies on the topic of the 
economic valuation of the consequences of HazMat accidents in ports (save for oil 
spills). 
Non-HazMat focused and non-port specific references are cited only if they 
contain significant elements that can be applied to the risk assessment of hazardous 
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Fig. 2.1. Layout of this chapter. 
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materials scenarios in ports.1 In such cases, the reason why the paper or book is 
referenced is explained. 
2.1 Oil spills 
2.1.1 Non-port-specific papers and reports about oil spills 
Literature about maritime oil spills is incredibly abundant. This section discusses 
several documents that, while not being necessarily related to port settings, contain 
interesting insights and may ultimately be used for spill risk assessment in ports. 
 
a. General concerns. As a result of the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, the United States 
Congress issued the Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90). One of the provisions of this act was 
the institution of an Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research. In 
1997 the Committee produced an Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan, a quite 
complete overview of oil spill related issues (Interagency Coordinating Commitee on 
Oil Pollution Research, 1997). 
Another interesting, if brief, outline of spill problems is the yearly ITOPF 
Handbook, issued by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF, 
2004-1). 
 
b. Physical models. When oil is spilled at sea it spreads and moves on the surface while 
undergoing a number of chemical and physical changes, collectively termed weathering 
(see Fig. 2.2). Most of the processes, such as evaporation, dispersion, dissolution and 
sedimentation, lead to the disappearance of oil from the surface of the sea, whereas 
others, particularly the formation of water-in-oil emulsions (mousse) and the 
accompanying increase in viscosity, promote its persistence. The speed and relative 
importance of the processes depend on factors such as the quantity and type of oil, the 
prevailing weather and sea conditions, and whether the oil remains at sea or is washed 
ashore. Ultimately, the marine environment assimilates spilled oil through the long-term 
process of biodegradation. 
The main properties that govern the behaviour of spilled oil at sea are specific 
gravity (its density relative to pure water, often expressed in ºAPI); distillation 
characteristics (its volatility); viscosity (its resistance to flow); and pour point (the 
temperature below which it will not flow). Since the interactions between the various 
weathering processes are not well understood, reliance is often placed on empirical 
models based upon the properties of different oil types (ITOPF, 2004-1). 
                                                 
1  Throughout this chapter the expressions “dangerous goods” and “hazardous materials”, as well as the 
abbreviation of the latter, i.e. “HazMat”, are used more or less interchangeably. Both expressions indicate 
substances (solids, liquids, or gases) that are dangerous to the well-being of humans, animals, or the 
environment. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the two terms: “dangerous goods” refers to 
hazardous materials being sold/transported as products, while “hazardous materials” and “HazMat” are 
more comprehensive expressions and can indicate any substance, either a product (good) or a raw 
material. 
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A great deal of research has been conducted on this topic. Several parameters 
have been researched. Equations have been proposed for the rate of spread, 
emulsification, evaporation, dispersion, and the maximum area affected by the spill. 
Two pioneering works were published by Fay (1969) and Fannelop & 
Waldman (1972). These have virtually been at the base of all the subsequent research 
during the next three decades, which is resumed by Brebbia (2001). 
The PhD thesis by Mestres (2002) describes the development, validation and 
application of a three-dimensional numerical model for pollution transport (including 
oil spills) in coastal waters. The model can be used in a variety of situations, of which 
marine oil spills are just an example. 
Fay (2003-1) has recently published a paper in which a complete model for 
predicting the dynamics of spills from LNG and oil product tankers. The model is 
constructed from fluid mechanics principles and empirical properties of oil and LNG 
spills on water. This has to be considered among the most up-to-date and interesting 
contributions on the topic of oil spill physical models. 
 
Fig. 2.2. Weathering of a marine oil spill (ITOPF, 2004-1). 
c. Software programmes. A variety of commercial software programmes are available 
that implement the aforementioned physical models. The majority of these programmes 
have been produced in the US, either by federal agencies, like NOAA, or private 
software or consultancy companies. These products are listed and discussed in a circular 
by IMO (2000) and in a report by NOAA (2002-2). Some of the most commonly used 
are the following: 
- GNOME (NOAA, 2002-1) by NOAA. This is a publicly available oil-spill 
trajectory model. GNOME plots the predicted evolution of spill positions 
from relevant oceanographic, atmospheric, and spill information. It also 
uses weathering algorithms to make simple predictions about the changes 
the oil will undergo while it is exposed to the environment (Fig. 2.2). It 
works at port scale. 
- ADIOS2 by NOAA, an oil weathering model that incorporates an extensive 
database of crude oils and petroleum products. It is publicly available. 
- SLORSM (Belore, n.d.) by SL Ross, based on the mathematical models by 
Fay (see above). It works at a larger scale than GNOME (tens of 
kilometres). 
- OILMAP by Applied Science Associates (ASA, n.d.-1), working at a 
medium-small scale. 
- SIMAP by ASA (n.d.-2), focused on forecast of spill response, natural 
resource damage assessment and contingency planning. 
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- ALOFT-FT by NIST, predicting the downwind distribution of smoke 
particulate and combustion products from large outdoor fires. ALOFT-FT 
was developed to aid in the planning process for the intentional burning of 
crude oils spills on water. It is publicly available. 
 
d. Historical analysis and statistics. Historical analysis (see section 2.2.1) is a tool 
widely used in the field of risk analysis and accident investigation for various purposes. 
In the case of oil spills, it is mainly used to determine statistical trends capable of 
describing the factors most likely to cause an accidental spill, as well as the most 
frequent locations and consequences of the accidents. Many institutions, such as the 
ITOPF, publish regular bulletins of oil spill statistics based on internal or public 
databases. 
An early example of application of a database taking into account maritime 
HazMat transportation is described by Heinecke & Golchert (1989). This is limited to 
the transport of dangerous goods through the territorial waters of the then Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
The Interagency Coordinating Commitee on Oil Pollution Research, established in 
the US by the OPA 90 convention (see section 1.3.1) published an interesting report 
(Interagency Coordinating Commitee on Oil Pollution Research, 1997) where extensive 
historical data and tables based on USCG data (previous to 1993) are presented and 
discussed. Appendix B of this report is a comparison of seven oil spill accident 
databases. 
The ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation) updates yearly a 
brief but very interesting statistical bulletin about maritime oil spills from tankers, 
barges and carriers (ITOPF, 2004-2). Statistics are based on an in-house oil spill 
database, which is not available to the public. Spills are classified into 3 categories, 
according to their size: < 7 tonnes; > 7 tonnes and < 700 tonnes; > 700 tonnes. ITOPF 
states that information on spills > 7 tonnes is complete and reliable, while the number of 
small spills is just estimated. Fig. 2.3 shows the number of medium and large spills per 
year in the last decades according to ITOPF. The diagram shows an evident decrease in 
the number of spills after 1980, probably as a result of the new international directives 
promulgated in the 1970s (see section 1.3.1). Fig. 2.4 enumerates the amount of oil 
spilled per year: besides a generalised reduction of the quantities spilled after 1980, it 
can be observed that catastrophic accidents, such as those occurred to the “Atlantic 
Empress”, the “Castillo de Bellver”, the “ABT Summer” and, more recently, the 
“Prestige”, have a dramatic impact over the yearly balance of spills. For instance, the 
year 1983 would have been quite in line with the general improvement of the early 
1980s, had it not been for the huge spill of the “Castillo de Bellver”. 
A valuable source of information is represented by the annual reports by ACOPS, 
the UK Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (for example: ACOPS, 2003; 
ACOPS, 2004). The reports include detailed annual lists of spills occurred in British 
territorial waters. 
McMahon Anderson & LaBelle (1994) performed a historical analysis in order to 
infer frequency data for oil spills (see section 2.1.1.e). The analysis involves both US 
and worldwide offshore platforms, pipelines and oil tankers accidents. 
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Fig. 2.3. Number of medium and large oil spills per year during the last three decades 
(after ITOPF, 2004-2). 
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Fig. 2.4. Amounts of oil spilled into the sea by year (ITOPF, 2004-2). 
Ketkar & Babu (1997) examine the size distribution of oil spills in the US from 
1980 to 1990. The analysis confirms that an increase in the size of vessels has increased 
the risk of larger oil spills in US waters. 
Several papers and communications by Dagmar Schmidt Etkin present the results 
of an extensive historical analysis. Etkin is a member of GESAMP (Joint Group of 
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Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection), a board of 
authorities in the field of maritime pollution, sponsored, among others, by the IMO. 
Etkin & Welch (1997) is the first paper published by this author on the topic of 
accidental oil spill statistics. It contains a description of the Oil Spill Intelligence Report 
International Oil Spill Database, which reports (as of 1997) more than 4100 accidents 
happened worldwide and involving at least 10,000 gallons of released product. 
Etkin et al. (1998) is a declaration of the future work to be carried out by the 
Working Group 32 of the GESAMP, focused on the collection of information regarding 
the pollution of sea waters due to sea-based activities. Etkin et al. (1999) and 
Etkin (1999-2) present the first results of such research, which were later updated in 
Etkin (2001-1). Some results are further summarised in Burns et al. (2002). GESAMP 
data do not differ significantly from those provided by ITOPF. The authors state that, 
contrary to popular perception after recent catastrophic events, oil spill frequencies and 
total spillage have decreased significantly over the last two decades, particularly in the 
last few years, despite an overall increase in oil movement. The decrease in oil spills 
worldwide (but in the United States in particular), may be attributed to a variety of 
factors. Etkin states that the influence of the OPA 90 has been widely positive and has 
had an important impact on this reduction. Nevertheless, she warns that, while the 
statistics show encouraging downward trends, there is no room for complacency. An ill-
timed oil spill that occurs in a sensitive location, regardless of spill size, can cause 
devastating damage to natural environments, property, and business, and, occasionally, 
to human lives. 
Finally, Lentz & Felleman (2003) present more historical data in a comprehensive 
overview of past spills. The research is performed on a database owned by ERC 
(Environmental Research Consulting) and agrees with those previously mentioned. 
 
e. Accidental frequencies for marine oil spills. Accidental frequencies are an essential 
aspect of risk assessment (see sections 1.1 and 2.2.2). Evaluating the frequency factor is 
sometimes more important than gauging the consequences of accidental scenarios, 
especially if the latter are expected to be particularly severe. This is the case with 
massive marine oil spills. Therefore, a certain number of studies have been specifically 
dedicated to estimate the rate of oil spills, building mainly on historical studies (see 
section 2.1.1.e). For an overview of references dealing with frequencies of maritime 
accidents in general, see section 2.2.2. 
McMahon Anderson & LaBelle (1990) estimated the occurrence rates of 
accidental oil spills on the US outer continental shelf. Years later, this work was 
improved and extended (McMahon Anderson & LaBelle, 1994; McMahon Anderson & 
LaBelle, 2000). The ultimate estimate proposed in these analyses were 0.90 and 0.40 
tanker spills greater than 1000 bbl (= 159 m3) for every 1.0 × 109 bbl transported by 
tanker. Specific figures were proposed for platform and maritime pipeline spills as well, 
but in this case data were limited to the US outer continental shelf. Data from these 
papers were used to build a complete oil spill risk analysis model (Price et al., 2003). 
 
f. Oil spill risk assessment. The elements analysed so far (physical models, software, 
historical analysis, databases, etc.) must be taken into consideration all at once when 
performing an oil spill risk assessment. Non-port-specific oil spill risk assessments are 
very ambitious studies. Their geographical scope is often very vast, whereas they tend 
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to use the traditional tools of risk assessment (e.g. probabilistic instruments like fault 
and event trees), which are maybe too formal to cope with such large areas. As a result, 
findings are often of a qualitative kind. Sometimes they are simply unsatisfactory.2 
Risk assessment surveys are mostly focused on environmental damage. Among 
the many factors usually taken into account are found:  
- Environmental sensitivity; 
- The industry sectors (e.g. fishing, tourism) most affected by spills; 
- Commercial cargo shipping size, frequency, trading patterns and amounts of 
oil carried as bunker fuel; 
- Oil/chemical tanker frequency, sizes, shipping patterns and quantities 
shipped; 
- Properties of oil/chemicals shipped as cargo; 
- Type, density and movement of shipping including concentration of fishing 
vessels and tourist vessels; 
- Areas that pose a high level of difficulty to safe navigation. 
Brown & Amrozowicz (1996) and Amrozowicz et al. (1997) perform a 
probabilistic risk assessment of tanker groundings. Their work is mainly based on fault 
trees specifically designed to describe tanker groundings and allows for human error, 
which is investigated in detail. 
Rawson et al. (1998) developed an index for the evaluation of the environmental 
performance of tankers in accidental groundings and collisions. Another risk index was 
devised by Forsyth et al. (1997) for the lower Mississippi River. After constructing a 
“mile database” where each mile of the river is catalogued according to a series of risk 
factors characterising either the river itself or vessel traffic, weights are assigned to the 
factors and a simple algorithm is used to obtain the relative risk ranking. Among the 
river features taken into account are width, turns, anchorages, bridges, junctions, ferry 
crossings, currents, etc. 
The Committee on Oil Spill Risks from Tank Vessel Lightering et al. (1998) 
produced an extensive risk assessment report for lightering operations in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Lightering is a procedure carried out at a certain distance from the coast, where 
a vessel transfers its cargo (or part of it) to another vessel, smaller than the first. This 
operation is made necessary in areas like the Gulf of Mexico where most supertankers 
from the Middle East arrive with their cargo of crude oil and petroleum products, but 
are unable to enter the ports of destination because they are too wide and/or deep.3 The 
study is mainly based on past safety records and historical data and eventually proposes 
good levels of risk for lightering operations. 
                                                 
2  “The most significant weaknesses of the PWS Study are: (1) the lack of an overarching framework to 
ensure the consistency and logic of the analyses; […] (4) the treatment of human and organizational error; 
and (5) the appearance that conclusions are precise and logical, when in fact, they are neither” 
(Committee on Risk Assessment and Management of Marine Systems et al., 1998). 
3  Lightering is in fact similar to ship-to-ship bunkering, except that cargo is transferred instead of 
bunkers (hence amounts transferred are normally higher in the case of lightering). Moreover, bunkering is 
normally carried out in a port, whereas lightering is performed offshore. 
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The accident of the “Exxon Valdez” in March 1989 developed a wider awareness 
of the environmental risks entailed by maritime transportation of petroleum products. 
One of the major effects was the issue of the US OPA 90 (see section 1.3.1). Another 
result was the sudden increase of the efforts in the field of oil spill risk assessment. The 
end product of such endeavours is the report by the Committee on Risk Assessment and 
Management of Marine Systems et al. (1998). This is a short account of the massive 
“PWS Study” (where PWS stands for Prince William Sound, the tanker-busy sea inlet 
affected by the “Exxon Valdez” oil spill). The PWS Study uses three modelling 
approaches: MARCS (Marine Accident Risk Calculation System), fault trees, and 
simulation. MARCS is a method devised by Det Norske Veritas. MARCS treats all 
ships alike and assumes that they stay in assigned shipping lanes, using Gaussian 
probability distribution of a ship’s distance from the centre of the lane. The MARCS 
model calculates the probability of collisions and powered groundings using fault trees 
based on expert judgement for collisions of vessels that pass within a ship’s length of 
each other. The model can include weather and other environmental factors, such as 
currents, sea states, and wind, as well as geographical features. Oil outflow models and 
expert judgement questionnaires were used as well, coupled with each of the 
aforementioned approaches. Results of the PWS Study are somehow questioned by the 
steering committee and, ultimately, by its authors, who admit that the scope of the 
analysis was too large in comparison with the refinement of the tools employed. 
Recently, the federal and regional governments of Australia (AMSA, 2001; 
Queensland Transport & Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, 2000), have 
commissioned important risk assessment studies, above all in view of the development 
of a comprehensive national oil pollution plan, capable of protecting both the seashore 
environments and the invaluable coral reefs. These studies are mainly based on DNV’s 
in-house experience (e.g. MARCS). One of the final results is that the overall frequency 
of spills > 10 tonnes in ports is three times that of offshore spills. 
 
g. Emergency, contingency, safety. The design of comprehensive contingency and 
safety plans for the organisation of the response to oil spills is currently a hot topic. 
Regional and national governments as well as international institutions are making great 
efforts in order to avoid that disasters such as the “Exxon Valdez” and the “Prestige” 
accidents happen again. 
The example set by past accidents has been used to predict the most likely oil spill 
scenarios for emergency and contingency designing purposes. Etkin (2003) and 
Etkin (2004) perform a statistical analysis of the ERC’s in-house database of tanker oil 
spills and infer that: 
- 95% grounding spills are expected not to exceed 2.5 × 106 gal (= 9500 m3); 
- 50% grounding spills are expected not to exceed 2.7 × 105 gal (= 1020 m3). 
A typical example of national contingency plan for oil spills response is the 
Australian “National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and Other Noxious and 
Hazardous Substances” (AMSA, 2001). This plan, in place since 1973 and regularly 
revised, commits the port authorities and the regional governments to harmonise their 
efforts and resources with the aim of effectively fighting oil spill spread and carrying 
out fast recovery in the case of accidents. The Plan holds a wide range of response 
equipment at 37 locations around the Australian coast, including all major ports. Types 
of equipment include oil spill control booms of varying dimensions, self-propelled oil 
recovery vessels, static oil recovery devices and sorbents. This is complemented by 
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equipment held by port authorities, individual oil and chemical companies and by the 
Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre stockpile. The Plan is based on a risk assessment 
study. 
 
h. Response and cleanup. ITOPF (2004-1) describes the cleanup techniques currently 
available for oil spill recovery. A cleanup response is not always necessary. Often the 
oil remains offshore, where it is dissipated and eventually degraded naturally without 
affecting coastal resources or wildlife. In such cases, monitoring the movement and fate 
of the floating slicks to confirm the predictions may be sufficient. On this basis, some of 
the largest spills over the last 30 years have not required a cleanup response. In contrast, 
even a small spill, especially of a very persistent crude or heavy fuel oil, may call for a 
major response effort, especially if sensitive resources are threatened. Response can be 
performed at sea or onshore. Possibly, the most obvious means of intervening at sea is 
making use of booms and skimmers. The use of booms to contain and concentrate 
floating oil prior to its recovery by specialised skimmers is often seen as the ideal 
solution since, if effective, it would remove the oil from the marine environment. 
Unfortunately, this approach suffers from a number of problems, not least of which is 
the fact that it is in direct opposition to the natural tendency of the oil to spread, 
fragment and disperse under the influence of wind, waves and currents. Because of this, 
it is rare that, even in ideal conditions, more than a relatively small proportion (10-15%) 
of the spilled oil is recovered. Another option is represented by in-situ burning: because 
of the logistical difficulties of picking up oil from the sea surface and storing it prior to 
final disposal on land, an alternative approach involves concentrating the oil in special 
fireproof booms and setting it alight. In practice, this technique is unlikely to be viable 
in most ship-source spills, due to the difficulty of collecting and maintaining sufficient 
thickness of oil to burn. As the most flammable components of the spilled oil evaporate 
quickly, ignition can also be difficult. Residues from burning may sink, with potential 
long-term effects on sea bed ecology and fisheries. Dispersant chemicals, instead, work 
by enhancing the natural dispersion of the oil into the sea. The oil is broken down into 
tiny droplets that are dispersed into the water column, where they are diluted by currents 
and eventually break down naturally. Dispersants can be sprayed from boats, planes and 
helicopters. With good operational support, large quantities of oil spread over a wide 
area can be treated quickly and effectively. The controlled use of dispersants can reduce 
the overall impact of an oil spill on the environmental and economic resources. 
However, since the use of dispersants results in the oil being transferred from the sea 
surface into the water column, it is necessary to evaluate the relative risk to potentially 
sensitive resources in different parts of the marine environment. 
On the other hand, once oil has reached coastlines, response efforts should first 
focus on areas that have the heaviest concentrations of mobile oil, which could 
otherwise lead to further pollution of surrounding areas. Shoreline cleanup is often 
performed through a combination of techniques, including manual and mechanical 
removal, flushing or washing with water at high or low temperatures and pressures, and 
even wiping with rags and sorbent materials. Bioremediation is another alternative: the 
application of oil-degrading bacteria and nutrients to contaminated shorelines to 
enhance the process of natural degradation has generated considerable interest for more 
than two decades. So far, however, it has not proved technologically feasible nor 
beneficial for large-scale restoration projects. 
Finally, disposal of the oil recovered has to be carried out. At-sea recovery and 
shoreline cleanup generate substantial amounts of oil and oily waste that need to be 
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transported, temporarily stored and ultimately disposed of in an environmentally 
acceptable manner. Such operations often continue long after the cleanup phase is over.  
Liquid oil and oily water may be reprocessed at a refinery. Oily material can be used as 
a low-grade feedstock in some industrial processes and it may also be stabilised for use 
in construction projects, as a low-cost secondary raw material. More traditional disposal 
routes include incineration and landfill. 
Needless to say, all this operations are not free. The cost of oil spill response has 
been investigated by D.S. Etkin (1999-1), who later focused on shoreline cleanup costs 
(Etkin, 2001-3) and at-sea response (Etkin, 2001-2; see section 2.1.1.j) 
 
i. Spill prevention. Lentz & Felleman (2003) summarise the development of the major 
international measures taken to address the prevention of vessel oil spills: 
- Prevention of oil spills begins with ship design requirements. Thanks to 
Regulation 13F of MARPOL, of 1993 (see section 1.3.1), new tankers have 
be equipped with a double hull, a device consistently found to be effective 
in the prevention and mitigation of spills. Not until the year 2020 is the 
entire world fleet scheduled to be converted to double hulls. The US Coast 
Guard’s Programmatic Regulatory Assessment found that double hull 
requirements will reduce the number of spills for tankers and barges by 13% 
and 16% respectively, and the volume of oil spilled by 21% and 22% 
respectively in the future (PMG, 2001). Double hulls were found to be even 
more effective in an analysis of vessels in US waterways, which 
demonstrated that for collisions, groundings and allisions there is an order 
of magnitude reduction in spill volume that can be attributed to the double 
hull/double bottom designs. While there is general agreement that double 
hulls play an important role in the prevention of oil spills, there is some 
debate on the cost effectiveness of this measure, with a number of experts 
submitting that it is a costly measure in relation to its effectiveness. This 
assessment can be largely attributed to the failure of most cost-benefit 
analyses to fully account for the true value of environmental benefits 
associated with the prevention of spills. 
- Other design requirements that should be incorporated in international 
standards (but so far have not) are: redundancy, alarm, and automatic 
changeover for steering gear in event of single failure; increased powering; 
emergency or redundant propulsion; improved longitudinal bending 
moments; restricted use of high tensile steel to internal structures; 
requirement for inherent positive stability throughout cargo and ballast 
handling. 
- ISM Code. Beyond the actual design of a ship, the extent to which spills 
might be prevented depends in large part on the standards set and 
maintained by those responsible for managing ship operations. The 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code was adopted in 1998 to 
provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of 
ships. The ISM Code requires a documented management system designed 
to provide for the prevention of accidents involving ships and personnel, 
casualties and damage to the marine environment. 
- The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended, sets qualification 
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standards for masters, officers and watch personnel on seagoing merchant 
ships. The Convention was amended in 1995, largely in response to the 
major spills of the “Braer” (1993), the “Aegean Sea” (1992) and the 
“Scandinavian Star” (1990). 
- Port state control. Historically, the primary responsibility for ensuring that 
ships comply with international regulations has rested with the flag state that 
issues the necessary certifications attesting to such compliance. 
Unfortunately, certain flag States, for various reasons, fail to fulfil their 
obligations to ensure ships’ compliance with internationally agreed 
standards. As a result, some ships operate in a substandard condition, 
threatening crew safety and posing serious risks to the marine environment. 
Port states have become increasingly impatient with the failure of flag states 
to meet their obligations. These circumstances have motivated port states to 
undertake efforts within IMO under Resolution 632 to increase supervision 
and broaden the scope of authority of port states for inspection and 
detention of vessels. More importantly, a number of regional Memoranda of 
Understanding have developed over the years to improve port state control 
in particular areas of the world. The first of these Memoranda was signed in 
Paris in 1982 among 13 EU countries. Nowadays, virtually any port state 
has signed a regional Memorandum. 
- A key ingredient for effective “preventive salvage” is the availability of safe 
havens or ports of refuge for vessels in distress, where salvage and/or repair 
efforts can be safely undertaken in a more controlled environment. The 
enormity of this problem was demonstrated in the case of the “Castor”. This 
ship, laden with gasoline, developed a deck crack. The responding salvagers 
were forced to tow the casualty over 2000 miles around the Western 
Mediterranean as they sought shelter to perform a ship-to-ship cargo 
transfer. Government after government refused their requests for shelter. 
IMO responded to the Castor incident by agreeing to develop guidelines for 
coastal states for identifying places of refuge, including ports, sheltered 
waters and safe anchorages. In addition, guidelines will be prepared for the 
evaluation of risks posed by casualties and for advice to masters in 
emergency situations. 
Another problem that has to be addressed in the framework of oil spill prevention 
is the human factor. The US Oil Pollution Research and Technology Plan (Interagency 
Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, 1997) thoroughly insists on this 
point, which was later tackled by Harrald et al. (1998) in the context of the PWS Risk 
Assessment (see section 2.1.1.f). The authors state that studying human error based on 
historical data is virtually impossible, because of the lack of valuable information, 
though the development of maritime simulators can help to capture human error data. 
 
j. Economics of oil spills. In the last few decades, in the wake of disastrous marine oil 
spills, environmental scientists and economists have joined efforts to model the costs 
caused by the accidents, as well as the economic benefits deriving from prevention 
policies and strategies (Field, 1994). 
The costs of an oil spill are multifarious. Basically, it can be said that on the one 
hand there are direct costs, which are essentially cleanup costs, while on the other hand 
social and environmental costs have to be accounted for. The latter strongly depend on 
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the oil spill location. The damaged coastline can be rich in biodiversity/highly sensitive 
or, instead, lack substantial environmental value, the socio-economic setting can be 
strongly dependent on sea-related activities (fishery, aquaculture, tourism) or practically 
independent of it. As a result, studies have often focused on cleanup costs only, which 
can be traced back to a number of physical variables (though in a not straightforward, 
unambiguous way). Studies on the benefits of spill prevention and cost benefit analyses 
are also scarce.4 
There is general agreement (Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil 
Pollution Research, 1997; Etkin, 1999-1; White & Molloy, 2003) that the main 
technical factors influencing the cost of oil spills are: 
- Type of oil. Basically, light oils and light refined products disperse more 
readily, which means lower cleanup costs. Nevertheless, sometimes they 
constitute a fire/explosion hazard if spilled in confined situations, leading to 
potential closure of ports and industrial districts. In addition, light products 
tend to be more toxic than heavier oils and they can lead to mortality of 
marine plants and animals, as well as to tainting of edible fish, shellfish and 
other marine products. On the other hand, heavy oils, besides normally 
requiring higher cleanup costs because of poor dispersion, constitute a threat 
to seabirds and other wildlife. 
- Physical, biological and economic characteristics of the spill location. A 
spill occurring far from the coast tends to cause little or no damage, as oil 
will be dispersed before reaching the shore. The “Atlantic Empress” 
accident off the coast of Tobago (1979, West Indies) represents so far the 
world record in terms of amount spilled (280,000 t), but caused little 
damage and costs (also due to favourable wind and weather conditions; see 
CEDRE, 2000-1). Similarly the vulnerability of different shoreline types, 
the extent to which they are self-cleaning, the feasibility of manual cleanup, 
the availability of local labour and facilities influence the cost of spill 
cleanup. 
- Weather and sea conditions. 
- Amount spilled. There is an obvious relation between the costs of a spill and 
the amount spilled. In general, larger spills imply higher costs. Yet, such 
relation is not linear, as proved by Etkin (1999-1), who showed that the 
cleanup costs on a per tonne basis decrease significantly with increasing 
amounts of oil spilled. White & Molloy (2003) insist on the fact that it is not 
possible to design an equation capable of predicting the cost of a spill on the 
sole basis of volume spilled. The other factors mentioned in this list are 
equally important, if not more so (in the case of ports, this is not always 
true; see section 2.1.2.h). See also Sirkar et al. (1997) that take into account 
the environmental performance of tankers. 
                                                 
4  Of the scant number of studies dealing with this subject, it is worth mentioning at least Cohen (1986). 
In order to perform a cost benefit analysis, the author first describes the costs of preventing oil spills (see 
section 1.2.1.i), then tries to estimate the benefits of prevention. Total benefits consist of three 
components: reduced cleanup costs, reduced environmental damages, and the value of oil not spilled. 
However, the author admits it is not possible to estimate a benefit function, other than for the value of the 
non-spilled oil (for which oil price is the only information required). 
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- Time of the year. 
- Effectiveness of clean-up. Quite understandably, good management and 
rapidity of response (see section 2.1.1.h) are fundamental to limit spill costs. 
- Pattern of spillage. Some spills last months instead of few days. This makes 
necessary to maintain a comprehensive cleanup response (oil collection, 
chemical dispersal, booming, beach cleanup) for a long time, which leads to 
cost shoot up. This was the case of the accident of the tanker “Betelgeuse” 
(1979, South-West Ireland; CEDRE, 2004-1). 
How all these factors relate to one another is shown in Fig. 2.5. 
One of the early studies on oil spill costs was performed by Cohen (1986), who 
ultimately proposes this correlation for the cost of the recovery of the oil spilt: 
21
0cl
ααα fVC =  [2.1]
where Ccl is the cleanup cost, V the volume spilled, f = 0.83 and α0 = 5.346, α1 = 0.439 
and  α2  =  -  0.798  (for  ports).  The  relation  is  based  on  data  owned  by  the USCG, 
collected between 1973 and 1981 and regarding 95 accidents. It accounts for the 
recovery of the spillage.5 
 
Fig. 2.5. Interaction among the factors influencing the cost of oil spill cleanup (Etkin, 1999-1). 
                                                 
5  For more details on Cohen’s correlation, see Paper 6 (“Economic valuation of damages originated by 
major accidents in port areas”). 
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Later Etkin (1999-1) significantly improved –and complicated– the model. She 
devised a method for estimating cleanup costs (per tonne of oil recovered) based on five 
variables: location, shoreline oiling, oil type, cleanup strategy and amount spilled. 
Etkin (2000) further refined the model by adding two important independent variables: 
- Specific location, allowing for three types of spills: offshore, coastal, and 
port spills (see section 2.1.2.g). 
- Country location. In fact, the previous study (Etkin, 1999-1) was based on 
US spills only, while in this new analysis a number of historical spills 
happened worldwide is used for the estimations. The influence of country 
location is decisive: average cleanup costs, on a per tonne basis, vary by at 
least one order of magnitude (they are in the order of 1000 $ 2000 in the 
Middle East and 20,000 $ 2001 in North America). 
Etkin (2001-2) validates this model with satisfactory results. Finally, Etkin (2001-
3) deals specifically with shoreline cleanup costs. 
2.1.2 Port-specific papers and reports about oil spills 
a. Physical models. The models cited in section 2.1.1.b are generally valid for the 
enclosed waters of a harbour. Kung et al. (2001) propose the combination of various 
models found in the literature to give a comprehensive explanation of the various oil 
weathering phenomena and shoreline deposition. The authors then validate the model, 
testing it in a spill scenario designed for the Taiwanese Mai-Liau Harbour. 
 
b. Software programmes. Only few of the programmes mentioned in section 2.1.1.c 
can be used to model oil spill weathering and trajectory. One of these is GNOME by 
NOAA (NOAA, 2002-1). 
Bruzzone et al. (2000) devised a programme implementing models allowing for 
chemical risk in port areas, including a module for the estimation of oil spill trajectories. 
This takes into account the possible use of response facilities, like skimmers and booms. 
Kung et al. (2001; see section 2.1.2.a) implemented their model in a programme 
with graphic animations of the oil spill trajectory. 
 
c. Historical analysis, databases, statistics. Many of the studies cited in section 2.1.1.d 
present statistics that are related to offshore as well as port spills. In particular ITOPF 
reports are highly recommendable (see Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4). ITOPF (2004-2) presents 
interesting data about the origin of the spills (Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.6). The following 
considerations can be made: 
- Most spills from tankers result from routine operations such as loading, 
discharging and bunkering, which normally occur in ports or at oil 
terminals. 
- The majority of these operational spills are small. 91% involve less than 
7 tonnes; only 30 out of 335 major spills happened during (un)loading 
operations, while 95 and 114 were due to a collision or a grounding, 
respectively. 
- Accidents involving collisions and groundings generally give rise to large 
spills, with almost a fifth involving quantities in excess of 700 tonnes. 
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Table 2.1. Number of spills by cause, 1974-2003 (ITOPF, 2004-2). 
 < 7 tonnes 7-700 tonnes > 700 tonnes Total 
Operations     
(Un)loading 2812 326 30 3168 
Bunkering 548 26 0 574 
Other routine operations 1177 55 0 1232 
 
Accidents     
Collisions 167 274 95 536 
Groundings 228 212 114 554 
Hull failures 572 88 43 703 
Fires and explosions 85 11 29 125 
     
Other/unknown 2175 143 24 2342 
 
TOTAL 7764 1135 335 9234 
 Groundings
 Hull failures
 Fires & explosions
 Other/Unknown
28%
1.1%7.4%
2.9%
2.2%
15%
7.1%
36%
 (Un)loading
 Bunkering
 Other routine operations
 Collisions
 
13%
0.97%
7.8%19%
24%
4.8%2.3%
29%
0%
7.2%
8.7%
13%
34%
28%
9%
 
 
TOTAL
spills > 7 and < 700 tonnes
spills > 700 tonnes
spills < 7 tonnes
25%
1.4%7.6%
6%
5.8%
13%
6.2%
34%
 
Fig. 2.6. Causes of oil spills, as a function of spill size. Routine operations, like 
(un)loading and bunkering, which are mainly carried out in ports and marine 
terminals, are predominant in the case of small spills, while maritime accidents like 
groundings and collisions are more important for larger spills. 
The National Research Council (2002) has published several data that tend to 
confirm the above conclusions (Table 2.2). The NRC states that in the period 1990-
1999, coastal facilities were responsible of 8.5% of the number of spills and 98.3% of 
the total spilled volume. 
The already mentioned study by Lentz & Felleman (2003) analyses the often 
overlooked topic of land-based sources. These are of two types: non-point sources, like 
urban/coastal runoff and atmospheric input, and land-based facilities (tanks, pipelines, 
other onshore facilities). In general, non-point sources are neither port-based nor 
Oil spills 57 
 
incidental. On the other hand, land-based facilities are mostly found in port settings. 
Many releases are actually originated from spills made during delivery. Spills usually 
result from human error during tank filling. Overfills can result in large volumes of oil 
spilled. 
 
d. Frequencies. It is clear that tanker spills occur more frequently in ports than at sea, 
(and that consequences tend to be less severe, due to the immediate presence of booms, 
skimmers and other facilities and to the fact that ports are almost confined spaces). 
Nevertheless frequency data are not easily found in literature. The only reference worth 
citing is SLR (2000), where a brief outline of predicted spill frequencies for US ports is 
given (although with no theoretical rationale). 
 
e. Risk assessment and human error. A simple example of oil spill risk assessment is 
included in Howard (2001), whose probabilistic approach is based on ITOPF data. The 
already cited work by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA, 2001) contains 
the results of a six-month study carried out by Det Norske Veritas to produce a risk 
assessment of oil and chemical spills in Australian ports and waters.  
Walker (2000-1), in the frame of the US Coast Guard’s efforts to standardise its 
maritime risk assessment procedures (see section 2.2.3), presents the results of a HazOp 
(hazard and operability analysis) of a small (un)loading hydrocarbon terminal for 
barges. The analysis is successful, above all on account of the small size of the system 
under analysis. Otherwise, HazOp is not an easy technique to use with port systems. 
Harrald et al. (1998; see section 2.1.1.i) and Bruzzone et al. (2000) focus on 
human error as the specific cause of port spills. 
Table 2.2. Spills from land based facilities to US coastal and marine waters (National Research 
Council, 2002). 
Spill source No. of spills 1990-1999 
Total amount spilled 
1990-1999 
(tonnes) 
Average amount 
spilled per spill 
(tonnes) 
Aircraft/airports 25 156 6.2 
Coastal pipelines 
(refined products) 48 5,377 112.0 
Industrial facilities 409 2,528 6.2 
Marinas 26 63 2.4 
Marine terminals 335 5,727 17.1 
Military facilities 55 914 16.6 
Municipal facilities 131 1,181 9.0 
Reception facilities 4 11 2.1 
Refineries 56 910 2.8 
Shipyards 35 72 16.3 
Storage tanks 44 109 2.1 
Other 17 36 2.5 
TOTAL 1,185 17,084 14.4 
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f. Response and cleanup. Oil spill response and cleanup is easier in ports than at sea. 
Ports are generally sheltered systems, connected to the open sea via narrow entrances, 
which are easy to close. Furthermore, booms and skimmers are often available in ports 
and intervention is definitely faster than at sea. 
Port cleanup techniques can be different from those used in the open sea (Darbra 
et al., 2002). The choice of one or another depends on the molecular weight and the 
viscosity of the product spilled. 
In the case of light hydrocarbons (density > 27 ºAPI), one of the following options 
is usually chosen: 
- Evaporation. 
- Screws are used to stir water, so as to make dissolution and evaporation 
easier. 
- Using dispersants (this can entail the environmental risk of contaminating 
bottom sediments and benthos). 
- Using absorbents, in the shape of barriers (e.g. lipophilic polypropylene), 
wood shavings, peat, etc. In order to be effective, these have to be put in 
place hastily, since they are in good operational conditions only if the slick 
is thick enough. 
Response to heavy hydrocarbon spills is usually accomplished using dispersants 
or skimmers. Booms are used in all cases, to hamper the expansion of the slick. 
Bioremediation and in-situ burning are not feasible in ports. 
 
g. Economics of oil spills. As it has been mentioned (see section 2.1.1.j), Etkin (1999-
1) devised a model for the estimation of cleanup costs of oil spills, which takes into 
account the specific location where the accident occurs. This can be either offshore, 
coastal, or a port. 
The model proposed by Etkin is the following: 
smotCC ⋅⋅⋅⋅= lu  [2.2]
nClrC ⋅⋅=l  [2.3]
ACC ⋅= ue  [2.4]
where Cu is the response cost per unit, Cl the cost per unit spilled, Cn the general cost 
per unit spilled in the country n, and Ce the estimated total response cost. The values of 
some of the modifiers (t, o, m, s, r, l) that appear in equations [2.2], [2.3] and [2.4] are 
shown in Table 2.3 in order to give an idea of how important factors like oil type, spill 
size, etc. are in the definition of the cleanup cost. The author warns that the model is 
affected by high uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is one of the few that allows for a high 
number of variables. Moreover it is capable of describing both spills at sea and in ports. 
Observing Table 2.3, it is possible to notice how, according to this source, the unit cost 
of a port spill is, on average, slightly lower than a coastal spill, but it is almost three 
times as much as the cost of an offshore spill. 
A lighter approach to the model can be found in Etkin (1998). French Mc Cay et 
al. (2002) and Etkin et al. (2003) use SIMAP (see section 2.1.1.c) to model several spill 
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scenarios in San Francisco Bay and eventually estimate cleanup costs, as well as social 
and environmental costs. 
Darbra et al. (2002) propose a simple method for port oil spill calculation, in 
which spill modelling is the step previous to the pricing of its cleanup. The scheme is 
summarised in Fig. 2.7 and Table 2.4. 
Table 2.3. Values of the modifiers of 
equations [2.2], [2.3] and [2.4] (Etkin, 
2000). 
Cost factor Modifier 
Oil type (t) 
No. 2 fuel (diesel) 0.18 
Light crude 0.32 
No. 4 fuel 1.82 
No. 5 fuel 1.82 
Crude  0.55 
Heavy crude 0.65 
No. 6 fuel 0.71 
Spill size (s) 
< 34 tonnes 2.00 
34-340 tonnes 0.65 
340-1700 tonnes 0.27 
1,700-3400 tonnes 0.15 
3400-34,000 tonnes 0.05 
>34,000 tonnes 0.01 
Location type (l) 
Near shore 1.46 
In-port 1.28 
Offshore 0.46 
Primary cleanup method (m) 
Dispersants 0.46 
In-situ burning 0.25 
Mechanical 0.92 
Manual 1.89 
Natural cleansing 0.10 
Shoreline oiling (o) 
0-1 km 0.47 
2-5 km  0.54 
8-15 km  0.54 
20-90 km  0.61 
100 km  1.06 
500 km  1.53 
Table 2.4. Estimated costs, itemised according to the 
operation (Darbra et al., 2002). 
Item Estimated cost (€ 2002) 
Cleanup/aeration:  
Preparing and transferring 
equipment 
100 €/h 
Labour (per person) 10 €/h 
Depreciation/rent of boat, fuel 80 €/h 
Transport (in casks) 20 €/m3 
Chemical analysis 500 €/spill 
Treatment 40 €/m3 
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SPILL INTERVENTION
Fluid properties 
(density, viscosity)
Spill properties 
(amount spilled)
Spill area estimation
Time until 
intervention
- Rate of recovery
- Width and 
effectiveness of 
skimmer
- Duration of 
intervention
- Amount recollected
- Cost of intervention
- Cost of transport
- Cost of treatment
 
Fig. 2.7. Model for the estimation of port spill cleanup 
costs (Darbra et al., 2002). 
2.2 Risk assessment of general port accidents 
This section deals with a number of aspects regarding risk assessment of port systems, 
not necessarily tied with the topic of oil spills. Risk assessment techniques are very 
numerous. It is not always possible to clearly differentiate among them. We tried to do 
it by dividing section 2.2 into four parts. 
Subsection 2.2.1 is devoted to historical analysis, i.e. the study of past accidents 
as a means of describing the trends of HazMat accidents regarding various 
characteristics. 
Subsection 2.2.2 focuses on the topic of frequency and probability of accidental 
events, as well as event and fault trees. These tools help define one of the two factors on 
which the definition of risk is based, i.e. the rate of occurrence of accidents. 
Subsection 2.2.3, instead, addresses those risk assessment techniques, as 
quantitative risk assessment and IMO’s Formal Safety Assessment, capable of 
combining both accidental frequencies and consequences in order to express the risk 
associated with a site or operation. The USCG’s Risk-based Decision-making 
Guidelines (USCG Research & Development Center, 2001) are mentioned as well, 
because they are a comprehensive collection of risk assessment tools for ports and 
maritime settings. 
Finally, subsection 2.2.4 deals with risk indices and risk ranking. The assessment 
methodologies reviewed here are consistent with the definition of risk as the product of 
frequency and magnitude of consequences; only, these methods are normally simpler 
than those reviewed in the previous subsection and require less effort in terms of time 
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Fig. 2.8. Relationships among various risk assessment techniques. 
and calculations. On the other hand, risk indices and ranking techniques are not 
designed to yield results expressed in standard risk units of measurements (e.g. expected 
casualties per year), which can make it difficult to compare risk levels of different 
facilities and to use the output for land use planning. 
All the abovementioned techniques are intermingled and depend on one another. 
Fig. 2.8 roughly describes these relationships. Historical analysis is often used as a 
means to estimate the frequency and/or probability of accidents and thus design event or 
fault trees (for example, Paper 3 is focused on a survey of two accident databases, 
which was carried out in order to define the probability of ignition and explosion of 
flammable spills). Moreover, historical analysis is often used for hazard identification. 
In this sense, it is often used as a previous step to quantitative risk analysis for the 
identification of hazardous scenarios. Frequencies, probabilities, event trees and fault 
trees, in turn, are all subsidiary tools to quantitative risk assessment. Actually, an 
important part of the work of QRA analysts is accomplished by resorting to lists of 
62 2 Bibliographic Survey 
 
frequency and probability data, which are then implemented into event and fault trees, 
as it will be explained later. 
Apart from this, it must be stressed that QRA, Formal Safety Assessment and 
other comprehensive risk assessment methods depend also on other information needs. 
A lot of data about the system analysed, the weather (and/or sea) conditions, the 
population density around the site under examination, etc., must be known in order to 
assess risk through these tools. The effects of dangerous scenarios, i.e. toxic 
concentrations, blast overpressure levels and fire thermal radiation, must also be 
estimated. 
More important than this, all of the above techniques and methods, possibly with 
the exception of historical analysis, are not independent from the use of expert 
judgement. Either they are designed based on expert judgement, as is the case with 
event trees and, above all, risk indices and ranking methods, or rely on the use of expert 
judgement when they are used in risk assessment. Quantitative risk assessment, for 
example, is a strictly formalised method, based on the mathematical integration of risk 
levels in or around the site analysed; nevertheless, a number of issues, such as the 
identification of proper hazardous scenarios and accident frequencies, directly involve 
the experience of the analyst. 
Where pertinent, the contributions of the present thesis to the field of risk 
assessment of HazMat activities in port areas are highlighted in the subsections below 
and discussed in relation to other studies. 
2.2.1 Historical analysis, databases, statistics 
A peculiar form of identifying hazards is turning to the so-called historical analysis of 
accidents. Referring to past accidents is always a good way of forecasting possible 
undesired events in the future. This kind of analysis is essentially a qualitative one, but 
allows to draw quantitative conclusions if many accident records are available (Casal et 
al., 1999). In several cases certain trends may be inferred from the data set, with respect 
to many variables and aspects involved in the accidents, such as: 
- Causes of the accidents; 
- Substances involved; 
- Amount of HazMat spilled; 
- Operation that was carried out when the accident occurred; 
- Accident type (fire, explosion, gas cloud, or, on a deeper level, type of fire  
–pool fire, tank fire, jet fire...–, explosion –UVCE, confined explosion, dust 
explosion...–, etc.); 
- Consequences of the accident (casualties, injuries, evacuees, economic loss, 
environmental damage). 
Moreover, past accidents represent “experimental data”: no doubt, they are 
achieved at a high cost but, once the damage is done, the valuable lessons they teach 
must not be discarded. This is most true in a field where experimental activities are 
almost impossible. So, accident analysis, in the few cases for which enough information 
is provided, is an effective means of validating physical models for thermal radiation, 
blast propagation and gas dispersion. 
For the above reasons, accident investigation is very important, and at present 
there are several public institutions aimed at analysing and recording HazMat accident 
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information. These can be either national or international bodies. The Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) and the National Response Center (NRC) must be cited as relevant 
institutions in the US. In the UK the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) must be 
mentioned. On a European level, the EU’s Major-Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) is 
the institution responsible for collecting and publishing relevant accident information 
about fixed installations. MAHB is the body to which every EU member country has to 
report accidents occurred in its territory at Seveso sites. 
If possible, not only accidents, but also incidents and near-misses6 should be 
recorded, because they provide information and lessons as valuable as those deriving 
from actual accidents, which caused life loss or damage to property. Nevertheless, this 
does not always happen, because most of the near-misses are not reported. The same 
occurs with some accidents, above all those that have not caused significant loss. 
Badoux (1983) discusses this aspect. 
Historical analysis is performed using accident databases. Several databases are 
available to the risk analyst, each having pros as well as cons. Some important 
databases listing HazMat accidents in general are reported in Table 2.5. An account of 
some of them has been given by Mannan (2004: vol. 3, Appendix 33) and Carol (2001). 
A number of databases are specifically devoted to marine accidents and spills. Table 2.6 
names and briefly describes some of them. More details on the MHIDAS can be found 
in the first and second paper of this PhD thesis (Darbra et al., 2005; Ronza et al., 2003). 
See Paper 3 of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2007-1) for a description and references of the 
MINMOD and the HMIRS. Another important source of information on the MINMOD 
is the study by Waters et al. (1999). Lin et al. (1998) used the MINMOD to draw 
quantitative conclusions about the factors affecting groundings of vessels on 
entering/exiting ports. Plenty of information about marine accident databases has been 
compiled by the US Coast Guard (USCG, n.d.) and the NTSB (2002). The databases 
listed in Table 2.6 do not necessarily focus on HazMat accidents. The most outstanding 
example is Lloyd's LMIS, which is about vessels in general, but has also data on marine 
and non-marine casualties (CBS Marine & BMT Reliability Consultants, Ltd., 2001). 
The inventory of Table 2.6 is not complete; among the databases not reported, DAMA 
(Norway; see for example Thevik et al., 2001, and Rømer et al., 1993), SAFIR 
(Norway), SYNERGI (Norway), MAIB-CHIRP (United Kingdom) must be mentioned. 
Some of them are briefly described by the USCG (1998). Most countries maintain a 
marine accident casualty database, be it in an electronic format or not. Caridis (1999) 
expresses the need for a unified reporting system, to be issued and maintained by a 
European institution and harmonised with IMO’s recommendations. 
A number of studies have been carried out using one of the aforementioned 
databases or, on occasions, some ad hoc accident list, in order to investigate trends of 
port and maritime accidents. Some of these studies are described below. Not all are 
                                                 
6  The difference between accident, incident and near-miss are quite confused. It can be said that 
accidents are events that have important consequences on human health, property and/or the environment, 
incidents have only slight consequences while near-misses only prove to have the potential for some 
important aftermath. Anyway confusing accidents with incidents or incidents with near-misses is 
common. 
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focused on HazMat, and yet have to be mentioned either because of methodological 
issues or their interesting results. 
Rømer et al. (1993) present the outcomes of a historical analysis of shipping 
accidents based on a Norwegian database (DNV’s DAMA) and a list built by the 
authors from data published in the “Incident Log” of the Hazardous Cargo Bulletin. 151 
accidents are scrutinised. Small event trees are drawn, and accidental frequencies 
estimated for each branch of them. Accident types allowed for are fire/explosion, 
collision, grounding and structural damage. Overall, this study does not put forth 
interesting conclusions, mainly because the sample analysed is not significant. 
Nevertheless the proposal for a taxonomy of shipping accidents is novel and the scheme 
of accident analysis is interesting (accidents with spills < 100 tonnes vs. others, fraction 
of deadly accidents, etc.). 
Later, the same research group (Rømer et al., 1995-1) proposed a more extensive 
analysis based on an in-house database including information about 2781 HazMat 
transportation accidents occurred between 1945 and 1993, of which 1780 affected 
shipping transportation while the remaining 1001 happened during land transport. The 
main outcomes of the study, which uses probability vs. number of fatalities (p-N) curves 
to compare different classes of accidental events, are the following: 
- 25% of shipping accidents occur in ports, 13% in inland waterways and 
60% in a full marine environment (either open sea, coastal environment or 
restricted waters). 
- The average number of victims as a consequence of a port accident is lower 
than the average number of victims of a full marine accident. 
- Shipping accidents are categorised according to operation (or “transport 
phase”). Although most of the accidents occur during navigation, mishaps 
occurred during cargo transfer and tank maintenance generally cause a 
higher number of fatalities, as shown in Table 2.7. 
- A comparison is carried out between shipping and land transportation 
accidents in terms of the distribution of fatalities, showing that vessel 
accidents easily involve higher mortality rates than land transportation 
accidents. This is probably due to a higher population density around the 
accident site. This population is often represented by the crew of the 
vessel(s) involved in the accident. 
Marí & Martín (1998) present the conclusions of a historical survey of ship fires 
that provoked at least one fatality. One interesting outcome of the study is that HazMat 
vessels (oil, chemical and gas tankers) are safer than generic cargo ships. 
Darbra & Casal (2004) is a historical analysis specifically focused on port HazMat 
accidents. The mishaps here considered are not necessarily shipping events; onshore 
events are taken into account as well, as long as they occurred in a port area. This is the 
first study to use the MHIDAS database, from which a sample of 471 accidents is 
extracted and investigated. The research behind this paper and, above all, the algorithm 
used to identify port accidents in the database were at the base of the efforts at the base 
of Darbra et al. (2005) and Ronza et al. (2003) –respectively Paper 1 and Paper 2–. The 
former study, in particular, has the same structure as Darbra & Casal (2004) and 
represents an improvement of this, since it is based on a sample of 1033 accidents. The 
main difference between Darbra & Casal (2004) and Darbra et al. (2005) is that the 
latter study makes use of a deeper categorisation of accidents, not dependent on
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Table 2.5. Some valuable accident databases. 
Database Scope Number of records Observations 
FACTS (managed 
by TNO, The Neth-
erlands) 
Worldwide scope. HazMat 
specific. Timespan covered: 
mainly events occurred in the 
last 75 years. 
> 21,400 Available on CD-ROM. Fee required. 
Updated yearly. TNO maintains also a 
mini-database (FRIENDS) containing 
the same records, but with less infor-
mation. 
HMIRS (managed 
by the RSPA of the 
US Department of 
Transport) 
Unintentional releases oc-
curred during transportation 
of hazardous materials in the 
USA. HazMat specific. 
Timespan covered: 1993- 
present. 
around 
150,000 spills 
Public, web-based.7 Available in data-
base format (not textual). Frequently 
updated. Huge amount of data. Very 
valuable for statistical purposes. Acci-
dent summaries not available. 
IRIS (managed by 
NRC, US) 
Telephonic reports of pollu-
tion incidents. Reporting to 
the NRC is required by the 
US Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act. HazMat 
specific. Timespan covered: 
1982-present. 
> 500,000 Public, free, web-based.8 Updated 
monthly. Accessible through queries or 
full downloadable spreadsheets. Accu-
racy and completeness depend on the 
entity submitting the report. Reports 
are often overstated and follow-up cor-
rections may not be made. 
MARS (managed 
by the MAHB, 
European Union) 
Accidents occurred in the 
European Union establish-
ments under the Seveso di-
rective. Fixed installations 
only, marine accidents are 
not included (see 
Kirchsteiger, 1998). HazMat 
specific. Timespan covered: 
1980- present. 
603 Web based.9 Accessible through que-
ries. Almost completely public and 
free (only some details are not avail-
able, e.g. the name of the plant where 
the accident occurred). Information is 
complete and accurate, but records are 
comparatively few.  
MHIDAS (managed 
by the HSE, UK) 
Accidents occurred with 
HazMat in any country or ac-
tivity. It includes maritime 
accidents as well. HazMat 
specific. Timespan covered: 
(practically) 1900-present. 
15,790 Available on CD-ROM (Health and 
Safety Executive, 2006). A fee is re-
quired to subscribe to the service. Up-
dated three times a year. Possibility of 
organising all the data in one table or 
spreadsheet. No clear criteria of inclu-
sion for the accidents. Average quality 
information, plenty of records. 
 
                                                 
7  <http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/inc/hmisframe.htm>, last consulted on September 21, 2006. 
8  <http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/foia.html>, last consulted on September 21, 2006. 
9  <http://mahbsrv4.jrc.it/mars/servlet/GenQuery?servletaction=ShortReports>, last consulted on 
September 20, 2006. 
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Table 2.6. Marine accident databases. 
Database Scope Number of records Observations 
LMIS (managed by 
the Lloyd’s Regis-
ter, UK/internation- 
al) 
Vessels > 100 GT. The 
LMIS includes 5 sub-data-
bases, one of which is about 
casualties aboard ships, but 
port accidents are not pre-
sent. Not HazMat specific. 
Timespan covered: last dec-
ades. 
> 85,000 
vessels filed 
Available in several electronic for-
mats. A costly fee is required. Very 
frequent updates. Accurate data. 
MARS (managed 
by The Nautical 
Institute, UK) 
Marine accidents. The Nauti-
cal Institute established the 
MARS in 1992 in response 
to its members’ needs. The 
MARS is a marine accident 
(and near miss) reporting 
scheme of a voluntary na-
ture: anyone may report an 
accident to The Nautical In-
stitute, on condition that the 
information is detailed. 
Nothing is published that 
may affect anonymity. Not 
HazMat specific. Timespan 
covered: 1992-present. See 
The Nautical Institute (n.d.). 
767 Hardcopies (journal Seaways) and 
web-availability10. Monthly updates. 
Full text descriptions of the accidents 
(~ 1 page per accident). No informa-
tion on location and ships involved in 
the accidents. 
MINMOD/MISLE 
(managed by the 
US Coast Guard) 
The MISLE has substituted 
previous USCG databases 
(PIRS, MSIS and 
MINMOD). It gathers infor-
mation about vessel casual-
ties in US waters. Not 
HazMat specific, but infor-
mation on any hazardous 
cargo involved can be re-
trieved. Timespan covered: 
1992-2001. 
> 170,000 
(MINMOD) 
Public. Web-based (textual). Valuable 
information. 
Table 2.7. Shipping accidents (Rømer et al., 1995-1). 
Transport phase % accidents 
% accidents 
with more than 
one death 
Sailing (i.e. navigation) 67 20 
Cargo transfer 15 32 
Empty tanks 7 74 
Other 11 21 
TOTAL 100 26 
 
                                                 
10  <http://www.nautinst.org/mars/index.htm>, last consulted on September 21, 2006. 
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MHIDAS classification, as all the records were checked prior to investigation in order 
to establish which operation, among seven possible (vessel approaching port, vessel 
manoeuvring in port, (un)loading vessel, vessel maintenance, storage of goods on land, 
process, and land transport), was being carried out when the accident occurred. This 
allowed for the examination of new issues not immediately retrievable from the 
database. 
One noteworthy study about HazMat accidents in onshore port-areas is 
Christou (1999). The author collects 617 HazMat accidents happened in marshalling 
yards and port areas from several databases (including MHIDAS, FACTS, and 
MAHB’s MARS). A series of p-N curves are estimated and proposed. The fact is 
stressed that EU Seveso directive does not affect these areas. 
Some authors have instead focused on port/marine accidents unrelated to the 
handling or transportation of hazardous materials. See Kite-Powell et al. (1997, 1998, 
1999), –which include a review of USCG vessel casualty data–, Nielsen (1999) and 
Hansen (1999) –who analyses data retrieved from USCG and Lloyd’s databases–. 
A comprehensive historical analysis of LNG accidents is found in CH·IV 
International (2004), where the good safety record of the LNG production and 
transportation chain is demonstrated. A review is presented of the quasi-totality of the 
accidents happened occurred in LNG export and regasification plants and to LNG 
carriers. Most of the accidents happened on land did not involve LNG directly, but are 
rather to be attributed to the formation of explosive atmospheres in enclosed spaces as a 
results of bad maintenance or to problems unrelated to the dangerous properties of 
LNG/natural gas (which is the case of the Staten Island, NY disaster of 1973, where 40 
workers lost their lives when the roof of an empty, under-maintenance LNG tank 
collapsed). 
As mentioned above, Paper 1 of this thesis (Darbra et al., 2005) is an account of a 
historical analysis of HazMat accidents in port areas.11 The analysis was carried out 
using the MHIDAS database. The principal contributions of this paper are the following 
(see Chapters 3 and 4 for more information): 
- It describes the distribution of port accidents according to the accident types 
(loss of containment, fire, explosion, gas cloud), according to the operation 
that was carried out when the accident occurred and the substance involved. 
- It also describes how lethal port accidents are, by showing a cumulative p-N 
curve (probability that an accident causes more than N deaths as a function 
of N). 
2.2.2 Frequencies, probabilities, event trees 
In the frame of probabilistic risk assessment and quantitative risk assessment, it is often 
necessary to assign: 
- A probability that a certain event happens instead of others. For example: 
the probability of a gas cloud being ignited, instead of being dispersed in the 
atmosphere. Probability is a dimensionless number between 0 and 1. 
                                                 
11  This study was originally published in the proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Loss 
Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries (Darbra et al., 2004). 
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- The frequency of a certain event happening over time. For example: the 
frequency of a tank failure. Frequency is expressed by way of 
events/duration units, normally yr-1. Thus, the frequency of a tank failure 
can be 1 × 10-7 yr-1 (once in ten million years). Alternatively, frequency can 
be expressed on a per-operation basis, especially if the failure is expected to 
occur only when a certain device, vehicle or machine is operating but not 
when it is not used. Example: a ship-ship collision in a port may be expected 
to happen, on average, once every ten thousand port calls. In this situation 
the unit of measurement is tailored according to the event considered. In the 
case mentioned, the unit of measurement is (port call)-1. 
Probability and frequency data are used above all in the frame of QRA analysis. 
In QRA, it is necessary to assign a frequency to every accident scenario identified. The 
frequency of the scenario is then multiplied by its consequences (e.g. the number of 
expected fatalities), to obtain the levels of individual or societal risk (see section 2.2.3). 
Frequencies are the expected rates of occurrence of an event, while a probability is the 
likelihood that an event, once it has happened, gives rise to a certain outcome. For 
example, once the frequency of tanker groundings in a port is defined (for example: 
3 × 10-1 yr-1), the risk analyst normally wants to know what is the probability that the oil 
or chemical substance transported is spilled. Supposing this is 0.1, a further question 
can arise, whether the spill can be ignited. If a probability of 0.4 is assigned to this 
outcome, then the analyst’s estimate of the frequency of a fire as a consequence of a 
tanker grounding in a port will be f = 3 × 10-1 yr-1 × 0.1 × 0.4  = 1.2 × 10-2 yr-1, i.e. a 
little more than once in 100 years. 
The above scheme of calculation entails a series of probability data, often arising 
from sheer expert judgement, but sometimes estimated on the basis of historical 
analysis. Furthermore, it involves a structured form of forecasting how an event 
evolves, called an event tree. Event trees are discussed in Paper 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
See the Fig. 1 of the latter paper for an example of event tree referred to an LPG spill. 
The way the above example frequency was obtained involves also the necessity to 
define the frequency of the initiating event (the grounding). In general, this is found by 
way of one of three methods: historical analysis, expert judgment or fault tree analysis 
(FTA). The first two methods are common when the event is strongly dependent on the 
human factor and/or conditions hard to describe in a “non-fuzzy” way. For example, a 
tanker grounding likely depends on visibility and weather/sea conditions, as well as on 
the pilot’s experience, but supposing that, when a tanker enters a port, there is bad 
weather and sea, little visibility and an inexperienced pilot onboard, it cannot be 
positively predicted that an accident will take place; similarly, it is possible that an 
accident happens even in the best possible conditions of sea, weather, etc. If, instead, 
the system under observation is rigidly depending on a series of devices that either work 
or do not work at all, then the fault tree technique can be applied. Fault trees work based 
on Boolean logic, obtained by combining the frequency of failure of a limited number 
of items (like valves, electrical devices, etc.) that make up the system under observation. 
The frequencies of failure of these items are the very basic elements of FTA. They are 
available in specialised databases for a wide range of items and devices (several types of 
flow valves, relief valves, engines, pumps, seals). They are always calculated after the 
observation of a large number of such devices during very long working times. The 
FTA approach is often used with chemical process risk analysis. Some authors have 
tried to use fault trees to describe events not determined by a rigid set of conditions, as, 
for example, vessel groundings and collisions as well as all types of transportation 
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accidents, but in our opinion this technique is inadequate in these cases. More on event 
trees and fault trees can be found in Mannan (2004) and Casal et al. (1999). 
The standard source for probability and frequency data in the frame of 
probabilistic risk assessment (including quantitative risk assessment) of hazardous 
materials activities –transport, storage, process– at a European level is Dutch CPR’s 
Purple Book (CPR, 1999; now available in a new edition: VROM, 2005). The Purple 
Book consists of two parts (Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999; Tiemessen et al., 1999) devoted 
to the risk assessment of fixed establishment and transport of hazardous materials, 
respectively. The Purple Book provides a complete framework for QRA. It was 
designed to standardise QRA in the Netherlands, in the frame of the Seveso directive, 
but was then adopted as a reference tool by several countries, including Spain (see 
section 1.3.2). Beerens et al. (2006) summarise the history of the frequency data 
included in these guidelines. The bulk of the figures proposed proceed from statistical 
studies –like IPO (1994)– performed on Dutch premises. Some of these studies, 
including the Rijnmond Report (Rijnmond Public Authority, 1982) are already more 
than two decades old. The new edition of the Purple Book, simply titled Guidelines for 
Quantitative Risk Assessment, does not entail relevant changes with respect to the 
former edition (1999), even if the CPR (Dutch Commission for the Prevention of 
Disasters) is now abolished and substituted by another organisation (Advisory Council 
on Dangerous Substances, AGS) that will soon deal with a re-edition of the document, 
with substantial changes. In fact, many claim that some data are outdated, as stressed by 
Beerens et al. (2006). 
The Purple Book is a Dutch study. Therefore, it is easy to understand why ports 
and waterways play an important role in it. The Purple Book, also known as CPR 18E, 
includes frequency data of several loss of containment scenarios for ports and maritime 
terminals. The frequency data corresponding to loading arm failures and vessel impact 
are used in Paper 4 of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2006-1). The ignition probability data for 
loading/unloading and waterway transport loss of containment events are listed and 
commented on in Paper 3 of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2007-1). 
In 1983, TNO published LPG, a Study, a “comparative analysis of the risks 
inherent in the storage, transshipment, transport and use of LPG and motor spirit” 
(TNO, 1983-1; TNO, 1983-2). This project is an early example of QRA, as applied to 
the entire LPG transport chain, as compared with other automotive fuels (see 
section 2.2.3). In this frame, the research group in charge of the project designed a 
series of frequency and probability data for LPG accidents, which cover many 
port/maritime events, from ship groundings and collisions to pipeline and loading arm 
failures. 
Four Elements Ltd (n.d.) is another interesting source of frequency data for oil 
and LPG carrier groundings. 
Roeleven et al. (1995) describe a method to calculate the probability of an 
accident in the frame of a model that calculates the integral impacts of safety measures 
for the entire waterway system in the Netherlands, including the risks of transporting 
dangerous goods. The probability of an accident is modelled per elementary traffic 
situation (a combination of several ships carrying out a ship motion produces a traffic 
situation) as a function of the attributes of the waterway and the specific circumstances. 
The primary governing variables appear to be visibility, wind speed, the ratio of the 
navigable width and the necessary width for an elementary traffic situation, and the 
bend radius of the waterway. The circumstances (visibility and wind speed) are more 
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explanatory with respect to the probability of accidents than the waterway 
characteristics are. 
Rømer et al. (1995-2) describe the results of a review of marine accident 
frequencies reported in 20 different sources. There seems to be consistency within the 
sources in the use of the terms total loss, casualty and accident/incident. The rates were 
observed to decrease by an order of magnitude going from accident/incident to casualty 
and likewise from casualty to total loss. The overall frequencies were found to be in the 
range of 0.009 to 0.07 total losses per 10-6 ship miles, 0.03 to 1 casualties per 10-
6 ship miles, and 0.5 to 13 accidents/incidents per 10-6 ship miles. It was found that the 
frequency depends on visibility, brightness, geographical environment, age of vessel 
and size of vessel. Collision and grounding frequencies were found to increase with 
decreasing visibility, brightness and more restricted waters. Collision frequencies were 
found to increase with increasing size of vessel. Fire/explosion and structural damage 
frequencies were found to increase with increasing age, and collisions to decrease with 
increasing age. No firm trend was found from the effect of flag state or type of vessel. 
Amrozowicz et al. (1997) put forth fault trees describing the accidental powered 
grounding and drift grounding of oil vessels. The proposal is original but questionable, 
because it is an attempt at formalising, in a quantitative way, the development of a 
series of human actions. As mentioned above, fault trees are a good tool for describing 
systems mainly controlled by automatic devices, but are often defective when it comes 
to analyse human error. 
The frequency of vessel groundings and collisions in US waters was studied by a 
team leaded by Hauke Kite-Powell (Kite-Powell et al., 1997, 1998, 1999) in the frame 
of risk factor prioritisation (see section 0). 
Correa Ruiz et al. (1999) use statistical traffic data in order to estimate the 
frequency of collision of vessels in the Algeciras-Gibraltar bay.  
Det Norske Veritas (2001) estimate the frequency of oil leaks around floating 
production, storage and offloading installations, using several base probabilities 
proceeding from different studies like McMahon Anderson & LaBelle (1994). 
A collection of frequencies for maritime accidents in the context of the 
transportation of oil and other hydrocarbons can be found in Álvarez & Larrull (2003). 
Ligthart (1980) opened up the way to the study of the frequencies of accidents in 
LNG transportation. Accident and traffic data for the period 1963-1974 and the port of 
Rotterdam were used to identify the frequency of collision and grounding of LNG 
carriers entering or leaving the port. This area was selected because of its high traffic 
density and the variety of vessels calling there. Only 70 accidents had occurred in the 
period analysed so the possibilities for extensive investigation were limited. Anyway 
the author proposes frequency data ranging from 3 to 25 collisions per 100,000 vessel 
movements, while no figure is proposed as regards groundings. 
This thesis includes two contributions on the topic of probability data. In Paper 2 
of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2003) a description is found of how event trees for port 
accidents were obtained based on historical analysis. The research was carried out using 
a sample of 828 port accident records, retrieved by way of a specific methodology from 
the MHIDAS database (see section 2.2.1). Due to the limitations imposed by the 
MHIDAS data, the event trees considered are of a basic type. They take into account 
sequences of the following events: loss of containment, fire, explosion, gas cloud. An 
interesting element of this study is that all port operations involving HazMat handling or 
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storage are accounted for. Nevertheless, some operations –process, land transport, 
maintenance– are so scantily represented that no positive statistical conclusion can be 
drawn as to the level of risk they entail. The results of this study were further refined 
–although without substantial changes– following the introduction of some 200 more 
accident records into the data sample (Ronza et al., 2004-1; Ronza et al., 2004-2). 
The second study on probability data is Ronza et al. (2007-1) (Paper 3 of this PhD 
thesis), which is focused on the probability of ignition and explosion of flammable 
spills happened during the transportation of hazardous materials. This analysis is based 
on two US federal databases: the Department of Transportation’s HMIRS and the US 
Coast Guard’s MINMOD. The former was used to infer a model to predict the ignition 
and explosion probability of road/rail transportation spills, while the results obtained 
from the latter are relevant to maritime spills. Among other things, this article can be 
considered as a source of ignition/explosion probability data for their use in quantitative 
risk analysis of port environments, as opposed to land transportation. Moreover, the 
paper –by expanding a previous, briefer report (Ronza et al., 2005)– reviews several 
probability data found in specialised literature. 
2.2.3 Comprehensive risk assessment techniques 
The present section is devoted to risk assessment methods accounting for hazard 
identification, frequency and probability of hazardous events, and the consequences of 
accident scenarios. In other words, these methods deal with risk as defined in 
section 1.1, i.e. the arithmetic product of the consequences by the frequency of accidents 
over time. Three sets of techniques will be analysed separately: 
- Quantitative risk assessment (QRA), a method that rigorously follows the 
definition of risk. 
- Formal safety assessment (FSA), a sort of adaptation of the QRA techniques 
to ships and maritime settings in general, as promoted by the IMO. 
- USCG's Risk-based Decision Making Guidelines, a set of methodologies in 
use at the Marine Safety Offices of the US Coast Guard. 
 
a. Quantitative risk assessment. A classic description of quantitative risk assessment 
is found in Pietersen & van het Veld (1992). QRA aims at estimating the risk entailed 
by a system, in terms of human loss or, on some occasions, economic loss. QRA results 
are presented in two forms: 
f-N curves. After completing a QRA process, the frequency (f) of and the 
number of victims (N) caused by a number of accident scenarios are known. 
It is therefore possible to draw a plot representing the frequency of the 
events against their importance in terms of victims caused. Such curves, 
normally  plotted  in  a  log-log  space,  represent  the frequency of accidents 
with more than N casualties. Therefore, f-N curves are always decreasing. 
They are often used to test the system analysed in terms of acceptable risk 
against some criteria defined in regulations and guidelines. Acceptability 
criteria are sometimes represented by way of straight, decreasing lines, and 
mathematically expressed by the following equation: 
constant=αfN  [2.5]
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Fig. 2.9. Example f-N curve (––––), partially exceeding the 
acceptable level of risk (––––). 
Risk must be considered acceptable if the f-N curve lies entirely below the 
acceptability line (see Fig. 2.9). 
- Risk contours or iso-risk curves. These curves represent the levels of 
individual risk12 around the installations analysed. They are used above all 
for land use planning, i.e. to ensure that residential areas, schools, hospitals, 
etc., fall outside specific risk contours. A common risk acceptability level is 
10-6 yr-1. An example of iso-risk map is Fig. 4 of Paper 4 of this thesis 
(Ronza et al., 2006-1). 
As mentioned before, QRA builds on a number of other methods, including historical 
analysis as a tool for hazard identification, as well as fault and event trees. Moreover, 
quantitative risk analysis makes use of accident consequence calculation and 
vulnerability theory in order to fully define individual risk. The combination of all these 
tools into a single methodology makes QRA a very comprehensive instrument. For the 
same reason, QRA is more demanding than other risk assessment techniques, in terms 
of time and training required to the risk analyst. Nowadays, a series of computer 
programmes are available on the market, which help accomplish the cumbersome QRA 
tasks. These include DNV's SAFETI and TNO's RISKCURVES. The latter was used in 
the frame of Paper 4 of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2006-1). Fig. 2.10 summarises the 
various steps involved in a QRA. 1.3.1. See Casal et al. (1999), Mannan (2004) and 
Pietersen & van het Veld (1992) for more insights on QRA. 
                                                 
12  If risk is expressed in terms of fatal victims, individual risk is a function of the spatial coordinates 
representing the probability that an individual, placed during one year in a fixed point, die as a 
consequence of the accidents considered for the system analysed, whereas societal risk is the expected 
number of casualties per year. The unit of measure of individual risk is yr-1, that of societal risk is 
casualties · yr-1. Societal risk is calculated as follows: 
( ) ( )[ ] yxyx dd ,densitypopulationriskIndividualrisk Societal ∫ ⋅=  
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Fig. 2.10. Steps required to perform QRA. 
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The first milestones of quantitative risk assessment of large HazMat 
handling/storage/processing areas are the two Canvey Reports, by the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (Health and Safety Executive, 1978; Health and Safety Executive, 
1981), and the Rijnmond Report, issued by the Rijnmond Public Authority (1982). 
These studies, which were later used in the implementation of QRA reference guides 
such as the Dutch Purple Book (CPR, 1999; VROM, 2005), are comprehensive hazard 
assessment of specific industrial areas located at the mouth of, respectively, the Thames, 
in the UK, and the Rhine, in the Netherlands.13 They were commissioned by public 
authorities (the Health and Safety Commission in the case of the Canvey Reports and 
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs for the Rijnmond Report) in response to the 
requirements of the industry and the population, both concerned about the risks entailed 
by such large concentrations of HazMat handling and storing facilities. These studies 
are so important that they are treated by Frank P. Lees in separate, extensive 
Appendices to his monumental Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (Lees, 1996-1; 
Lees, 1996-2). It is interesting to note that both Canvey Island and the Rijnmond district 
are complex industrial port areas. The former falls under the jurisdiction of the Port of 
London Authority and the latter belongs to the Port of Rotterdam. 
At the time of the risk assessment behind the reports, Canvey Island facilities 
included an LNG storage/regasification plant, two LPG terminals, an oil products 
storage terminal, two oil refineries, an ammonium nitrate plant, while the construction 
of two new oil refineries was under way. The Canvey Reports, the first one in 
particular, represent an important effort in the investigation of accident frequencies. 
These were obtained by way of several methods entailing different levels of uncertainty. 
Where possible, they were assessed statistically from historical data; otherwise they 
were estimated on the basis of expert judgement or simplified fault trees. Failure data 
include the possibility of ship collision, groundings, etc.14 The first Report was not well 
received by some of the parties involved, because the estimated levels of societal risk 
were deemed too high. It is generally recognised that risk was in fact overestimated, 
mostly due to an exaggeratedly conservative approach. Nevertheless, in the wake of the 
publication  of  the results, several improvements were put in place in some of the plants 
affected. These changes and the criticisms received drove the HSE to carry out a new 
study, whose results were published in 1981 in the second Canvey Report. An important 
improvement of the second Report was the introduction of a full set of ignition 
probability data for flammable clouds, which are reviewed and commented in Paper 3 of 
this thesis. 
One year after the issuing of the second Canvey Report the Rijnmond Public 
Authority published the Rijnmond Report, in five parts, including a review by an 
external party (the Battelle Institute), to ensure the neutrality and reliability of the study. 
The scope of the report, as its full title indicates, are “six potentially hazardous 
industrial objects in the Rijnmond area”, which include five storage facilities 
(acrylonitrile,  ammonia,  chlorine,  LNG  and propylene) and a hydrodesulphuriser. The 
major achievement of this project is the reorganisation of a great deal of failure 
                                                 
13  “Rijnmond” is Dutch for “mouth of the Rhine”. Rijnmond is in fact the greater Rotterdam metropolitan 
area. 
14  These latter data are used in the fourth publication of this Ph.D. thesis (Ronza et al., 2006-1). 
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frequency data collected from several sources. The failure events considered allow for a 
large inventory of pieces of equipment such as tanks and vessels, pumps and pipework 
–including hoses and loading arms–, valves, instrumentation and electrical equipment. 
Another important aspect of the study is the high effectiveness of the representation of 
the results, achieved by way of f-N curves and risk contours. The Rijnmond project was 
focused on land installations; so, although these belong to a port area, no specific port 
accident events, such as vessel (un)loading spills and ship groundings/collisions, were 
included in the scope of the study. As Beerens et al. (2006) demonstrate, the Rijnmond 
Report is the main source of data for the Purple Book. 
The CPR 18E, or Purple Book (CPR, 1999; VROM, 2005; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 
1999; Tiemessen et al., 1999; see section 2.2.2) not only defines the frequencies of 
several maritime transportation accidents, but also describes an approach to quantify the 
amounts spilled from punctured vessels (see Table 2.8). Though this is not justified in 
any way and is likely the result of expert judgement, it is probably a good approach for 
spills likely to happen in a port, which are generally smaller than those in open sea. The 
Purple Book does not include any other specific guideline on maritime and port 
accidents. 
The Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis by the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety of the AIChE (CCPS, 1995) is the US reference guide to 
performing HazMat transportation QRA. Together with the CCPS' Guidelines for fixed 
installations (CCPS, 1989), it represents a sort of American counterpart to the Purple 
Book. The Dutch and American guidelines do not contradict each other, but can be used 
together to complement possible missing data in one of the two sources. CCPS' 
Guidelines are a solid source of information on quantitative risk analysis, more mature 
and general than the scattered, project-specific data provided by the Canvey and 
Rijnmond Reports. 
Table 2.8. Risk analysis approach to maritime spills, as suggested by the Purple Book. 
Modes of loss of containment for ships in an establishment 
L.1 Full bore rupture of the loading/unloading arm: 
- Outflow from both sides of the full bore rupture. 
 
L.2 Leak of the loading/unloading arm: 
- Outflow from a leak with an effective diameter equal to 10% of the nominal diameter, with a 
maximum of 50 mm. 
 
E.1 External impact, large spill: 
- Gas tanker continuous release of 180 m3 in 1800 s 
- Semi-gas tanker (refrigerated) continuous release of 126 m3 in 1800 s 
- Single-walled liquid tanker continuous release of 75 m3 in 1800 s 
- Double-walled liquid tanker continuous release of 75 m3 in 1800 s 
 
E.2 External impact, small spill: 
- Gas tanker continuous release of 90 m3 in 1800 s 
- Semi-gas tanker (refrigerated) continuous release of 32 m3 in 1800 s 
- Single-walled liquid tanker continuous release of 30 m3 in 1800 s 
- Double-walled liquid tanker continuous release of 20 m3 in 1800 s 
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Table 2.9. Sea-going vessel casualties per 10,000 port calls, collected in CCPS (1995; original 
source: Sandwell, Inc., 1991). 
Casualty type All tankers Chemical tankers Tanker barges 
Collisions 1.0 1.25 1.5 
Groundings 4.0 4.80 1.0 
Strikings (rammings) 7.0 8.75 7.5 
Fires/explosions 2.0 2.20 0.5 
Structural failures 0.5 0.53 1.5 
TOTAL 14.5 17.5   12.0 
The Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis are strictly focused on 
HazMat  transportation.  They  are  designed to assess the individual and societal risk of 
transportation routes and account for pipelines, rail tankers, road tankers, barges, ocean 
going vessels and intermodal containers. In the context of ports and maritime transport, 
the major point of interest of this document is the collection of ship accident frequencies 
and spill probabilities, some of which are reported in Table 2.9. Other interesting 
chapters of the Guidelines are devoted to examine a series of ignition probability data 
and algorithms, which are reviewed in Paper 3 of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2007-1) and 
to list and assess an extensive collection of information on transportation accidents, 
including the HMIRS and MINMOD databases, also used in that publication. 
A more recent QRA approach to port areas is the ARIPAR method, which was 
first adopted for a pilot study of the Ravenna industrial/port area (Adriatic Sea, Italy), 
featuring both chemical and petrochemical establishments (Amendola & Contini, 1998). 
Egidi et al. (1995), in describing the methodology, recognise the debt they owe to the 
Canvey Reports, recognised as the first effort to draw a consistent QRA methodology 
for large industrial districts, including marine terminals. The pilot study allowed for 
fixed installations and HazMat transportation, i.e. road and rail transportation, 
marshalling yards, pipelines, and ship transportation. The near absence (at that time) of 
historical data to predict carrier accident frequencies is stressed (see section 2.2.2). 
An example application of the ARIPAR methodology is given in Lisi et al. (2003) 
for the industrial area of Gela (Sicily, Italy), including its port. An interesting result of 
this project was that the expected mortality rate specifically due to the maritime 
transport of dangerous goods is lower than that due to road and rail transport and fixed 
plants, which is the same result obtained for the Ravenna area in 1993 (Egidi et al., 
1995). 
Overall, the ARIPAR methodology is not really innovative as compared with the 
classic QRA method summarised by Pietersen & van het Veld (1992), although it is one 
of the first QRA methods to incorporate GIS tools (see e.g. Maschio et al., 2001). 
It is noteworthy that the ARIPAR methodology, like the Canvey and the Rijnmond 
Reports –all important efforts to improve HazMat QRA techniques– were focused on 
port industrial areas. All of those projects were made possible by substantial public 
funding. This demonstrates that the sheer magnitude of port industrial districts, as well 
as their proximity to urban areas, greatly concern the general public and the authorities. 
Liquefied gas handling, loading and unloading entail very specific safety features 
(see section 1.2.1). Overall, the LPG and LNG industries' have a cleaner safety record 
than other HazMat-related ones. Nevertheless, they have always been a major concern 
because of their potential for being sources of large scale accidents. Although the 
interest in the safety assessment of LPG storage and LNG regasification plants is as old 
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as general HazMat risk analysis (see Keeney et al., 1979; Konkel, 1987), the institutions 
involved in gas trade are still making efforts to demonstrate that the gas industry is 
willing to further reduce the risk of accidents (SIGTTO, 1999). These endeavours are 
particularly intense in the case of LNG, which is getting more and more important in the 
global energy market. This forces the LNG industry, as well as the public authorities 
that back it, to influence the public opinion with regard to the great opportunities 
offered by regasification plants as compared to their low environmental cost and high 
safety standards. 
Additionally, regasification plants have recently been indicated as potential major 
targets of terrorist attacks (Fay, 2003-2). However, the technology employed in these 
terminals is generally very advanced –and inherently safe–, especially if compared to 
most oil terminals. 
An early but complete example of QRA of a marine LNG terminal is found in 
Keeney et al. (1979), who, however, fail to justify adequately the frequency/probability 
data used. 
The already mentioned LPG, a Study (TNO, 1983-1; TNO, 1983-2) is a sort of 
QRA analysis applied to the entire LPG and motor spirit (petrol) transport chain, 
including maritime/waterway transport, vessels unloading at berth and storage at port 
terminals. A full range of accident scenarios are considered for each of the typical 
settings where LPG is handled and/or stored. Finally, f-N curves are estimated, in order 
to compare the societal risk entailed by the LPG and the motor spirit transport chains. 
The analysis showed that, in terms of societal risk, motor spirit, i.e. petrol, is safer than 
automotive LP gas (TNO, 1983-2). The LPG Study was performed in the wake of the 
Rijnmond Report, thus making extensive use of the experience gathered in that previous 
study. 
The study by Boult (2000) is an example QRA for the LPG logistic chain into and 
out of a port area, much in the style of the LPG Study. 
Quantitative risk analysis techniques, as well as other forms of risk assessment, 
have seldom been used with container terminals, warehouses and other temporal storage 
areas. Rigas & Sklavounos (2002) give an example of risk analysis for port marshalling 
yards and warehouses. However, they overlook the topic of accident frequencies. The 
authors consider four different accident scenarios: ethylene oxide BLEVE, toxic 
dispersion and UVCE and toxic dispersion from a pesticide fire. Royal 
Haskoning (2003) carried out a complete QRA for a projected container terminal. This 
study, however, is not satisfactory, because it only covers few hazards among several 
possible accident scenarios expected in such a complex setting as a container terminal. 
Temporal storage poses an important challenge to risk analysis. The inventory and 
placement of dangerous goods in these areas are not fixed. They are instead subject to 
continual change. This makes it difficult to describe them by way of classic QRA and 
other methods based on the identification of relevant accident scenarios. Moreover, to 
our knowledge, there is a generalised legislative gap regarding these settings, which, 
however, are gaining more and more importance as a result of the exponential growth of 
container transportation. In our opinion, it is possible to satisfactorily deal with 
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temporal HazMat storage sites by using other risk assessment methodologies, like risk 
indexing/ranking.15 
The present thesis contains two contributions focused on QRA, i.e. Papers 4 
and 5. The former, titled “A Quantitative Risk Analysis Approach to Port Hydrocarbon 
Logistics” (Ronza et al., 2006-1) summarises the main findings of the major-accident 
section of a project called FLEXRIS,16 which was carried out in 2003-2004. The 
principal aim of this project was to develop a method to valuate, from the economic 
point of view, the consequences of HazMat handling in port premises. In order to devise 
and demonstrate the method, a pilot study was carried out on the facilities of the Port of 
Barcelona. The scope of the study was restricted to hydrocarbon logistics, that is to say 
the transportation of oil products –including LPG– plus liquefied natural gas to/from 
berths and jetties, as well as the (un)loading operations of those products to/from 
tankers. While a research team focused on long-run ecological risk (Centre Tecnològic 
de Manresa, 2004), another (Arnaldos et al., 2004) concentrated on accidental risk. A 
third team (González et al., 2004) collected the results of the two former and translated 
them into monetary units. The major-accident study (Arnaldos et al., 2004) generated 
the above mentioned Journal of Hazardous Materials article and its results were also 
reported at an international congress (de Pablo et al., 2005). This study is an attempt at 
defining, in a standardised way, a consistent methodology to perform the quantitative 
risk assessment of port milieus, as regards maritime energetic hydrocarbon 
transportation and (un)loading operations. One of the major contributions of the paper is 
a structured scheme to predict the frequencies of tanker accidents, which is based on the 
possibility of a tanker being struck while at berth/during navigation, striking another 
vessel or grounding. The study puts forth two different methodologies for punctual 
accident events (accidents that occur while the vessel is at berth and (un)loading spills) 
and “linear” accident events (accidents that occur while the vessel is in route to/from the 
berth). 
Paper 4 also contains a shortcut to predict the number of injured people based on 
the number of fatal victims. This shortcut, specifically devised for port quantitative risk 
assessment, helps estimate the number of injured victims without further calculations 
than those needed for determining the number of fatalities. QRA sometimes poses the 
problem of finding the number of non-fatal victims. The standard way to solve the 
problem is to apply vulnerability analysis. Vulnerability equations are empirical 
relations that link the effects of accidents (thermal radiation, overpressure, toxic 
concentration) with the probability that a certain receptor suffers a certain consequence, 
via a probit function. The receptor can be a human individual or an object, like a 
structure or some piece of equipment. In the case the receptor is a person, the 
consequence examined can be either death or some kind of injury. For example, given 
an explosion whose overpressure is 1200 mbar at a certain location, it is possible to 
estimate that the probability that an individual dies because of pulmonary haemorrhage 
                                                 
15  However, we have not found in the literature any such method specifically designed for container 
terminals. This could be an interesting line of research for the future. 
16  Acronym for “Nueva metodología Flexible para la valoración económica de los Riesgos ambientales – 
Aplicación a la logística de hidrocarburos en el Port de Barcelona” (New Flexible methodology for the 
economic valuation of Environmental risks – A case study: the logistics of energetic hydrocarbons at the 
Port of Barcelona). 
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is 10% and the probability that he or she suffers ear drum damage is 59% (Casal et al., 
1999). The probit calculation of the number of injured people can be tedious. The 
analyst can deem excessive the effort required, especially if only a rough approximation 
is needed, as it often happens. The goal of the quick method presented by Ronza et 
al. (2006-1) is precisely a way to help estimate the number of injured people bypassing 
the cumbersome probit calculations. The shortcut scheme is based on the historical 
analysis of the port accidents considered in previous research (Darbra et al., 2005). 
The topic of the relationship between the number of fatal and non-fatal casualties 
of major accidents is further developed in Paper 5 of this thesis (Ronza et al., 2006-2). 
This paper is not focused on port/maritime milieus alone, but on accidents at large. The 
article reports the results of statistical research carried out on a large accident sample 
retrieved from the MHIDAS databases by way of techniques such as principal 
component analysis and data clustering, among others. A simple correlation was found 
that estimates the mean number of injured people as a function of the number of fatal 
victims. 
 
b. Formal Safety Assessment. In 1997 the IMO introduced a new scheme that is 
gaining importance year after year: the Formal Safety Assessment. FSA represents an 
important attempt to spread risk assessment practice in the maritime area. IMO (n.d.) 
defines FSA as a “way of ensuring that action is taken before a disaster occurs”. In 
IMO’s words, FSA is “a systematic process for assessing the risks associated with 
shipping activity and for evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO’s options for reducing 
these risks”. 
FSA can be used as a tool to help evaluate new regulations or to compare 
proposed changes with existing standards. It enables to draw a balance between various 
technical and operational issues, including the human element and between safety and 
costs. FSA, which was originally developed as a response to the Piper Alpha disaster of 
1988,17 is now being applied to the IMO rule making process. Interim guidelines were 
adopted in 1997 and IMO Member States have been invited to carry out trials and report 
back to IMO. 
FSA consists of five steps: 
1) Identification of hazards, i.e. preparing a list of all relevant accident 
scenarios with their respective causes and outcomes; 
2) Assessment of risks, i.e. evaluation of risk factors; 
3) Risk control options, i.e. devising regulatory measures to control and reduce 
the identified risks; 
4) Cost benefit assessment, i.e. determining cost effectiveness of each risk 
control option; and 
5) Recommendations for decision-making, i.e. defining a decision strategy 
based on the results obtained in the previous steps. 
Application of FSA can be relevant in the case of proposals for regulatory 
measures that have broad implications in terms of costs or imply administrative and 
                                                 
17  When an offshore platform exploded in the North Sea causing 167 fatal victims. 
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legislative burdens. The basic goal of FSA is to facilitate a transparent decision-making 
process. In addition, FSA provides a means of being proactive, enabling the interested 
parties to consider potential hazards before a serious accident occurs. In IMO’s 
intentions, FSA represents a fundamental change from what was previously a largely 
piecemeal and reactive regulatory approach to one that is proactive, integrated, and 
above all based on risk evaluation and management in a transparent and justifiable 
manner, thereby encouraging greater compliance with the maritime regulatory 
framework. Overall, FSA is an attempt at standardise, formalise, and regulate 
worldwide the practice of risk assessment of marine facilities, especially sea-going 
vessels and offshore platforms. FSA shares with QRA the overall goal of defining the 
levels of risk for a given system thus providing a means for decision making. However, 
QRA is not the same thing as QRA. In fact, it normally makes use of simplified risk 
matrices (see section 2.2.4) instead of a full risk estimation algorithm based on 
consequence calculation. FSA is relatively recent and IMO has not yet provided definite 
guidelines for its application. 
One area where FSA is already being applied is bulk carrier safety. The SEALOC 
project (SEALOC Consortium, 1998) represents and early attempt of implementing an 
FSA at large scale. The case studies included in this EC-funded project cover maritime 
transport of crude oil, LPG and containerised dangerous cargo to and from European 
ports. 
Trbojevic & Carr (2000) (see also Trbojevic & Carr, 2001) advance a further 
proposal for a hazard identification method in ports in the framework of the FSA. This 
scheme and the SEALOC are based on risk matrices. The authors demonstrate a way to 
design a port safety management system based on FSA. 
Skjong (2003) discusses IMO’s viewpoint on FSA. Wang (2001 and 2002) 
demonstrates some procedures used to apply FSA on ships and offshore installations in 
the UK. An interesting approach to FSA in ports is the safety report commissioned by 
the Port of London Authority (Leedham & Riding, 2001). The project was made 
necessary to comply with the UK’s Port Marine Safety Code, but the analysts chose to 
follow almost entirely the FSA method (only cost benefit analysis was discarded). 
 
c. The Risk-based Decision-making Guidelines. The United States Coast Guard has 
recently shown a great interest in risk analysis techniques and accidental risk prevention 
and has developed several solutions and tools for risk analysis and management. The 
scope of such tools is maritime accidents in general, with occasional focus on port 
accidents. The USCG allows for HazMat transportation in several of the methodologies 
presented, but dangerous goods are not necessarily the specific target of USCG’s 
methods. 
The milestone summing up USCG’s work in this field are the Risk-based 
Decision-making Guidelines, a sort of comprehensive handbook collecting the 
information generated by the diverse Marine Safety Offices around the US since 1997 
(USCG Research & Development Center, 2001). As Garrick (1999) stresses, this work 
involved a great effort to adapt the standard techniques of risk analysis to port areas (or, 
in general, maritime and coastal environments), only comparable to the program of 
Formal Safety Assessment introduced by the IMO (see below) and the risk assessment 
for Prince William Sound (where the stranding of the “Exxon Valdez” took place; see 
section 2.1.1.f). The Guidelines are made up of 3 volumes: 
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- Vol. 1 (Risk-based Decision-making Navigator) is an index of the following 
two, and includes a didactic and methodological introduction to the text. 
- Vol. 2 (Introduction to Risk-based Decision Making) describes the 
principles of risk-based decision making and of risk evaluation, 
management and communication. 
- Vol. 3 (Procedures for Assessing Risks) describes the following risk 
assessment tools, which are mainly derived from the standard techniques 
used in the process industry: 
a) Pareto analysis; 
b) Checklists; 
c) Relative ranking and risk indexing; 
d) Preliminary risk analysis (PrRA); 
e) Change analysis; 
f) What-if analysis; 
g) FMEA; 
h) HazOp; 
i) Fault trees (FTA); 
j) Event trees (ETA); 
k) Event and causal factor charting; 
l) Preliminary hazard analysis (PrHA). 
According to the USCG, the approach of the RBDM Guidelines is one that offers 
to the Marine Safety Offices (MSOs) a complete, reliable and easy to use toolbox, so 
that they can carry out their own projects in the field of risk assessment, management 
and evaluation. As said above, the notion of risk on which the Guidelines are based is 
relatively wide and involves not only hazardous cargo, but also unexpected events 
causing harm to people, installations and the environment. 
Several of the techniques presented in the RBDM Guidelines, because of their 
high logical formalisation and intrinsic need to be implemented on well defined systems 
(as the ones of process industry), cannot be adapted to such complex (and fuzzy) 
environments as ports considered in their entirety. Such is the case of HazOp, FMEA 
and fault tree analyses; the examples presented in the text and the practical applications 
by the USCG (Walker, 2000-1; Walker, 2000-2; ABS Group, Inc., 1999; Guthrie, 2000) 
are focused on small systems found in port environments. The report by Walker (2000-
1), for instance, includes an attempt to apply HazOp to small (un)loading hydrocarbon 
terminals for barges. 
Macesker et al. (n.d.) give a complete account of the implementation of the 
Guidelines by the Marine Safety Offices. More papers regarding the Guidelines can be 
found on the journal-newsletter Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security 
Council (n.d.). 
The PrRa (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) is a semi-quantitative technique 
incorporating some features of a standard risk index. It is based on the HazOp process. 
In the framework of this methodology, three levels are defined for accidental 
consequences (minor, moderate, major). Accident severity is measured by economic 
impact. Three frequencies are assigned to accidental scenarios, one for each level of
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Table 2.10. Pattern suggested for frequency scoring in the PrRA 
technique (USCG Research & Development Center, 2001). 
Frequency description Frequency value (yr-1) Score 
Continuous > 102 8 
Very frequent 101 < f < 102 7 
Frequent 100 < f < 101 6 
Occasional 10-1 < f < 100 5 
Probable 10-2 < f < 10-1 4 
Improbable 10-3 < f < 10-2 3 
Rare 10-4 < f < 10-3 2 
Remote 10-5 < f < 10-4 1 
Incredible < 10-5 0 
Table 2.11. Pattern suggested for defining and scoring consequences in the PrRA technique (USCG 
Research & Development Center, 2001). 
Severity Safety impact Environmental impact Economic impact 
Major One or more deaths or permanent disability 
Releases that result in long-term 
disruption of the ecosystem or long-
term exposure to chronic health risks 
≥ US$ 3 × 106 
 
Moderate 
Injury that requires 
hospitalisation or lost work 
days 
Releases that result in short-term 
disruption of the ecosystem 
< US$ 3 × 106 
≥ US$ 10 ×103 
Minor Injury that requires first aid Pollution with minimal acute environmental or public health impact 
< US$ 10 ×103 
≥ US$ 100 
severity; the frequencies are then given a score between 0 and 8. The recommended 
patterns for frequency scoring and the definition of the levels of severity are shown in 
Table 2.10 and Table 2.11. A short account of some practical applications of the PrRA 
is given by Macesker (1999). He describes in particular a PrRA based on several risk 
indices characterising harbour operations. Even though the paper does not provide a 
satisfactory account of the tool, it is evident that the indices are based on an economic 
measure of the risk. 
2.2.4 Risk indices and ranking 
Risk indexing expresses the level of risk associated with a plant or an installation. 
Nevertheless, the scope of an index can be other than establishments, facilities, building 
and machinery. For instance, there are indices describing the inherent hazards of 
substances, reacting systems, etc. 
Risk indexing first appeared as a risk assessment technique in the chemical 
industry. The first important index to be proposed and used was the Dow Chemical 
Company’s Fire and Explosion Index, which was originally published in 1964 and has 
since gone through seven editions. The most recent one was published in 1994 (Dow 
Chemical Company, 1994). The Dow Index was introduced into safety audits for the 
purpose of insurance premium rating (see Velasco, 2005, for an original application of 
this index to the loading/unloading of liquefied gas tankers). The Mond index was 
likewise developed for the insurance industry at the end of the 1970s. Another 
important ranking technique has recently been proposed in the frame of the European 
project ARAMIS (Planas et al., 2004-1; Planas et al., 2004-2). 
Rosenblum & Lapp (1987) give an enthusiastic account of risk indexing practice 
in the chemical industry. As early as 20 years ago, this technique had already gained a 
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Fig. 2.11. Relative sensitivity (responsiveness to actual risk variations) of 
risk indexing vs. QRA methods (Rosenblum & Lapp, 1987). 
widespread acceptance as a cost-effective prioritisation and screening tool for risk 
assessment programmes. From a simplistic point of view, it can be said that risk 
indexing is the same as quantitative risk assessment, in that both approaches are 
intended to describe the level of risk of a certain object/system (be it a plant, a process 
unit or a chemical). Whereas QRA expresses risk in proper units of measurement (e.g. 
expected number of casualties per year) and is a deterministic methodology, risk index 
provides only a ranking (that is a value to be compared with those previously calculated 
for other plants/units) and is essentially based on expert judgement. The ranking is 
generally expressed by way of a dimensionless number, which is normally provided a 
verbal translation by way of verbal assessments such as “unacceptable”, “tolerable”, 
“negligible”, etc. Risk indexing is not a substitute for a detailed risk analysis, but it is 
probably the best assessment tool at the stage of planning, screening and ranking 
priorities. 
A risk index may be more or less complex. Generally, the more complex the 
index, the more aspects related to a plant or installation are taken into account, and the 
“better” the device. An index demonstrates good performance when it has a good 
sensitivity to the presence of safety systems. While using a risk index may be very cost-
effective in comparison with turning to a QRA, a risk indexing algorithm has to be 
sufficiently well structured and representative of the system for which it has been 
devised: using a very simplified method could lead to significant errors in the decision 
making (see Fig. 2.11). 
As it has been briefly stated above, there is another difference between risk 
indexing and QRA. Although risk indexing was first introduced as a means of 
evaluating plant and unit hazards (like QRA), it was soon understood that it was a much 
more adaptable tool. So, in the course of the last decades, a number of indices have been 
published, describing the inherent risk/hazard of chemical substances, runaway reacting 
systems, environmental hazards, etc. 
A section of the RBDM Guidelines (USCG Research & Development 
Center, 2001, vol. 3, chapter 5; see section 2.2.3) describes risk indexing and ranking 
techniques. USCG’s intention is to provide MSOs with practical, not necessarily very 
original and/or elaborate tools. Thus, risk indexing is presented above all as a form of 
prioritisation. Assigning a risk index is describing numerically the risk inherent to an 
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installation, vessel. Risk indices, above all, must make decision making easier. The 
essential features of this risk indexing are the following: 
- Risk indices are conceived based on expert judgement. 
- An index is normally devised by a group of experts instead of a single 
individual. 
- The process of designing an index can involve interviews, brainstorming, 
lists of past accidents, bibliography and on-site inspections. 
The basic steps to take when using a risk index, as described by the RBDM 
Guidelines, are: 
a) Define the scope of the study; 
b) Select a prioritisation (ranking) method; 
c) Gather the data needed to run the tool; 
d) Calculate the indices; 
e) Use the results in the decision making process. 
The crucial step is obviously the selection of the ranking method, which defines 
the structure of the index and its practical effectiveness. According to the USCG, the 
risk analyst can resort to a USCG-designed method,18 or to other existing 
methodologies, such as Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index, or devise a custom risk index. 
Of all, the latter is the most daring option. However, in certain situations, it may 
be the only viable one, because the existing methodologies cannot be adapted to the 
scope of the study. The Guidelines describe the process of defining an effective risk 
index in the following fashion: 
1) Define what the index is supposed to represent: its scope may be limited to 
the frequencies of certain accidental events, or to their consequences, or 
rather to their risk (frequency × consequences). 
2) Identify a list of factors that affect the value of the index, through historical 
analysis, expert judgement and/or by the study of technical literature. 
3) Identify specific situations that require special actions, i.e. those situations 
in which the index shall represent the maximum risk. 
4) Characterise the sensitivity and selectivity for each factor; this, together 
with step 2), is the most critical in designing the index; expert judgement, 
comparison with reference points and statistical assessments must be used 
carefully in order to optimise this step. 
5) Select a ranking algorithm (multiplicative, additive, etc.). 
6) Develop ranking scales for each factor, based on the sensitivity and 
selectivity of the factors. 
7) Select action thresholds for the index. 
                                                 
18  Examples: the Foreign Vessel Targeting Matrix (Fig. 2.15), the Ports and Waterways Safety 
Assessment (The George Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management, 1996), 
the Waterway Evaluation Tool (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center – Economic Analysis 
Division (1997). 
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8) Organise the scoring scales, index calculations and action thresholds into a 
job aid (spreadsheets, checklists, etc.). 
9) Validate the methodology and the job aid through test applications, obtain 
views from experts and test the method through historical data. 
Several risk ranking techniques will be described below. Such schemes can be 
regarded as both PrRAs and ranking methods. Studies are presented in chronological 
order. 
Marí (1991) introduces a risk prioritisation method for fires onboard vessels, 
based on historical analysis. He carries out a correspondence analysis to rank several 
risk factors like number of crew, classification society, etc. 
Rao & Raghavan (1996) introduce the issue of the identification and 
quantification of risk in port environments referring to some tools used by the USCG. 
The authors report analytical formulae to calculate diverse indices. They do not quote 
their source, which is actually a paper by Luckritz & Schneider (1980), who in turn 
makes a reference to Danahy & Gathy (1973), who were the first to introduce the 
Equivalent Safety Concept (ESC; see below). The equations are fairly simple and 
immediate. The aim of the method is estimating the dangerousness of a certain cargo 
entering a port by way of a Transportation Index (TI). TI is a function of the inherent 
hazard of the substance transported and the vessel that transports it: 
VI
CI
=TI  [2.6]
where CI is a Cargo Index and VI is a Vessel Index. The higher CI the more dangerous 
the substance transported; the higher VI, the safer the vessel. Therefore, a high TI 
means serious hazard. 
The equation defining CI depends on whether the hazard of a substance is toxicity 
or flammability. CI depends only on the properties of the transported materials: 
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where: 
- K1 is defined by the following equation 
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- Pv = Reid vapour pressure (Pa). 
- ρv = vapour density (non dimensional; air =1). 
- Tamb = ambient temperature (K). 
- TBP = boiling point (K). 
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- TLV = Threshold Limit Value (ppmv), as established for each by the 
American Conference of Governmental and Hygienists. 
- UFL = upper flammability limit (%vol). 
- LFL = lower flammability limit (%vol). 
- K2 is defined by the following equation 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
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−= − AI
005
2 101.0
TeK  [2.9]
- TAI = auto-ignition temperature (ºC). 
VI measures ship safety. It is a calculation of the relative ability of a vessel to 
contain the cargo and minimize or avoid damage: 
32
1VI
FF
FK=  [2.10]
where: 
- K is a scale function. 
- F1 measures the safety of the ship structure (double bottom, ship stability, 
etc.). 
- F2 is a capacity factor. 
- F3 depends on the vessel’s size , turning factor, etc. 
A fourth index (PSI, Port Safety Index) is finally introduced. PSI describes the 
safety conditions of a port and the vulnerability of its surroundings. Contrary to its 
name, the higher the PSI, the greater risk. Three multiplicative factors define PSI. They 
are related to the physical and topological features of the port (width of waterways, 
corners to be covered, etc.) and the population and logistic/industrial activity density in 
the port and its context: 
21
510PSI STS−=  [2.11]
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where: 
- T = traffic density (tonnes/month). 
- V = unobstructed line of sight (m). 
- W = channel width (m). 
- R = channel radius of turn (m). 
- d = distance from side of channel to solid obstruction (m). 
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- n = number of channel junctions and river crossings. 
- Vk = maximum water current (km/h). 
- θ = angle of current measured from channel axis (rad). 
- P1, P2, P3 = fixed population densities (people/km2) at different distances 
from the waterway. 
- P4 = mobile population density (vehicles/km2). 
- A = public/commercial activities within 3 km (people/km2). 
- C = industrial activities within 3 km (people/km2). 
In order to evaluate whether a ship transporting certain products needs specific 
control measures, TI has to be compared with PSI: if the latter is higher than the former, 
a ship call is considered safe, otherwise special safety measures have to be taken. 
The indices described by Luckritz and Schneider (1980) are related to 
navigational aspects alone. Moreover, the scope is not the port in itself, but the relation 
between vessels transporting hazardous materials and port of calling. The aspects 
allowed for are the properties of the cargo, the vessel characteristics, traffic density, 
geometric features of the waterways, current speed and population density in areas close 
to the harbour. 
In a report by the Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management (The George 
Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management, 1996), prepared 
for the USCG, an interesting list of variables is proposed, on which to base vessel and 
port risk assessment, in the frame of the so-called Ports and Waterways Safety 
Assessment. This list can be used also for risk indexing. A first list, focused on vessels, 
is displayed in Table 2.12. The variables are the same as in the Foreign Vessel 
Targeting Matrix (USCG, 1982), which will be referred to later on. The second list 
(Table 2.13) is about port features. 
In diverse works by Hauke Kite-Powell (Kite-Powell et al., 1997; Kite-Powell et 
al., 1998; Kite-Powell et al., 1999) a Bayesian model is formulated to estimate the 
physical risk of grounding during transits into and out of port as a function of potential 
risk factors. Information on groundings in three US ports between 1981 and 1995 is 
assembled and analysed. Although the data are far from perfect, associations are 
established between grounding risk and changes in factors such as vessel type and size, 
wind speed, and visibility. Authors affirm that groundings of commercial ships account 
for about one third of all commercial maritime accidents. Their intention is to calculate, 
through the cited Bayesian model, the probability of an accident as a function of several 
factors, the relative importance of which must be determined based on historical 
analysis. It is interesting to have a look at the variables that the model uses: 
- Vessel characteristics (draft, beam, manoeuvrability); 
- Topography of the waterway (water depth, channel width, channel length, 
complexity of turns, traffic density); 
- Environmental conditions (wind, visibility, currents, waves); 
- Operators (experience with the vessel, training, local knowledge); 
- Information available to operators (quality of charts, quality of information 
about tide levels and currents, VTS guidance, navigation aids). 
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Table 2.12. List of variables influencing vessel accident risk (The George Washington University – 
Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management, 1996). 
Variable Typical values 
Vessel type Deep draft calling fleet 
Passenger vessels 
Tank vessels 
Container vessels 
Bulk cargo vessels 
Special purpose vessels 
Other 
Shallow draft transit fleet 
Tugs with tows 
Line haul tows 
Fishing vessels 
River/inland passenger vessels 
Other 
Shallow draft local fleet 
Ferries 
Excursion boats 
Gambling boats 
Other 
Vessel age 0 ÷ 15 years 
15 ÷ 25 years 
> 25 years 
Classification society IACS member 
IACS associate member 
Not classed by recognised classification society 
Pilot Pilot on board 
More than one pilot on board 
No pilot on board 
Flag US/Canadian/traditional maritime 
Flag of convenience 
Targeted flag 
Management changes No changes in owner, flag or class society within 3 years 
Change in either owner, flag or class society within 3 years 
Frequent changes or targeted owner/operator 
Vessel violation/incident history No violation or casualties within 3 years 
Minor violation or incidents within 3 years 
Repeated minor or recent major incident or violation 
In order to produce the model, a historical analysis was carried out on five US 
port areas (San Francisco, Houston/Galveston, Tampa, New York, and Boston). 
Grounding data were retrieved from USCG’s databases (MSIS above all). Vessels are 
roughly divided into two groups: “large” (draft > 30 ft) and “small” ones (draft < 30 ft). 
Barge trains are considered apart. The data were used to draw a distribution of 
explanatory factors, but this was not satisfactory. Quantitative weights were not 
assigned to the risk factors while several qualitative remarks arose from historical 
analysis: 
- On vessel type and size: barge trains are more likely to ground than ships; 
large ships are more likely to ground than small ones. 
- Wind speed has apparently no significant effect on grounding probability; 
however historical analysis may be perturbed by port closures (during high 
winds port are closed and no accident is recorded in those periods). 
- Lack of visibility increases grounding risk in a clearer way than high winds. 
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Table 2.13. List of port- and waterway-dependent variables influencing accidental risk (The George 
Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management, 1996). 
Variable Typical values 
Waterway configuration Open (fairway with good water on both sides) 
Restricted (shallow water or hazard near the marked channel) 
Converging (multiple channels that meet or cross) 
Visibility Good 
Adequate 
Restricted/rapidly changing 
Wind Light 
Bothersome 
Difficult (rapidly changing or high) 
Current None 
Low 
Difficult (rapidly changing or high) 
Traffic situation Single vessel 
Simple situation (meeting, overtaking) 
Complex situation (multiple vessels crossing/passing) 
Traffic density No vessel within 0.5 miles 
One vessel within 0.5 miles 
Multiple vessels within 0.5 miles 
The authors express criticism about of the databases used (see also Paper 3 of this 
thesis). 
Another study on waterway risk prioritisation is presented by Nally (1998), who 
ranked 33 waterways of southeast Alaska according to their commercial importance, 
environmental value and navigational difficulties. The ranking is based on a 
questionnaire handed out to 368 experts and/or waterway users, the results of which are 
arithmetically averaged for each of the 33 waterways considered. The methodology 
does not entail mathematical complications. The questionnaire was a concise checklist, 
made up of 26 questions, whose answer was to be chosen among four score levels. The 
waterway ranking is derived from the checklist through a simple additive process. The 
scope of this study, although not focused on open sea navigation, is not strictly centred 
on port settings, but rather on vast and particularly problematic navigable areas, 
characterised by straits, small islands and a broken coastline. 
A common use of the prioritising technique described in the RBDM Guidelines is 
the classification of foreign (i.e. non-US flagged) vessels, for the prioritisation of the 
operations of boarding and inspection. A report focused on vessel inspection 
prioritisation was produced by EQE International, Inc. (2000). This study introduces a 
new form of ranking, slightly different from a previous one, used since the beginning of 
the 1980s (USCG, 1982). The method is consistent with the RBDM Guidelines 
recommendations. 
Thomas (1999) presents diverse risk assessment tools in use at Jacksonville 
harbour (Florida), which are based on the strategies outlined in the Guidelines: 
- Three indices are used to measure the inherent risk of vessels: the Inherent 
Risk Factor (IRF), the Discrepancy Risk Factor (DRF) and the Crew Drill 
Score (CDS). The IRF represents intrinsic vessel features, the DRF is 
calculated based on the regulatory discrepancies established after checking 
the safety conditions of the vessel, while the CDS describes the level of risk 
prevention training and awareness in the crew. 
- The three indices are combined to give the Vessel Risk Factor (VRF): 
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CDS25.0DRF5.0IRF25.0VRF ++=  [2.14]
- In the same way, for each port installation (loading arm, crane, jetty, etc.) a 
specific risk index is defined, as linear combination of three sub-indices 
depending on the characteristics of the installation, based on the results of 
the yearly installation audit and on the responsible personnel. 
- Also, a Port Activity Risk Index is introduced (although in a descriptive 
way), which is a function of the activities carried out in a harbour during a 
certain week. 
The paper by Thomas does not contain detailed insights into the mathematical 
definition of the indices. However, it is interesting to observe what groups of variables 
are considered, and the fact that, at least in the case of the VRF, compliance with the 
safety checklist is weighted twice as much as inherent vessel features and crew 
training/awareness. 
A better description of the Port Activity Risk Index (PARI) is found in 
Hartley (1999). This tool is in fact an adaptation of the one proposed by Thomas (1999), 
and was used in the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach in order to define the level of risk 
associated with the daily activity of the port. The index is based on 16 risk factors that 
were decided in a brainstorming session. Among them, one can find the number of 
vessel movements, weather conditions and the status of navigational aids (buoys, 
lighthouses, etc.). A complete account of the 16 factors is actually missing, but it is 
evident that they are not related to the intrinsic features of the port, since the PARI is 
not intended to be a tool for comparing of ports among them, but for a quick risk 
assessment of the activity of one port during a certain day. A partial list of the risk 
factors is displayed in Table 2.14. 
The author states that the expert board also agreed on a scoring scheme for the 
index; in fact, the PARI is nothing but the sum of all the values assigned to each risk 
factor, according to semi-quantitative relations (some of which are shown in Table 
2.14). Its value can vary between 0 and 160. 
Schoolcraft (2000), in a report prepared for the USCG, describes a ranking of 
navigable areas around the Florida Panhandle (northwest Florida), aimed at planning 
actions in the field of hydrocarbon spill prevention. As found in Nally (1998), the scope 
of the study is neither ports, nor open sea, but coastal waters. The approach is simple 
and based on opinions from a 10-member expert panel. After deciding on a suitable 
division of the area analysed into 12 “districts” for prioritising purposes, six risk factors 
were proposed during a brainstorming session, to each of which a score was assigned 
between 0 and 100. Then, by turning to a software for expert opinion analysis (the 
DECIDE), a weight was established for each factor. Again, the ranking index is 
obtained by summation (= Σ(factor value) × (factor weight)). The list of prioritising 
factors, as well as their relative weight, are shown in Table 2.15. 
A prioritisation of risk factors for ports is presented in several studies by the 
George Washington University for the USCG (Harrald & Merrick, 2000; The George 
Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management, 1998-1; The 
George Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management, 1998-2). 
In this case the ranking is a step prior to a decision making process about the choice of 
vessel traffic systems (VTS) for US ports. The authors introduce six factors influencing 
accidental risk in ports and waterways. Four of them (composition of calling fleet,  
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Table 2.14. Structure of the Port Activity Risk Index: list of some risk factors with their scoring scale 
(Hartley, 1999). 
Risk factor Possible values Weight 
Number of vessels due to arrive 
0 ÷ 5 
6 ÷ 12 
13 ÷ 20 
> 20 
1 
2 
3 
5 
Number of vessels due to depart 
0 ÷ 5 
6 ÷ 12 
13 ÷ 20 
> 20 
1 
2 
3 
5 
Number of vessels due to arrive under deviation 
1 
2 
3 
> 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Cruise ship activity (day of week) 
Other 
Sunday 
Monday and Friday 
Monday and Friday, with additional traffic 
0 
1 
3 
5 
Forecasted wind (knots) 
5 ÷ 10 
11 ÷ 25 
26 ÷ 40 
> 40 
2 
6 
4 
8 
Forecasted visibility (nautical miles) 
2 ÷ 5 
1 ÷ 2 
0.5 ÷ 1 
< 0.5 
2 
4 
6 
8 
Special operations 
No impact on channel/traffic 
Minor impact 
Medium impact 
Significant impact 
1 
3 
5 
8 
Forecasted sea state 
1 ÷ 3 
3 ÷ 5 
5 ÷ 10 
> 10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Vessel radar/tracking equipment status ... 
Conditions of navigational aids (buoys, etc.) ... 
Table 2.15. List of risk factors and their respective weight (Schoolcraft, 2000). 
Risk factor Possible values Weight 
Exposition 
Level of hazardous material/petroleum spill exposure based on 
the combination of the volume of HazMat transiting the area, 
as well as the number of HazMat/petroleum transfer opera-
tions conducted in the given subdivision 
10 
Natural resource sensitivity 
Credible damage potential to natural resources based on the 
hazards associated with the expected spill profile and the ac-
tual presence of sensitive natural resource receptors 
10 
Socio-economic sensitivity 
Credible industry impact potential (tourism, fishing, etc.) 
based on the wide range of consequences associated with the 
expected spill profile 
10 
Known risk factors 
Presence of factors significantly increasing risk (such as navi-
gation difficulties, emergency response inhibitors, unfavour-
able river/sea state conditions, etc.) 
20 
History Frequency of accidents that (could) have caused medium or large spills 30 
Health/safety sensitivity Annual frequency of reported incidents that caused (or could have caused) major or moderate spills 20 
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Fig. 2.12. Risk factors prioritised by Harrald & Merrick (2000). 
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Fig. 2.13. Results of the inquiry on risk factors (Harrald & Merrick, 2000; 
The George Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster 
Management, 1998-2). 
traffic conditions, weather conditions, waterway configuration) influence the probability 
of accidental events, the other two (potential consequences, potential impacts)19 affect 
their aftermath. There is no evidence as to how such variables were chosen or the 
respective sub-factors were selected. The set of risk factors, and of the sub-factors that 
“measure” them, is shown in Fig. 2.12.20 
The approach used to establish the weights for each factor is based on the use of 
expert panels. Its essential steps are the following: 
                                                 
19  The authors refer to the physical effects of the accidents as consequences, and to the economic and 
environmental repercussions as impacts. 
20  A seventh factor, the historical frequency of accidents, which is present in the original version of Fig. 
2.12, is subsequently abandoned by the authors (Harrald and Merrick, 2000). 
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- The best and the worst level were established for each risk factor, according 
to the actual situation in US ports. 
- All possible pairs of risk factors were compared, through the elicitation 
technique and the application of software for expert opinion analysis, thus 
obtaining relative weights for each factor. 
- In the same fashion, the weight attributed to each factor was then subdivided 
into additive sub-weights (one for each measuring variable of Fig. 2.12). 
This procedure was accomplished with two different expert panels; both panels 
were made up of experienced personnel, but one (15 officers, some of whom from the 
USCG) proceeded from various ports, while the other (12 port employees) was entirely 
from Hampton Roads harbour (Virginia). The results of the analysis are shown in Fig. 
2.13 and Fig. 2.14. 
It is clear that the results provided have a strong dependence on the panel that 
helped infer them. This is a partial proof that the method used to identify the weights is 
not completely reliable, even though the authors state that much better outcomes would 
arise from an inquiry based on a larger and more homogeneous panel. The discrepancy 
between the boards is likely to be attributable to the difference in their inherent 
composition: while panel no. 1 proceeded from several ports and organisations, panel 
no. 2 belonged in its entirety to the personnel of one port only. Therefore, it is probable 
that the latter answered the questionnaire referring to the features of that harbour. While  
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Fig. 2.14. Results of the inquiry on the weights to attribute to the variables gauging the risk 
factors (Harrald & Merrick, 2000; The George Washington University – Institute for Crisis and 
Disaster Management, 1998-2). In the case of panel no. 2 (Hampton Roads harbour) the results 
have been normalised so as to sum up 1 and thus be comparable with the ones from panel no. 1. 
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probably we can assert that the result from panel no. 1 is more reliable, the following 
issues have to be stressed: 
- Both panels referred to the composition of the calling fleet as the most 
critical risk factor. Weather conditions are the second most important item. 
- On the deeper level of the variables measuring the risk factors (which are a 
kind of “sub-factors”), disagreement between the two boards was very 
strong. Waterway complexity was the most outstanding issue according to 
panel no. 1 while panel no. 2’s choice was conditions of channels and 
waterway bottoms (dredging, etc.), that was in turn indicated as the second 
most important by panel no. 1. Both boards ascribe the least relative weight 
to the traffic of pleasure and fishing boats. 
- If one averages the results from the two panels (using member numbers as 
weights), the five most significant sub-factors appear to be respectively 
waterway configuration, channel and bottom, presence of visibility 
obstructions, visibility conditions, and traffic density. 
- The amount of hazardous materials transported (both hydrocarbons and 
chemicals: sub-factors 16 and 17) was not considered as a decisive factor. 
This depended –at least partially– on the approach followed, which is 
generic and not specifically focused on HazMat transport. 
An example of foreign vessel prioritisation is reported in Fig. 2.15. This scheme 
identifies five groups of factors that affect the inherent level of risk of a vessel: ship 
owner, flag, classification society, boarding history (with respect to accidents and 
violations), and vessel type.21 To each of these classes, one or more scoring factors are 
assigned. The total sum of the scores expresses a risk level that, in comparison with 
other vessels, makes it possible to prioritise USCG’s ship inspections. 
Cunningham (2001) provides an overview of a risk methodology for marine 
terminals based on risk matrices as a way to rank accident scenarios. 
2.3 Conclusions 
The first remark about the present bibliographic review is that, in general, stronger 
research efforts have been made on maritime oil spills than on any other risk issue 
affecting the maritime environment and port systems. As a result, many more studies 
were found on oil spills than were on other types of accident, even though only the most 
significant among the former have been referenced in this chapter. 
                                                 
21  The variables highlighted by this method are very similar to those proposed by The George 
Washington University – Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management (1996). 
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Fig. 2.15. Example of risk index (Foreign Vessel Targeting Matrix) for the 
prioritisation of inspections to foreign flagged vessels (USCG Research & 
Development Center, 2001; for a complete account see USCG, 1982). 
A reason why specialised literature is more abundant on oil spills than other 
accidents is that the former are distinctively maritime events, while most other accidents 
are not specific to the maritime transport, which results in a relatively scarce amount of 
references devoted to the topic of non-oil-spill accidents in ports. In other words, ports 
are “less popular” with risk analysts than open-sea transportation, land transportation 
and the process industries. In this sense, one of the aims of the present thesis is to 
develop a series of risk assessment tools specifically designed for ports and particularly 
for port-specific operations –such as navigation in port waters and vessel loading and 
unloading–, hitherto somehow overlooked and put on an equal with general 
transportation and process accidents. 
It was not possible to find interesting studies on the economic valuation of the 
consequences of general port accidents. On the other hand, it was possible to scrutinise 
and review a certain amount of references focusing on the costs of maritime oil spills in 
open sea and ports. As the FLEXRIS project demonstrated, port authorities and terminal 
management are interested in forecasting the environmental cost of their activities, in 
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terms of both continued pollution and accidental events. Hopefully the sixth –and last– 
paper included in this thesis (titled “Economic Valuation of Damages Originated by 
Major Accidents in Port Areas”; Ronza et al., 2007-2) is a first step towards the 
definition of a comprehensive method to forecast the costs of HazMat-related accidental 
events in ports, including oil spills. As to oil discharges into water, the scheme proposed 
incorporates the approaches of Etkin and Cohen (Etkin, 2001-2; Cohen, 1986), whereas 
a series of original criteria are discussed that address the valuation of potential damage 
to the environment, equipment and buildings as well as. the loss of profits due to 
activity breakdown and indirect costs. One drawback of this part of the thesis is that the 
method described presently needs a programme of validation, due to the strict 
confidentiality of the data related to the costs of accidents, that no firm or port authority 
is really willing to share… If this validation is carried out, the method of economic 
valuation could receive substantial improvements and –together with the necessary 
complement of quantitative risk analysis– be effectively used to predict the expected 
environmental costs of port terminals for budgeting purposes. 
Overall the bibliographic research carried out has shed light on a wide variety of 
port and maritime risk-related topics. It was therefore of great importance for this thesis. 
A number of papers and studies proved of some relevance to the research, and are cited 
and commented accordingly in the corresponding article enclosed in this document.
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3 Objectives, methodology and main results 
As it is evident from the Introduction and the Bibliographic Survey, ports are a 
relatively propitious setting for major accidents to occur. 
Ports are generally large industrial districts including several standard 
manufacturing and transport activities, among which it is worth mentioning: 
- Chemical plants; 
- Other process plants; 
- Oil and chemical depots; 
- Road transport; 
- Rail transport; 
- Oil and gas pipelines. 
Nevertheless, port areas have peculiar characteristics that make them different 
from other industrial facilities. Among these attributes, the following are the most 
important: 
- Ports are invariably located on the edge of a large body of water. They often 
entertain a difficult relation with it, be this the ocean, an inner sea, a river or 
a lake. 
- As a corollary of the previous point, ports are characterised by the presence 
of ships, boats, carriers, liners, tankers, in other words vessels. Almost all of 
these are propelled by fuel oil or diesel oil and thus represent a potential 
source of HazMat spills. Moreover, a number of vessels visiting ports are 
carriers specifically designed for the transport of huge quantities of 
hazardous materials. Sea going vessels are the world's largest carriers of 
goods, infinitely more sizeable than lorries and even freight trains, and the 
only periods they spend in the vicinities of populated areas are port calls. 
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- Ports are quintessential intermodal clusters. Practically any possible means 
of transport can have (or should have) access to a port, from railcars to 
lorries, from pipeline transport to –obviously– vessels. Even airports are 
sometimes enclosed in ports (as in Genoa, Italy). Goods are handled in 
every possible form, including liquid, liquefied gas and solid bulk, 
containers (which are gaining an increasingly important role in the global 
transport of goods) and several others. 
- Ports are not only located on the edge of a body of water, but also on the 
edge of, or even inside, urban areas. This entails additional problems related 
to land use planning, pollution, rail/road traffic. Standard industrial districts 
may not be affected by these problems, if they are of recent construction and 
thus located away from cities as a consequence of careful planning. Ports, 
however, are normally ancient sites, so cities grew around them rather than 
the contrary. 
- From an administrative point of view, ports can be managed by a variety of 
organisations. A Port Authority normally has jurisdiction on the landward 
side of the shoreline, while navigation affairs are under the competence of a 
Harbourmaster’s Office, but things depend on local laws and customs. Port 
authorities and harbourmaster’s offices are under control of local authorities 
or national governments. 
In spite of all this, the risk assessment of port operations is currently carried out as 
if ports were standard industrial districts. It is true that the bulk of such approaches may 
be correct, but it is urgent to review the problem of ports –as related to the risk 
assessment of major accidents– under a different light, to add some specific information 
that would be unavailable or overlooked if generic risk assessment tools were used. 
The main objectives of this thesis are therefore: 
1. To analyse the specific features of port areas from the point of view of the 
risk entailed by port operations; 
2. To identify and characterise a series of tools to be used in risk assessment of 
port areas, based on existing risk analysis tools but, at the same time, 
allowing for specific port features. 
We will spend here some words on the methodology followed in order to attain 
such objectives, although this is described more extensively in the papers constituting 
this thesis. 
It is important to stress that the order in which the papers are presented is not 
strictly chronological. On the one hand, the editorial process was sometimes shorter for 
papers written well after other ones, which caused the former to be published before the 
latter. However, the order of presentation does not even respect closely the actual 
sequence of preparation of the papers. They are instead presented in a logical sequence 
more suitable to demonstrate the commitment of each paper to fulfil the above 
mentioned objectives.1 
                                                 
1 Thus, for example, Paper 1 was written after Paper 2 (and in fact the latter is based on an accident 
sample a little smaller than the one of Paper 1), but in this thesis is made to precede Paper 2. In fact 
Paper 1 is essentially analytical –a historical analysis of accidents– while Paper 2 is more oriented to tool-
building –simplified event trees–. Paper 3, also because of editorial reasons, was the last to be completed, 
but it is presented before Paper 4 because: a) Paper 4 is more tool-oriented, being focused on adapting 
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An important part of the research developed is based on historical analysis of past 
accidents. Various accident samples have been identified and analysed. Historical 
analysis and/or accident database analysis play a fundamental part in Papers 1, 2, 3 
and 5. 
 
Paper 1 (“A Survey of Accidents in Ports”) is in itself a historical analysis of port 
HazMat accidents, based on an accident sample of 1000+ events, retrieved from the 
accident database MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident Data Service, see Table 2.5). The 
algorithm used to retrieve the relevant accidents, i.e. port accidents, and thus discard 
non-port accidents, is based on that shown in Fig. 1 of Paper 2. The objective of this 
paper is to analyse the fundamental trends of port accidents, allowing for their specific 
characteristics. 
The main findings of Paper 1 are the following: 
- The research shed light on the operations most commonly generating 
accidental situations (Figure 2 of Paper 1). Typical port operations as ship 
(un)loading, ship manoeuvre and ship approach to berths are the most 
important in this sense. 
- The hazardous substances most commonly involved in port accidents are 
crude oil, fuel oil and petrol, i.e. hydrocarbons (Table 1 of Paper 1). 
- A general probability-number of casualties curve was obtained, and three 
specific p-N graphs found as a function of the state of development of the 
country where the accident happened (Figures 3 and 4). 
 
Paper 2 is based on the historical analysis of an accident sample similar to that of 
Paper 1, but the objective of the research is here to study the occurrence of accidental 
sequences in port areas and to statistically describe them by way of simplified event 
trees. “Simplified” means that such trees allow for events such as spill, fire, explosion 
and gas cloud, without entering into further detail as event trees in risk analysis 
normally do. The accidents analysed were examined to scrutinise their accidental 
sequences, i.e. in which order the above mentioned events (fire, explosion, gas cloud) 
occurred. The methodology followed is similar to that of Paper 1, i.e. use of a port 
accident sample extracted from the MHIDAS and analysed in worksheets. 
The main result of Paper 2 is the ranking of accidental sequences, classed 
according to the operations (approach + manoeuvre, loading/unloading, land operations) 
that were being carried out when the accident occurred. Among the several quantitative 
conclusions drawn and listed in Section 4 of the article, it is worth mentioning that the 
percentage of release cases without further consequences is always the highest and one 
out of every 13.0 releases gives way to a fire. Overall the simplified event trees of 
Table 8 and Figure 2 can be used in QRA studies. To do this, it is necessary to know the 
frequency of the initiating event of the accident scenario examined. Table 9 is a list of 
expected frequencies for a number of common port accident scenarios. 
 
––––– 
QRA to port milieus, while at least the first part of Paper 3 is analytical (research of ignition/explosion 
probability data in literature and database analysis); b) The very subject of Paper 3 –ignition/explosion 
probability– is preparatory to the next Paper, being probability data an essential component of QRA. 
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Paper 3 is maybe the most extensive of this thesis. It is focussed on the topic of ignition 
and explosion probabilities of flammable spills. This issue has a special interest in the 
frame of quantitative risk assessment, which is treated in a more general form in 
Paper 4. The specific objectives of the paper are: to review the data available in the 
literature, to determine if two accident databases can be used to estimate the probability 
of ignition and/or explosion of flammable releases, and, if this is the case, to propose 
such probability data based on the database analysis. It is evident that, in order to 
accomplish the second objective, the databases used must be such that minor accidents 
are not underrepresented. If non-ignited spills and non-exploded clouds go unrecorded 
in the process of database compiling, then it is not possible to draw statistical 
conclusions on the relative possibility that a spill, in general, is ignited or a cloud 
generates a blast. So the initial idea of using MHIDAS, as in Paper 1 and 2, was 
discarded. Two databases were identified that, instead, allow for minor spills: the 
HMIRS and the MINMOD. Both are managed by US Federal institutions (the 
Department of Transportation and the US Coast Guard, respectively) and are, or were, 
part of comprehensive and compulsory schemes to inventory all the spills of hazardous 
materials, for land transportation (road, rail) in the case of HMIRS and for maritime 
transportation in the case of MINMOD.  
The findings of Paper 3 are the following: 
- In Tables 1 and 2 two comprehensive and detailed lists of literature data are 
presented of, respectively, ignition and explosion probabilities for use in 
QRA. Collecting the data helped define the major variables that influence 
those probabilities. Some of these regard the accident setting (weather, 
density of ignition sources), other the type of accident and others the 
material properties and the amount of substance spilled. The data collected 
are much more numerous for ignition than explosion. Data are discussed 
showing that, for example, authors tended to overlook the possibility of a 
blast of flammable vapour clouds originated from liquid spills. 
- A general analysis of the databases (Section 4) showed that these are fit to 
be used for the purpose of obtaining ignition and explosion probabilities. 
Two variables were allowed for: material properties (basically the flash 
temperature of the hydrocarbon mixture spilled) and the amount spilled. 
Average ignition rate proved to consistently increase with the amount 
spilled and decrease with the flash point. Explosion rate increases with the 
amount spilled whereas shows a maximum when it is plotted against the 
flash temperature. In any case ignition probability of maritime accidents is 
one order of magnitude lower than for land transportation, due to the 
scarcity of ignition sources around maritime vessels. 
- The use of the two databases allows for considering the two fundamental 
activities of port areas related to the use of hazardous materials and, in 
particular, energetic hydrocarbons/oil products, i.e. land and sea 
transportations. Actually, however, the scope of the article is more 
comprehensive than port areas alone and the results can be applied outside 
port boundaries as well. 
- Figure 10 and Eq. (5) are a quantitative scheme for predicting ignition 
probability for land transportation spills, whereas Figure 11 and Eq. (6) refer 
to maritime spills. The equations were obtained by interpolation and allow 
for both the amount and the type of substance spilled. 
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- As for explosion probabilities, interpolation was not an option, and figures 
are proposed in a different way (Table 5), but always taking into 
consideration both the substance and amount spilled. 
- The methods proposed are summarised in Table 6, which allows for fixed 
plants as well. 
- The schemes put forward are finally contrasted against some literature data. 
 
Paper 4 is the major outcome of a project called FLEXRIS (Nueva metodología 
Flexible para la valoración económica de los Riesgos ambientales) financed by the 
Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and carried out on the premises of the Port 
of Barcelona. The objective of our segment of the project was, in short, to propose a 
QRA-based methodology for HazMat risk assessment of port areas. The scope of the 
project was maritime and (un)loading accidents. Together with Paper 6 this is the least 
“analytical” part of this thesis, being in fact focused on the adaptation of QRA tools to 
port settings. 
The major outcome of the project is a general scheme for performing QRA of port 
operations involving the transit and (un)loading of HazMat tankers.2 The following 
results deserve special highlighting: 
- It is proposed that 4n + 2m scenarios be considered in the QRA, being n the 
number of substances transported and (un)loaded and m the number of 
substances bunkered (fuel oil and/or diesel oil). As to the n substances 
transported/loaded/unloaded, 4 scenarios are allowed for: major and minor 
spill for loading arm failure, major and minor spill for vessel hull failure. 
The two former scenarios are merely punctual, while the two latter are both 
punctual (if the accident happens while the vessel is at berth) and linear (if 
instead a collision or grounding happen while the vessel navigates through 
port waters). Bunkering scenarios are tackled in much the same way, but no 
major spill is allowed for in this case, due to the relatively small amount of 
fuel involved. A definition of “minor” and “major” spill is proposed, based 
on previous results found in the specialised literature. 
- A novel scheme is proposed to estimate the spill frequency of those 
scenarios. This must be employed for all the substances handled in the ports 
and for all the berths used by HazMat vessels. The scheme is summarised in 
Tables 4 and 5 of the paper. 
- Other important issues are defined for port QRAs, as the spilled amounts to 
be expected in case of hull or loading arm failure and the most proper 
software to calculate accident effects as a function of the type of scenario. 
- The method was tested in the Port of Barcelona, Spain, where n = 5 (LNG, 
LPG, petrol, kerosene/diesel oil and fuel oil) and m = 2 (fuel oil and diesel 
oil). The case study yielded coherent results, which are shown in individual 
risk plot of Figure 4 and the p-N curve of Figure 5. 
 
                                                 
2 Although the paper is focussed on oil product and gas tankers, the method can easily be extended to 
other chemical products, including toxic products. 
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Paper 5 develops a proposal briefly introduced in Paper 4. Risk analysts generally seek 
to estimate the overall number of people affected by a set of accident scenarios, i.e. their 
aim is evaluating the expected number of fatalities, injuries and possibly evacuees 
arising from accidents. Standard QRA focuses mainly on calculating the number of fatal 
victims as well as calculating the distances that define the areas to be evacuated. The 
number of injured people is seldom evaluated, as it would involve significant additional 
effort. These estimations are all based on calculating the effects of an accident, and they 
are independent from each other, being each estimation referred to a specific 
vulnerability criterion and thus requiring a certain amount of calculation. The objective 
of the research behind this paper was to find a shortcut allowing estimating the number 
of injured people based on the number of fatalities of an accident. The shortcut would 
permit to obtain complete vulnerability results in the frame of a QRA without recurring 
to complicate vulnerability calculations for injured people. Moreover, it can be used in 
the aftermath of HazMat accidents to get an idea of how many people need to be 
hospitalised based on the known or expected number of deaths.3 
The methodology followed to find such shortcut was, once again, the analysis of 
past accidents and the database chosen the MHIDAS. Note that this database is suitable 
for this task, while it was definitely not for seeking ignition/explosion probabilities. In 
fact, the accidents considered in the statistical sample were only those that caused one 
or more fatality and are assigned a certain number of injured people in the database 
(sometimes this field is left blank). This means that data bias is minimised, as fatal 
accidents are normally reported and included in the database, forming a homogeneous 
and reliable accident sample. In this case the sample, of 975 events, was analysed by 
way of statistical tools more refined than in the previous works: 
- PCA (principal component analysis) was used to establish which variables 
have the greatest influence on NK/NI, ratio between the number of fatalities 
and the number of injured people. 
- Another technique, i.e. data clustering, was used with the same aim. 
- The outcome of the above mentioned analyses was that the only aspect 
worth allowing for among a set of accident variables, including location, 
accident origin –process, warehouse, etc.– and accident type, was the 
accident type (explosion, fire or toxic gas cloud). 
- Overall, however, the first conclusion drawn from the multivariate analyses 
was that there is no reason to correlate the data with a generalised linear 
model or other regressions, since NK/NI correlates very poorly with other 
variables other than the accident type. Attempts to define a linear model 
based on 10-12 variables gave discouraging results. 
- On the basis of these considerations, it was decided to analyse the 
percentiles of the data distribution. By observing the 97.5% percentile, it 
was possible to assert that in an industrial accident with less than 25 deaths, 
it is highly unlikely that the number of injured people exceeds 150. The 
major result of the research is Eqs. (2-5), obtained by interpolating the 
average number of injured people for a series of intervals of the variable NK, 
                                                 
3 The scope of this paper is not only port accidents but HazMat accidents at large. the research was 
undertaken in the wake of the FLEXRIS project, when the need of calculating the expected number of 
injured people for a high number of scenarios made it apparent that some kind of reasonable shortcut 
would have been very useful. 
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separately for the three above mentioned accident types. The equations 
represent a shortcut to evaluate rapidly the number of injured people once 
the accident type and the number of fatal victims is known. On average, the 
ratio NI/NK is highest for gas clouds and lowest for fires, although in the 
case of gas clouds NI shows a low increase with NK if compared to fires and 
explosions. 
 
Finally, the objective of Paper 6 was to come up with a scheme to evaluate, from an 
economic point of view, the damage caused by HazMat accidents in port areas. The 
scheme can be applied after an accident has happened or a priori. In this second case, 
the scheme can be used for example as a tool to complete the results of a QRA by 
adding an economic estimation of the damage expected on certain premises on top of 
the classic evaluation of the expected individual and societal risk. 
The methodology followed to design the scheme was to “dissect” the various 
components of the economic damage of accidents and subsequently analyse each of 
them establishing a shortcut method of evaluation based on previous work and 
literature. 
The major outcomes of the paper are the following: 
- A classification of damages caused by accidents is proposed, as follows: 
• Damage to human life and health; 
• Environmental damage; 
• Material damage; 
• Indirect costs (loss of profits). 
- The damage to human life and health is estimated by way of a summation of 
the costs due to, respectively, fatal victims, injured and evacuees. The 
number of injured people can be estimated based on the number of fatal 
victims thanks to the equations put forth in Paper 4. The cost of an 
individual fatal victim is estimated on the basis of Spanish legislation on 
compensation for traffic accidents. The cost of an injured person has been 
estimated with a weighted average of the expected costs of, respectively, 
light, serious and very serious injuries. The cost of the evacuees is 
calculated on the basis of the cost of the number of people and the number 
of days of evacuation. 
- Environmental damage is split up in: valuable animals (productive animals 
and endangered wildlife) lost due to the accident; cost of water cleaning 
after spills, which is made to depend basically on the amount of substance 
spilled; and the cost of soil remediation. 
- Material damage is estimated by way of unitary costs of the equipment and 
structures lost in the accident, which in turn can be obtained from simplified 
equations found in literature. However, as to ships, it is proposed that an ad 
hoc treatment be followed for each accident since it is almost impossible to 
evaluate the economic damage to ships due to the many factors that affect it 
(ship age, type, flag, damage received, etc.). 
- Indirect costs/loss of profits are divided into breakdown costs, due to the 
necessity to stop activities and/or shut down the terminal, the cost of lost 
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wages (i.e. wages paid to workers unable to work due to the shut-down), 
other indirect costs (like loss of image, administrative costs, reduced 
productivity of workers on light duty, etc.). Breakdown cost are determined 
on the base of the length of mooring line affected by shut-down to be 
multiplied by the average daily income of the terminal per meter of mooring 
line. Other indirect costs are instead evaluated based on direct costs. Among 
these losses, there are morale effects on coworkers, personnel allocated to 
investigating the accident, recruitment and training costs for replacement 
workers, reduced quality of recruitment pool, reduced productivity of 
injured workers on light duty, overhead cost of spare capacity maintained in 
order to absorb the cost of accidents, rise in insurance premiums, 
communication costs, administrative costs, prevention initiatives, etc. A 
ratio of 1:1 between direct and indirect cost is proposed based on previous 
literature. 
- A case study is presented in an Appendix, in which it is shown that a diesel 
pool fire due to a loading arm failure should cause a damage of about 
1 × 106 € (2005). 
 
All in all, while Papers 1 and 2 are quite descriptive, Papers 3, 4, 5 and 6 may well 
represent, as a whole, a complete, QRA-based risk assessment methodology for port 
settings: the risk analyst could follow the QRA scheme, described in Paper 4, using the 
ignition and explosion probability data proposed in Paper 3; in order to shorten 
vulnerability calculations, he or she could use the shortcut described in Paper 5; finally, 
he or she can obtain an economic estimation of the damage expected. 
  
4 Conclusions 
Detailed conclusions for the individual segments of the thesis can be found in the 
published papers, a copy of which is attached to this document. However, in this 
chapter, we relate the major outcomes of the whole of the research. The reader should 
refer to the individual papers for more details. 
1. Historical analysis demonstrated the distribution of accidents in ports as a 
function of several parameters such as the type of accident (70% involve a 
loss of containment, 30% involve fire, 24% involve explosion, 5% involve 
gas clouds) and the operation carried out when the accident occurred (the 
most important being loading/unloading, ship manoeuvre and approach, in 
this order). The substances most commonly involved in the accidents were, 
not surprisingly, crude oil and its derivatives, ammonia being the first 
chemical in the list. Specific p-N curves for port accidents are another result 
of the historical analysis. 
2. Historical analysis of a large sample of port accidents led to the definition of 
a series of simplified event trees for port accidents. On one hand this 
allowed to describe the most common accident sequences in port settings, as 
a function of the activity/operation carried out when the accident occurred 
(namely ship approach/manoeuvre, ship (un)loading, land operations). 
Moreover, the event trees proposed can be used in quantitative risk 
assessment of port accidents. 
3. Given that the majority of port HazMat spills involve flammable 
hydrocarbons and/or oil derivatives and have, as a possible ultimate 
consequence, a fire and/or explosion, the probability of ignition and blast 
wave formation of hydrocarbon spills was further researched, by way of two 
US federal spill databases. Extensive bibliographical analysis of probability 
data used in HazMat QRA showed that figures put forth by a variety of 
authors during the last decades are seldom in agreement and depend on an 
array of variables such as material properties, amount spilled, and accident 
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type. The probabilities collected were put in their original context, which 
made it possible to weigh them against each other. It was specified whether 
ignition probabilities were referred to immediate rather than delayed 
ignition. The spill databases HMIRS and MINMOD were investigated in 
order to propose alternative probability data for hazardous materials spills 
that occur during land and sea transport, respectively. A selection of 
significant commercial hydrocarbons were taken into account, which 
brought to examine more than 12,000 spills for HMIRS and more than 
34,000 for MINMOD. Database analysis enabled to explain how ignition 
and explosion probability vary as a function of the amount and the 
substance spilled. The analysis was surprisingly consistent and yielded 
coherent results due to the great amount of accident records provided by the 
two databases analysed. Ignition probability was found to increase with the 
amount spilled and to decrease with the flash temperature of the mixture 
spilled. Explosion probability grows with the amount spilled as well, 
whereas its trend as a function of flash temperature presents a peak 
corresponding to crude oil and kerosene. Significant differences were found 
between land and sea transport. Accordingly, a quantitative scheme, which 
includes the possibility of extending the findings of the analysis to fixed 
plants, was proposed to predict ignition and explosion probability of 
hydrocarbon spills. The fact that specific ignition/explosion probabilities are 
put forth for sea transportation spills is particularly important, due to the 
near absence of such data for these scenarios in the literature. The study 
proved that the data systems analysed, apart from being broad, appear to be 
particularly reliable and unbiased. 
4. The pilot study carried out for the Port of Barcelona, allowed to refine some 
aspects of the application of quantitative risk assessment of bulk 
hydrocarbon logistics in ports. Initiating events were identified for four 
types of scenario (major/minor loading arm failure and major/minor tanker 
hull failure). Frequencies were estimated for all the initiating events through 
an extensive bibliographical survey. A set of equations was consequently 
proposed to estimate the global frequency for every scenario type. It was 
found that punctual and linear events have an individual risk of the same 
order of magnitude, but in general punctual events have a higher societal 
risk, because their effects can have a significant impact ashore, where the 
population density is higher. The critical step regarding both sensitivity and 
uncertainty of the method was identified to be frequency estimation. The 
case study provided results that are consistent with classic quantitative risk 
analyses as applied to chemical plants and storage areas. An aspect that was 
addressed is how to take into account the presence of both single- and 
double-hulled liquid tankers in port waters. 
5. Paper 5 (“Consequences of Major Accidents: Assessing the Number of 
Injured People”) is not specifically based on port settings, but is of general 
interest. It develops some aspects previously introduced in Paper 4. A 
criterion to evaluate NI (number of injured people in an accident) as a 
function of NK (number of fatal victims) was identified based on historical 
analysis. The sample used in this survey followed a trend of NI increasing 
with NK. However, due to the degree of data dispersion, a conventional 
statistical correlation approach proved to be unreliable. Two multivariate 
analyses were consequently used to study the data: principal component 
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analysis and clustering. These procedures showed that the variables 
describing the accident type have the most influence on the ratio of injured 
people to fatalities. Both principal component analysis and clustering 
revealed a pattern according to which the highest values of NI/NK pertain to 
gas cloud accidents, followed by fires and then explosions. This was 
confirmed by plotting the mean NI data against proper ranges of NK for the 
three different accident types. Finally, a set of correlations were proposed 
that estimate the mean number of injured people as a function of NI. These 
equations can be helpful in the case of fatal accidents involving hazardous 
materials, since they give an idea of the number of people that are expected 
to be hospitalised after an accident with fatalities occurs. On the other hand, 
using these criteria a priori is a way of saving time in estimating the number 
of injured people without resorting to effects calculations and probit 
techniques. 
6. The last paper of the thesis (“Economic valuation of damages originated by 
major accidents in port areas”) is focused on the assessment of the cost of 
the diverse losses originated by a major accident in a port. The difficult and 
controversial issue of attributing a value to human life was addressed. A set 
of values was proposed for compensations due to death, injuries or 
evacuation of people. As for the damages to the environment, three aspects 
were essentially considered: water, soil and fauna. Economic values were 
proposed for the decontamination of water, as a function of the amount of 
spilled material, soil remediation and losses in fauna. Damage to equipment 
was estimated by applying standard values per unit surface area or per lineal 
metre. Finally, a set of equations was described that can be applied to assess 
the loss of profits due to the ceasing of activities. By applying the method 
devised, it is possible to allow for all of the expectable costs of a port 
accident. 
Overall, the thesis has attained its objectives –described in Chapter 3 – Objectives 
and Methodology–. First, thanks to historical analysis, an original overview was 
provided of several specific risk aspects of ports. Secondly, the outcomes of such 
overview and the statistical analysis of past accidents are used for the proposal of 
methodologies specific to port areas and/or maritime transport (Papers 2 and 3) or even 
general methodologies (Paper 5). Lastly, the knowledge gathered through the reading of 
specialised literature and the collaboration with the Port of Barcelona led to formulating 
two original tools, i.e. a general methodology for bulk hydrocarbon liquid transport in 
ports (Paper 4) and a scheme for the economic valuation of damage caused by major 
accidents in ports (Paper 6). 

